

Citizenship and Indigeneity

Conflicts in Nigeria



Citizenship and Indigeneity Conflicts in Nigeria



Centre for Democracy and Development



Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution



Open Society Initiative for West Africa

November 2012

Table of Contents

I. Defining Indigene and Settlers

Chapter One: Introduction by Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim and Idayat Hassan----6

Chapter Two: Citizenship and Exclusion in Africa: Indigeneity in Question – Key note address by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja----20

Chapter Three: Indigeneity and Belonging in Nigeria from the Pre-Colonial times to 1960 by Prof. Armstrong Adejo----40

Chapter Four: Indigeneity and the Bifurcation of Citizenship Rights in Nigeria: The Search for a Political Solution by Jibrin Ibrahim----64

II. Indigenes and Settlers in Nigeria: Case Studies

Chapter Five: Zangon Kataf by Toure Kazah Toure----82

Chapter Six: Aguleri/Umuleri by Okey Ibeanu and Peter Mbah----115

Chapter Seven: Kano by Ibrahim Muazzam----132

III. Indigenes and Settlers on the Plateau

Chapter Eight: Historical Insights on Plateau Indigenes and the Struggle for Emancipation by Prof Monday Mangwat----146

Chapter Nine: The Exclusion of minority groups in the Plateau: Uprooting Citizenship Rights by Dr. Audu Gambo----159

Chapter Ten: The Exclusion of Minority Groups in the Plateau – a Hausa Fulani Perspective by Baba Bala Muhammed----175

Chapter Eleven: Reflections on Citizenship -Related Crises in Jos: Finding the Road-
Map for Peace by Dr. Joseph Golwa----185

Chapter Twelve: Identity Crisis and the Politics of Conflict Management in Jos, Nigeria by
Joseph Ochogwu and Geraldine Yop-Kim----- 214

Workshop Report---- 227

Abuja Declaration----- 230

Acknowledgements

On behalf of the Centre for Democracy and Development, CDD and our partners the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, IPCR and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa, OSIWA, I would like to acknowledge and appreciate the contributions of partners in the dialogues and projects that went into the making of this book.

First, I acknowledge the contribution of the individuals and organisations that made up our informal but vibrant coalition for peace in Jos. The opinions, questions and emotions expressed in this forum went a long way in shaping our thoughts and projects. Our National Workshop on Citizenship and Indigeneity Conflicts in Nigeria and this book stemmed directly from these conversations. Also, we acknowledge that the participation of this group of individuals and organisations in the April 2010 Civil Society Coalition Mission to Jos has availed all of us firsthand information about the situation in Jos which has enriched our collective and also individual projects. It is my hope that the publication of this book would inspire and strengthen our work towards improved citizenship in Nigeria.

I wish also to thank the Office of the National Security Adviser, especially General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau and his staff for the series of discussion he hosted with us about the security situation in Jos. We are appreciative of this collaboration and hope that the information contained in this volume would assist in the analysis of the crisis of citizenship not only in Jos which has become the hottest flashpoint, but elsewhere in Nigeria.

We thank also the authors whose works are contained in this volume for writing and participating in the National Workshop. We thank especially Professor Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja whose keynote address inspired and enriched the Workshop. We thank all other participants and the media for participating in this workshop.

I acknowledge the partnership and support received from our colleagues at OSIWA especially from Dayo Olaide and Peter Ocheikwu; and from Dr. Joseph Golwa and Joseph Ochogwu of the IPCR; without their collaboration, this project could not have been a success. Lastly I thank my

staff: Nengak Daniel Gondyi, Idayat Hassan, Uyoyoghene Ugherughe and Terfa Hemen who worked tirelessly to get this book published and accessible to the general public.

Signed

Jibrin Ibrahim, Ph.D
Director, CDD Abuja,
November 2012

Chapter One

Introduction

Jibrin Ibrahim and Idayat Hassan

Rather than pursuing the common interests of humanity – equality of rights, the satisfaction of material needs, universal respect for the dignity of an individual – their [our] efforts are directed mainly at asserting the rights of their [our] own group (James Littleton, 1991 as quoted in Engin and Patricia, 1999).

Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has celebrated the event, every 29th day of May. Frankly, the regular transfer of power from civilian to civilian government; as against the past experiences of uncultured interventions of the military in politics, which led to the demise of the First, Second and aborted Third Republics, is worth celebrating. This is because the survival of the democratic system offers opportunities for dialogue and open conversations on the reconstitution of the Nigerian State in the context of the promotion of human rights, constitutionalism, regular elections and the return of a development agenda for the country. However, as much as we rejoice over the enduring return of civil rule, it is very important to reflect on and examine the patterns, dimensions and dynamics of the increasingly troublesome issue of citizenship and identity-related conflict in the country.

Studies on Nigeria's citizenship and the problem of indigeneity have been intrinsically linked to the colonial experience of the country, as well as the nature and character of the post-colonial

state. Drawing from the works of Ekeh (1983), Tukur (1990), Otite (1992), Mustapha (1992), Mamdani (2007), amongst others, there is a theoretical understanding that the divide and rule policy of the colonial state created a series of ethno-religious platforms among the formally unified social groups and this continues to gain prominence and play a significant role in the current socio-political violence that characterizes the post-colonial state. Kenneth (1956) and Mustapha (1992) reveal the existence of inter-communal co-operation and multiple identities in Rogo, a village near Kano, as well as Kano itself, and between the Igbo and Ijaw in the Niger Delta, respectively, during the pre-colonial times. In many cases, there was culture contact, and ethnocentrism was not associated with ethnicity (Nnoli, 1998). However, with the advent of colonialism, social and political structures of traditional societies were reorganized and restructured, featuring what Osaghae (2006) referred to as “ethnic profiling,” or institutional segregation (Mamdani, 1996), which later paved the way for transformation and politicization of existing culture to suit politico-economic agenda of the colonial authority.

The relationship between the citizenship and indigeneity crisis, the failure of the emerging post-colonial state to adequately maintain social order and promote nation-building and institutionalize the principles of social equality amongst existing social groups have also been advanced. At the dawn of independence in 1960, the emerging petty bourgeoisie; fractioned and factionalised along ethnic groupings, while they were confronted with the problem of how to effectively manage the complex system of citizenship, nativity and indigeneity, inherited from the colonial authority. As independence brought to light an era where universalization of citizenship became the norm following the collapse of colonial native enclaves and colonial urban centres, the concept of “indigene” was invented by the petty bourgeoisie as hybrid persona combining the attributes of the citizen and those of colonized native (Ibeanu, 2012). The implication of the ostensible remedial approach to solving citizenship/native question is that Nigerians became both individual citizens and communal natives (Ibid). They consequently became inadvertently separated within the sphere of basic universal individual political rights and freedoms, and the indigenous-community-oriented rights provided for in the 1999 constitution (as amended).

Related to the debate about the failure of post-independent political elites to confront the vexing question of citizenship and indigeneity, Ugo (2004) noted that the post-colonial political elites have eschewed corruption as a way of life, and subsequently incapacitated states thereby rendering the state an ineffective organ to guarantee security and other goals of social order. This was a process of vitiating efforts to improve human well-being and development at the personal and national levels. While the nation-building project was going on along with the rhetoric of national unity, old patterns of exclusion and domination continued and new ones were invented. Consequently, the reality of nation-building often saw some ethnic groups consolidating their grip on state institutions to the exclusion of others (Alubo, 2004) and thus deepened the crisis of uneven development. As the rivalry continues to wax stronger, the hitherto bottled emotions exploded. Apparently, rather than the country's diversity to offer opportunity for exchange of ideas, innovation and creativity to tackle societal challenges, ethnic, religious, gender, regional and other identities, have become major challenges in the polity, because these are somehow associated with the perceptions of discriminations and the prevailing limitations of inclusive citizenship (Momoh, 2001).

The scholars we have evoked have lucidly and elaborately provided explanations for Nigeria's predicament on this matter. They have proffered policy and legal recommendations to tackle the intricate web of citizenship crises facing the country. They have also made us understand that more reflections are necessary to understand the complexity of the citizenship contestation since the inception of the current phase of democracy. Since the country marked the beginning of the Fourth Republic, it has witnessed a plethora of citizenship and identity-based conflicts. From Ife/Modakeke, Aguleri/Umuleri, Tiv/Jukun, Hausa/Kataf to the multifaceted Jos Crises, and finally, the pockets of citizenship-related claims and rivalries in Nassarawa State. All of them pose the question of who is an indigene and who is a settler? It is a huge problem that has assumed alarming proportions in the country. The settlers who have inhabited an area for centuries cannot lay claim to rights and entitlements simply because s/he does not share a common ancestry with the original natives couched as indigenes. At one end, the indigenous groups define themselves as the only social group that should enjoy rights and privileges, as contained in the 1999 Constitution (as amended), and on the other, the settlers are simply deprived of their own rights. This has led to the problem of exclusion politically, socially and

economically. It is also interesting that there are many examples of indigenous communities fighting each other in some states. Populations rising against another within the State. In these cases, narratives about discrimination recur further complexifying the situation.

It is worthy to note that constitutional provisions regarding the federal character principle intended to give ethnic groups in the country a sense of belonging by providing geo-political spread in political appointments has compounded the issue of citizenship rights. According to section 147(3) of the constitution: “any appointment under sub-section (2) of this section by the President shall be in conformity with the provisions of section 14(3) of this Constitution, provided that in giving effect to the provisions aforesaid the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene of such State. Nonetheless, as observed by Ibrahim (2001), a cursory look at the provisions of the 1999 constitution on citizenship rights and fundamental human rights as embodied in chapter 3 and 4 of the constitution did not suggest an overshadowing of national citizenship by cultural identity and, neither is the Federal Character principle in Chapter 2, Section 14 (3) without the lofty aim of promoting national integration. The elusiveness of national citizenship as experienced for more than a decade is however rooted in the praxis of the constitutional prescriptions.

In actual fact, the constitution in its third schedule states that the Federal Character Commission shall work out an equitable formula for the distribution of positions in the public service, parastatals and other government institutions, economic, media, political positions¹. As Mamdani (2005) rightly stated, ‘once the law makes cultural identity the basis for political identity, it inevitably turns ethnicity into a political identity’. This provides a convenient platform for ambitious politicians and elites to hang on to birth and descent criteria to determine citizenship. The lacuna in the Constitution as it relates to the construct of citizenship and indigeneity rights is a major driver of the persistent inter-cine crises in the country. To bolster their political might, politicians often mobilize citizens on the basis of ethnicity and religion, and transform the State

¹ Third schedule sections 8(a)(b) of the 1999 constitution as amended. promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the principles of proportional sharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels of government; work out an equitable formula subject to the approval of the National Assembly for the distribution of all cadres of posts in the public service of the Federation and of the States, the armed forces of the Federation, the Nigeria Police Force and other government security agencies, government owned companies and parastatals of the states;

to the means of promoting improved economic livelihoods of particular social groups, thus creating horizontal inequalities amongst existing groups. Implicitly, rather than creating a regime of equal rights, the State operates on a process of normalization which creates distinctions between the domain of citizenship and rights. Consequent upon the discriminatory regime, some settlers; based on their prolonged stay and contribution to the growth of their host community become assertive of their rights through the creation of several ethnic militias to fight for their survival in the new place they call home.

Another issue worth investigating on the question of citizenship in Nigeria is the lack of equality in terms of voice amongst citizens; the rich and the poor. The growing impunity amongst the rich and powerful has consistently thwarted the move to address the lingering challenges of citizenship as the domain of citizenship is unduly reserved for the privileged few. The big-man (*oga*) syndrome has been consistent with the growth of impunity, arbitrariness and high-handedness by public officers as they deal with citizens and by the rich as they deal with the poor. Citizenship is meaningless if there is not an equality of voice in the public sphere². Also, linking citizenship with gender, poverty and good governance, is apt because the dominant discourse has been dominated by *indigeneship*. For example, under the Nigerian Constitution, Nigerian women are precluded from conferring citizenship on their foreign spouses; excluding non-Nigerian men married to Nigerian women of citizenship rights via marriage. The pernicious effect of this tendency for *indigeneship* looms large in discussing the citizenship question such that these other issues get relegated. Yet, it is precisely the failure of the country to address some of these other questions that continues to fuel the embers of identity-based conflicts in Nigeria.

The urgency of tackling the issues of citizenship in Nigeria is of immense importance particularly within the context of discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, indigene-settler dichotomy and other factors inhibiting citizenship rights in the country. It is within this context that the National Workshop on Citizenship and Indigeneity Conflicts in Nigeria was convened by the Centre for Democracy & Development (CDD) and the Institute of Peace & Conflict Resolution (IPCR), with support from Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), from February 8th-9th 2011 which brought together experts in the academia and civil society

² See Ibeanu (2012)

organizations to share insights and comparative lessons on the problematic of indigeneity based tensions and conflicts in the most populous country in Africa. The chapters in this book emanate from the papers presented during the conference. The authors in this book seek to provide understanding to the nature and causes of violent conflicts.

In chapter two of this book, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Professor of African Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in the Keynote titled, '*Citizenship and Exclusion in Africa: Indigeneity in Question,*' noted that the ongoing turmoil in Côte d'Ivoire, the Great Lakes Region, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere on this continent can be traced to the question of citizenship and exclusion, as segments of the national population feel excluded from the enjoyment of their full citizenship rights. Since these rights include access to power and those resources needed to ensure decent livelihood and a better future for the youth, the question of citizenship is central to the crisis of the state in postcolonial Africa.

In chapter three of this book, Armstrong Adejo espouses in his paper, "*Indigeneity and Belonging in Nigeria: From Pre-colonial times to 1960,*" that though colonial experience and multi-ethnic nature of Nigerian State have been excused in some literature for the problems of national integration and indigeneity crisis, however, these are part of the broader misconceptions that hinder understanding of the present realities. To him, there exist multi-ethnic states that have coped with their diversity and translated differences to forging ahead positively without being tied down by incessant contestation and struggle over access to rights and citizenship. Disunity amongst political elites, the experience in the State regarding the horrendous relationship between the State and ethnic groups, and continuous problematic of indigeneity are functions of the State aggressive accumulation of power and resources; deprivation of communities of their autonomy and power hierarchies, and structural change in the economy which exposed a reasonable percentage of people to several shocks in the development problem. Also noted as a contributory factor to the heightened inter-communal division is the importance that the State attached to indigeneity. In his analysis of pre-colonial experience of different cultural units in Nigeria, he debunked the fact that existence of diverse cultural groups implies their isolation and lack of reasonable interaction. Bilingualism and the culture of accommodating foreigners helped to promote integration and unity. He however raised fundamental question about why such could

not be harnessed for building cultural bridges and encouraging national unity in the post colonial era. He concluded that the seemingly intractable identity-based crisis that befell the nation can be addressed by deepening knowledge and understanding of the various cultural groups and people, promotion of the spirit of tolerance and developing a philosophy that can sustain and nurture the idea of national unity.

Ibrahim argues in chapter four that the Nigerian federal process is beginning to impose a hierarchy of rights on citizens, defined either as indigenes or as settlers. Explaining further, he affirmed that policies designed to improve unity in diversity such as the creation of states and local governments have had a boomerang effect further exacerbating division in the country. To him, a cursory look at the provisions on citizenship and fundamental human rights in the 1999 Constitution of the country did not suggest unequal access to rights and privileges by citizens. Indeed, the continuous contestation over citizenship resulted from the implementation of the federal character principle embedded in Chapter 2, Section 14, of Nigeria's constitution. He noted the way in which the "indigeneity" clause in the Constitution has tended to legitimize discriminatory practices against Nigerians who reside within the state, which is "not their own". He warned that as long as the indigeneship/settler claim continues, Nigeria's democratic project would be negatively affected thus posing a potential danger to the country's nascent democracy. He opined that to address the seemingly intractable indigene/settler woes, the concept of indigene should be deleted from the Constitution of Nigeria and all should benefit equally from citizenship rights irrespective of their origins.

Kazah-Toure in chapter five challenges the dominant perspective on identity crisis in Zango-Kataf by interpreting the conflict as product of more complex processes. Looking at the dynamics of conflicts between the minority Hausa Muslim and other ethnic communities including the Bajju, Atyap, Ikulu, amongst others, Toure noted that the central issues in the dynamics are aristocratic oppression, political exclusion and economic marginalization. In the chapter, he comprehensively and exhaustively captured pre-colonial relations and conflicts that existed between Zazzau (Zaria) emirate and other ethnic communities. He stressed that as in the case of pre-colonial subjugation, the conflicts that arose alongside external slave raiding in the pre-colonial communities was not as a result of non-payment of tributes because ethnic

communities were not subject of the emirates. Rather, the central driver to the conflict and subsequent slave raiding is the apparent difference of levels of development of social-political system of the protagonists. He further examined how colonial incursion helped the people of Zazzau emirate to lord it over the indigenous communities in Zango-Kataf.

According to Toure, the introduction of the new district system by the colonialists in 1907 led to the imposition of the rulers from the Hausa Emirate of Zazzau upon other ethnic communities, widening the economic gap and further exacerbating an already growing tension. More horrendous, according to him, is the forced labour and huge taxation that ethnic communities were subjected to leading to Atyap and Bajju anti-colonial revolts in the 1920 to 1942, Atyap revolt of May 1946, ethno-religious agitation and politics in the 1950s; that lay the foundation for the identity politics that have been played out since the 1970s. These crystalised into questions about “rights, power relations, participation, definition of citizenship, local loyalties, control and distribution of resources as well as social provisioning, social equality and the democratic question in the local context”.

In chapter six, Okechukwu Ibeanu and Peter Mbah break with existing scholarship by going beyond traditional dichotomies in academic approaches towards understanding conflicts in Nigeria. The focus in this Chapter is the conflict between the ‘ethnically homogenous’ tribes, the *Aguleri* and the *Umuleri* in Anambra state. Ibeanu and Mbah argue that in the cultural situation where conflicts occur within the same ethnic lines, it is difficult to apply the traditional ‘indigene’/‘settler’ dichotomy to explain the cause and continuation of violence. Similarly, the authors take the view that the widely differing ‘innate’ and ‘constructionist’ schema employed in the understanding of identity formation are inadequate for the understanding of conflict generation. For Ibeanu and Mbah, ethnic or sub-ethnic identity does not have a simple natural basis, and it is not socially constructed *ex nihilo*. The authors argue that the ‘innate’ and ‘constructionist’ accounts are aspects of a historical development which is responsible for identity formation. The identifying features of ethnic groups are formed through a protracted period of arbitration and contestation by social actors who determine what is to be considered ‘primordial’ to the ethnic group and what/who are excluded. The determination, dissemination and sedimentation of selected characteristics of ethnic identity over long historical periods are

referred to as *primordialisation*. These socio-cultural processes of construction and primordialisation work in conjunction with *propagation* and *intensification* of selected common characteristics across many generations in historical time to form stable ethnic identities. Mbah and Ibeanu suggest that these processes are inherently conflictual since they are based on the policies of exclusion which can materially disadvantage a particular ethnic or sub-ethnic group.

Ibeanu and Mbah argue that despite the fact that the four-stage socio-cultural processes of formation of ethnic identity mentioned above are inherently conflict-laden, they are not sufficient to cause conflicts. Their main argument is that it is the conjunction of *material considerations* and the conflict-laden socio-cultural processes of identity formation that generate conflicts. Specifically, the intersection of the processes of construction, primordialisation, propagation and intensification with contestation over material resources, provides a comprehensive explanatory account of the cause of outbreaks of violent conflicts. The significant contribution of these authors is their insistence on the introduction of material considerations as conceptual categories that supplement the conventional socio-cultural explanation of conflicts. These four socio-cultural processes are undertaken by social actors who create and control the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, and regulate the relative distribution of material privileges. In the Aguleri-Umulari test case, disputes over the ownership of the profitable Otu Ocha land worked in conjunction with the conflict-laden socio-cultural processes of identity formation involving disputes over Eri ancestry to generate conflicts among these tribes in the Anambra East Local Government. In addition to the *objective* causes of the conflict, Ibeanu and Mbah provide a *subjective* and dynamic account of its *continuation*. They label it 'animosity', or the stored negative emotions and memories among members of the fractional tribes that tend to promote the perpetuation of violence.

Ibrahim Muazzam in chapter seven diverges from the other papers when he argued that the cosmopolitan culture in Kano which was historically established through commerce, scholarship and migration has created an important example of unity across multiple ethnic and nationality lines. Muazzam shows that the presence of a distinct Kanawa ethnic identity and Islam in Kano has not prevented it from successfully integrating various nationalities within the periphery of a single city. The combined effect of migration, economic trading and intellectual exchanges over

several centuries brought together Arabs, Ghanaians, Cameroonians, Igbo, Yoruba and Edo migrants among others in a city which exemplifies unity and integration. In Kano, there is a peaceful co-existence of all ethnicities, Christians and Muslims. Muazzam argues that the accomplishment of such 'cosmopolitan state building' has to do with the fact that culture is always a mixture of heterogeneous elements. For him, ethnic identity does not have natural basis; identity is gradually formed and re-formed through inter-relations among diverse groups of people. Identity formation emerges as an open-ended process which fosters continuous cycles of integration. Muazzam views any emphasis on static ethnicity as a restrictive measure which stimulates an unjustified nostalgia for an exclusive purity that has long ceased to exist. He suggests that we view communities not as preserves of a particular ethnic identity, but as a shared platform for growth, enlightenment and the dissemination of universal values. Taking this perspective and learning from Kano's example, we will be able to appreciate and contribute to the diversity that the world offers us.

In chapter eight, Monday Mangwat analyses the settler phenomenon on the Jos Plateau referring to it as a *syndrome* because of the lingering complex socio-economic, political and religious problems which have arisen due to the juxtaposition of indigenes and settlers. Mangwat argues strongly that the claim of the Hausa settlers to the ownership of Jos town was simply untenable as they simply augmented the existing population of the town, and they themselves were a colonial importation. As far as Mangwat is concerned, the issue in contention at the moment is, in whose domain was Jos or Guash located? There is a contestation by the three indigenous ethnic groups, Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom – on who are the authentic owners of Jos. It is a subject of current judicial litigation but the Hausa Fulani settlers are not even party to this contentious issue and are therefore not stakeholders in the Jos ownership debate.

In chapter nine, Audu Gambo offers an explanation of the genesis of the conflict in Jos premised on two interlocking arguments. First, he focuses on the negative effect of identity politics and exclusion of minorities that follow when *indigeneship has priority over citizenship*. Secondly, the national government's failure to provide a robust legal framework for the promotion of citizenship. This is exemplified in the *1999 Constitution as amended* which explicitly bases

citizenship on indigeniety. In addition, the State's inability to ensure socio-economic stability in the country reinforces the presence of identity politics and the primacy of a divisive indigeneship. Citizenship sets down widely applicable and non-discriminatory abstract legal principles of rights and duties that govern the relationship between an individual and the government without recourse to ethnicity. The concept of indigeneship is formed by distinct social actors who identify and bestow benefits on a particular group to the exclusion of others. Gambo suggests that indigeneship inculcates an oppositional and sectarian 'primordial consciousness'. Indigeniety and exclusion inevitably become the causes of violence when groups feel that their political or socio-economic needs are side-lined for the benefit of other groups. Gambo argues that the Government's persistent failure to solve socio-economic problems and its subordination of citizenship to indigeniety within the framework of the *1999 Constitution* lead directly to the proliferation of 'primordial consciousness', identity politics and the practice of the principles of exclusion that eventually cause violence.

In complete opposition to Mangyvat's arguments, Baba Bala Mohammad in chapter ten focuses on two distinct issues of historical origins of Jos and the constitutional and democratic basis of citizenship rights. He argues that the most of the historical claims about the citizenship rights of the indigenous population is lacking in empirical facts. He points out that the conception that every Hausa/Fulani is any person who is a Muslim leads to the exclusion of other ethnic groups such as Kanuri, Nupe and more worrisome indigenous Muslims. Baba argues that there is no historical evidence to suggest that the Berom were the first inhabitants of Jos and Bukuru to the exclusion of other groups such as the Afizere, Anaguata, Ateng and Miango. He argued that the city of Jos grew around tin mining activities and the Hausa/Fulani were the major actors leading to economic growth of the city and they provided thirteen traditional rulers between 1903 and 1952. It was only after this period that first chief of Berom with the mandate to settle disputes was appointed. Baba asserted that the position of Gwong Gwon arose only out of an elite manipulation as there is no evidence of any ancestral rulership tied to the position.

He further stated that the current exclusion of the Hausa/Fulani despite their contribution to the economic development of the state is unacceptable. The exclusion has now become both social and political with the use of hired mercenaries to perpetrate violence and displace Hausas

communities by the ethnic Beroms with the state looking the other way. The current climate of culture of impunity is creating violent conflict. On the constitutional plane, Baba argued that the ascription of the settler-ship to the Hausa/Fulani status in the state has excluded them from social, economic and political benefits enjoyed by the indigenes. Citing the Fiberismima Commission's definition of an indigene as faulty, ambiguous and lacking in solid legal backing, Baba argues that the main objective of the political elites is to justify the exclusion of the Hausa/Fulani from participation based on largely inaccurate historical analysis, a situation which has turned the state into a crisis ridden state with heightened insecurity and rising crime levels.

In chapter eleven, Dr. Golwa's inquiry into the causes of violent conflicts in Jos reaches similar conclusions as Joseph Ochogwu and Geraldine Yop-Kim and Audu Gambo as he identifies *politics* as the root cause of violent clashes in Jos. He argues that self-interested political actors or 'conflict entrepreneurs' manipulate ethnic or religious tensions and foster exclusion and marginalization of certain communal groups inevitably leading to the escalation of violence. According to Golwa, the cause of violent conflicts in Jos in 1994 and 2001 can be traced to political considerations by the Nigerian Government. In 1994, violence erupted when a non indigene of Jos was installed as the Chairman of Jos North Local Government by the military government. This political move was perceived by the native tribes indigenous to Jos as an attempt to exclude and marginalize them from the political decision-making processes to the benefit of the local Hausa community. Seven years later, a similar appointment of a Northerner as Plateau local government's state co-ordinator led to the renewal of fighting. Furthermore, the government's ineffective political measures have led to the continuation of violent conflicts. The Government has not developed adequate policy initiatives at the federal level nor shown decisiveness or 'political will' in dealing with the problem and, despite sufficient experience in conflict resolution, has not been able to develop an effective 'warning and response system'. Golwa proposes that problem of violent conflicts can only be solved when the government undertakes legislative efforts at making citizenship dependent on residence rather than indigeniety and raises awareness issues concerning citizenship, rights and obligations.

Joseph Ochogwu and Geraldine Yop-Kim in chapter twelve argued on the failure of Government to effectively handle crises situations which has significantly contributed to the perpetuation of

violent conflicts. Political decision-making is directly responsible for the persistence of violent conflicts. Ochogwu and Yop-Kim distinguish three distinct ways in which the government has been implicated in the continuation of violence. First, it is argued by the authors that the Federal Government has not built up sufficient capacity to successfully deal with violent conflicts when they arise. Secondly, Ochogwu and Yop-Kim argue that divisiveness and political differences among various governmental actors ensure the continuation of violence. What they term the 'politicization of the interventions and conflict management' or the intrusion of political considerations into the frameworks of intervention prolongs violence. They illustrate it with the violent conflicts in Jos. When violence broke out in Jos in 2009, the antagonistic relationship between President Umaru Yar'Adua and the Governor of Plateau State, Jonah Jang prevented both parties from finding effective solutions to the crisis. When violent conflicts recurred a year later, a similar disagreement between Governor Jang and Major-General Saleh Maina deteriorated to the point that it was alleged that army soldiers began to participate in the actual violence. Thirdly, the government favours a 'hard-line' approach to dealing with violent conflicts. It uses military and police force to physically restrain all actors involved in violence and initiates legal punitive measures to deal with other suspects once the conflict has subsided. However, this approach has not proved very effective and has been unable to prevent the recurrence of violence. Ochogwu and Yop-Kim argue that 'softer', more innovative and flexible conflict resolution policies should be employed by the Government.

Conclusions

The Constitution of Nigeria provides for citizenship but also talks about indigenes in a context where differentiating citizens from indigenes could not but become a principal political activity. The evolution of the acquisition of additional rights for indigenes and less rights for citizens considered to be settlers has accentuated political inequality all over the country. This has placed severe strain on the doctrine of unity in diversity as divisions based on identities continue to sharpen. The political doctrine of indigeneity has exacerbated ethnic and religious divisions among Nigeria's 170 million inhabitants and it is necessary to start reversing such trends. It is time we begin to accept that our identities are multiple and fluid and start defining ourselves in multifarious alternatives for instance as; Woman, Muslim, Yoruba, South Westerner, Southerner, Nigerian, West African and African thereby manifesting a tolerance for diversity. The chapters

in this book provide sufficient evidence of political processes that divide us. The challenge is to invent new forms of political processes that unite us.

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Chapter 2

CITIZENSHIP AND EXCLUSION IN AFRICA: THE INDIGENEITY QUESTION

Keynote Address Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

INTRODUCTION

I am very grateful to Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim and the staff of the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) for inviting me to address this very important workshop. It is a reflection of my special bond with Nigeria that this is the sixth major address that I am giving in this country within the last 11 years, following the two Claude Ake memorial lectures for the Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS) and the African Centre for Democratic Governance (AFRIGOV) in 2000; the graduation lecture at the National War College in 2001; the annual democracy lecture for the Centre for Constitutionalism and Demilitarisation (CENCOD) in 2005; and the Billy J. Dudley Memorial Lecture for the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) in 2008.

In addition to these major addresses, I have contributed over a dozen presentations to public forums and scholarly meetings, including two papers related to the theme of this workshop. The first was a paper on the national question in Africa in comparative perspective, delivered at the Conference on “The Management of the National Question in Nigeria,” organized by the

Program on Ethnic and Federal Studies of the University of Ibadan and held in Ibadan on August 28-29, 2000. The second paper was on “Citizenship, Democratization and the State in Africa,” presented at the Methodology Workshop of the Research Project on the State in Africa by Professors Pita Ogaba Agbese and George Klay Kieh, Jr. held in Abuja on January 11-12, 2002, and from which I have freely borrowed for this address.

Recent or ongoing turmoil in Côte d’Ivoire, the Great Lakes Region, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere on this continent can be traced to the question of citizenship and exclusion, as segments of the national population feel excluded from the enjoyment of their full citizenship rights. Since these rights include access to power and those resources needed to ensure decent livelihood and a better future for the youth, the question of citizenship is central to the crisis of the state in postcolonial Africa. Even though I have spent three years in Nigeria as a university lecturer and a UNDP governance adviser, I cannot pretend to be an expert on this country’s indigeneity conflicts. Having read what Nigerian experts have written about some of them, I will attempt to integrate their general characteristics into an overall analysis of the subject matter of citizenship, identity conflicts, and exclusion in postcolonial Africa. I will do so by looking at two interrelated issues: (1) how citizenship and indigeneity are articulated in Africa; and (2) social exclusion and identity conflicts; due to exclusionary notions of citizenship in Africa.

CITIZENSHIP AND INDIGENEITY IN AFRICA

Any useful discussion of the state of citizenship in contemporary Africa has to take into account both African and Western concepts of citizenship. For if the notions of citizenship associated with the postcolonial state are of Western origin, being derived mostly from the American and French revolutions and the influences on their respective theoreticians from ancient Greece,

Rome and the Enlightenment, their operationalization in Africa is influenced by local ideas, values and circumstances, most of which are subsumed under the notion of indigeneity. As the noted historian C. Northcote Parkinson points out, it would be a mistake to believe that all political ideas have been thought out in Europe and North America.ⁱ

Parkinson's pioneering defense of the universality of political ideas and practices such as democracy is particularly pertinent with respect to the concept of citizenship, in view of the fact that except for the differences due to the development of capitalism and liberalism in the West, many of the African and Western notions and practices of citizenship are similar. I shall try to demonstrate this with reference to the following issues: (1) the ontological basis of citizenship as a political concept; (2) the exclusion of certain categories of the population from citizenship throughout history; (3) the very notion of citizenship as involving civic activity, public spiritedness and political participation; (4) the challenge of redefining citizenship in multiethnic and multicultural societies by taking multiple identities into account; and (5) the moral imperative of pan-African and global citizenship in the era of globalization.

The Ontological Basis of Citizenship

In the Western world, according to Chantal Mouffe, the term *citizenship* or membership in a political community originated in “the classical Greek and Roman conception of man as a political being.”ⁱⁱ Since the debate by Socrates and his disciples against the Sophists, citizenship in Greek political theory implied a profound obligation on the part of the individual to identify with one's community and to “hold its interests as dear as one's own.”ⁱⁱⁱ Good citizenship was therefore the antithesis of the Sophists' position that might is right and that each person should, to the best of his/her ability, pursue the satisfaction of his/her appetites with no regard for the best interests of the community as a whole.^{iv}

That good citizenship requires a shared set of goals and values in a political community, whether it is a village, a town, or a larger grouping, is an idea that was fundamental to the very notion of a human being in pre-colonial Africa. In Bantu societies, for example, the individual was conceptualized as a *vital force*, whose existence transcends the temporal body in which a person is objectified in his/her earthly life. For this reason, the individual is fully human only through the complex web of relations that ties him or her to other vital forces, both dead and alive.^v As I have written elsewhere, Africans are not only the first humans, they are also the humans with the greatest attachment to ancestral lands, and it is on the basis of their experience in living in society from the family to larger social units that their values of solidarity such as ethnic allegiance and patriotism are born.^{vi}

Indigeneity as a condition of membership in a theoretically timeless kinship community defined by identification with a specific homeland or collection of ancestral lands in Africa is grounded in this ontological conception of citizenship. Given the fact that for the most part land was held in common for all the members of the community and was not a commodity for private appropriation or sale, land leases to strangers and settlers could only be temporary or of limited duration, since only indigenes could be considered as rightful heirs to this property. This is why, across the continent, groups identified as strangers or settlers may live in an area for over 100 years and still be considered as having no legitimate rights in the land they occupy.

The Exclusionary Nature of Citizenship

It follows that attachment to one's community and, through it, to the soil of the ancestors or the homeland, is a fundamental dimension of the notion of citizenship in Africa.^{vii} That this attachment was not in contradiction with the colonial legal concept of *indigeneity*, which was enforced through the *indigénat*, a separate legal status for Africans in French colonies until 1946, and the native authority system elsewhere, should not make it the root cause of the citizenship crisis in Africa today. For all original legal definitions of citizenship in the world are notorious

by their exclusionary character. In the democratic Greek city-states, citizenship was restricted to free and native-born men, with slaves and women taking care of productive and reproductive activities to allow their masters to engage in politics, leisure activities and warfare. In the Roman Empire, citizenship was first restricted to the residents of Rome, and was extended to all free inhabitants of the empire in A.D. 212. Moreover, the level of participation by citizens in governance was determined by class distinctions.

As for the modern concepts of citizenship associated with the American and French revolutions, citizenship is determined either by the place of birth (*jus soli*, or the law of the soil) or by blood (*jus sanguinis*). Between 1787, when the U.S. constitution was enacted, and the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, African Americans as a group were not recognized as citizens of the United States, and did not enjoy full voting rights before the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In both Europe and North America, women did not get the suffrage until the 20th century. With respect to expanding the definition of citizenship, the United States extends the principle of *jus sanguinis* to children born of U.S. citizens abroad, and whatever principle is applicable, individuals can become citizens by naturalization in virtually all countries of the world, African included.

Thus, while indigeneity or *jus sanguinis* is the first principle of citizenship in Africa, other legal principles do exist and can be used to broaden the boundaries of citizenship in postcolonial Africa. The democratization process, which involves expanding the political space to empower women, the young, ethnic minorities and other strata of the population, requires the expansion of the boundaries of postcolonial citizenship beyond indigeneity in conformity with the Pan-African ideal and the realities of globalization. The manner in which this is done will have major consequences for democracy, political stability and sustainable human development.

The Civic Character of Citizenship

In addition to defining who the citizens are, the notion of citizenship includes what it means to be a citizen. Here both the African and Western traditions are in agreement that citizenship refers to the capacity to govern and be governed. It implies civic activity, public spiritedness and active political participation by members of a political community. Since civic activity is part and parcel of the very definition of citizenship, it makes no sense to distinguish, as Mahmood Mamdani does, between “civic citizenship” and “ethnic citizenship.”^{viii} By definition, every type of citizenship involves political rights and civic obligations, or both the entitlements of citizenship and the responsibilities or duties that each citizen has towards keeping the community a going concern. This may involve, depending on circumstances, participating in the management of the common good or public affairs; contributing to enhancing the capacity of the community for responsible governance through taxes and other means; and defending its security through military service.

In pre-colonial Africa, these three types of activity consisted of participation in the deliberative or judicial activity through lineage councils or the village palaver, paying tribute and going to war. Under the restrictive definition of citizenship that obtained under the systems of patriarchy and gerontocracy, the deliberative and judicial functions were generally the preserve of old men, while younger men were under the obligation to engage in the other two activities. With respect to entitlements, the main benefits of citizenship were access to land and collective security in the form of protection of life and property against criminality and/or external threats. Although Africans did not develop systems of law comparable to those of modern contractualism in the West, the concept of the consent of the governed was an integral part of the customary legal framework, as shown by Max Gluckman in his study of the Bantu kingdoms of Central and Southern Africa.^{ix} The mutual or reciprocal obligations of the ruler and the ruled are aptly captured in the Luba proverb, “*Mukalenge wa bantu, bantu wa mukalenge,*” which Pierre Kayembe Nzongola has translated as “The Chief is for the people and the people are for the chief.”^x For the Luba, there can be no accountability and no normal political life outside of this equation.

Today, the notion of entitlement and those of democracy, development and stability are basically interrelated. A constant theme in political theory from Aristotle to Karl Marx, and including the contributions of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, is that the end of the political community is the happiness of its citizens, and this includes political stability and the provision of sustainable livelihood and development. As Rousseau maintains in a memorable passage of his classic *On the Social Contract*, the main objective of political association is “the preservation and prosperity of its members.”^{xi} Unlike the liberal model of citizenship and its individualistic bias, it is this tradition of social democracy with its emphasis on the common good that comes closest to the political values of pre-colonial Africa, where individuals and groups felt free to vote with their feet by moving and establishing new political communities elsewhere, whenever their political, economic and social rights were no longer guaranteed. Democracy as a continuous process of expanding political space and fundamental human rights is inconceivable without economic, social, political and cultural rights. Full citizenship thus implies both democratic governance and the provision of social opportunities or entitlements likely to empower people and enhance their capacity to take part in their own development.

Citizenship in Multiethnic and Multicultural Societies

One of the major lessons that contemporary Africa can learn from its past is respect and tolerance for diversity, or maintaining unity in diversity. Contrary to the oversimplification of African social realities by Western rulers, settlers and missionaries, the African world is a complex universe of relations and meanings, too complicated to be reduced to clichés such as tribalism. Individuals had multiple identities, with the importance attached to any of them varying depending on circumstances. As Bruce Berman has pointed out, “pre-colonial political and socio-cultural boundaries were marked by fuzziness and flexibility; and Africans existed within a reality of multiple, overlapping and alternative collective identities.”^{xii}

Let us take, for example, the Kuba kingdom of the Congo. In his authoritative history of the Kuba people, Jan Vansina presents them as a multiethnic society consisting of five ethnic groups. From his analysis, it can be shown that the Kuba kingdom consisted of one nation – a Kuba nation – relying heavily for its identity on the central Kuba chiefdoms led by the Bushoong as its core group, and supported at different levels of attachment by the peripheral Kuba chiefdoms, which shared a common culture with the core group, and by four ethnic minorities (Kete, Coofa, Cwa, Mbeengi), which were for the most part oppressed minorities.^{xiii}

If all of these peoples recognized themselves in a common ancestry as the “children of Woot,” the minorities were clearly less integrated in the political system than the Kuba proper, who were at the same time differentiated between the central and the peripheral groups. For each of the five ethnic groups, there were at least two different levels of citizenship, at the level of the chiefdom and that of the kingdom. Obviously, the intensity of allegiance to one or the other citizenship was a function of circumstances. Today, five centuries since the formation of the kingdom, a Kuba has three additional identities: as a Kasaiian, a Congolese and an African. As a Congolese citizen, a Kuba individual could still be a victim of ethnic cleansing and expelled from the Congolese province of Katanga in 1992-94, on the account that his/her parents or grandparents had settled there from the Kasai province.

Africa is not alone in this predicament over the question of citizenship in multiethnic and multicultural societies. Chantal Mouffe has correctly stated the problem as follows:

“At the moment, one of the most discussed questions in many countries is how to establish a notion of citizenship that makes room for the increasingly multiethnic and multicultural character of the population. Such a problem has long existed in North America, but satisfactory solutions have yet to be found there as well. The difficulty seems to lie in the need to create unity without denying multiplicity. How might one combine an effective pluralism as far as cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious, and other identities are concerned while constructing a common

political identity around an allegiance to shared political principles? This is the contemporary challenge associated with citizenship for both communitarians and liberals.”^{xiv}

Pan-African and Global Citizenship

To this challenge of defining a widely accepted notion of citizenship in multiethnic and multicultural societies, both in Africa and elsewhere, corresponds another and more difficult challenge at the global level. This is the moral imperative of coupling the globalization of the economy with the universalization of political, economic, social and cultural rights. In spite of the restrictive immigration policies of the countries of the North and the stringent population movement controls put in place as a response to the events of September 11, 2001, interstate borders are too porous to stop the flow of people to the more developed countries. A major irony of the war against undocumented aliens in North America and Europe is that entire sectors of their respective economies cannot function in a profitable way without illegal labor, and the authorities are well aware of this fact. Since the prosperity of these countries is inconceivable without the raw materials and the labor coming from less developed countries, migrants from these countries have a moral claim to full citizenship rights in the countries in which they work.

In their bestseller, *Empire*, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri see this claim as a major plank in the political platform of the world proletariat:

*“What we can see nonetheless is a first element of a political program for the global multitude, a first political demand: **global citizenship**. During the 1996 demonstrations for the **sans papiers**, the undocumented aliens residing in France, the banners demanded “**Papiers pour tous**.” Residency papers for everyone means in the first place that all should have the full rights of citizenship in the country where they live and work. This is not a utopian or unrealistic political demand. The demand is simply that the juridical status of the population be reformed in step with*

*the real economic transformations of recent years. ... The multitude must be able to decide if, when, and where it moves. It must have the right also to stay still and enjoy one place rather than being forced constantly to be on the move. **The general right to control its own movement is the multitude's ultimate demand for global citizenship**".^{XV}*

Africa, too, must heed this call for residency papers for everyone, particularly for law-abiding African migrants willing to contribute their skills and labor to the development of the continent, and for people fleeing persecution and violence from their respective countries. Our profession of pan-Africanism and faith in African unity would seem to be insincere when we consider the difficulties Africans face in traveling from one country to another in their own continent. Even in West Africa, where the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) seems to have made progress with respect to community passports and the free movement of people and goods, it is not uncommon for trucks carrying merchandise to take a whole week to go from Lagos to Accra. This is due to the culture of corruption among civil servants and law enforcement agents, who harass travelers and lorry drivers for purposes of collecting bribes. Apparently, ECOWAS member states have not succeeded in eradicating these bureaucratic obstacles to the regional integration process.

A more sinister threat to pan-African citizenship is the type of xenophobic violence that we witnessed in South Africa in 2008. While intercommunal conflicts between citizens and migrants do exist elsewhere and may flair up in violence from time to time, what happened in South Africa was most shocking in terms of intensity and the very fact that it happened in a country whose liberation from apartheid was due to a large extent to the support and sacrifices of peoples and governments from all over the continent. Rather than acting out of an intrinsic dislike of foreigners, unemployed and underemployed nationals are likely to attack migrants because the latter are easy targets against which they can vent their frustrations and anger vis-à-vis their own government.

The roots of this type of intercommunal violence between nationals on the one side and migrants and/or refugees on the other are to be found in poverty and competition for scarce jobs and other economic opportunities among workers. For example, in early January 2002, the police and soldiers were sent into the Joe Slovo residential area in Milnerton, South Africa, to put an end to fighting between locals and Angolan refugees in which three Angolans and one South African were killed.^{xvi} The locals' grievance against the refugees, which is more or less the same all over Africa, was that "foreigners were stealing their 'women and their jobs'."^{xvii} In this particular case, however, the foreigners had the full weight of international law behind them. One Angolan was quoted by the *Cape Argus* as follows: "We are here legally and we have rights as refugees to work to support ourselves and our families."^{xviii} Thus, although they were not South African citizens, they did have rights as African and global citizens.

SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND IDENTITY CONFLICTS

Social exclusion is a function of class and other identity-based distinctions. The question of indigeneity in Africa assumes political significance with respect to identity-based conflicts in which the bone of contention is control over power and resources such as land. In Africa today, identity conflicts are exacerbated by the growing poverty of ordinary Africans and the state's declining capacity for development. With the growing reduction in arable and grazing land due to a variety of reasons, territorial and land disputes keep multiplying, particularly between pastoralists and agriculturalists and in areas where communal boundaries are either too difficult to establish or contested by one of the parties. Consequently, identity conflicts due to social exclusion have increased the level of intercommunal violence and ethnic wars, which are defined here as cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Citizenship and Intercommunal Violence

As indicated above with reference to South Africa, intercommunal violence based on identity conflicts takes place between a group that defines itself as the rightful stakeholder and the one or those it perceives as intruders. The crisis in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria between indigenous groups and the Hausa-Fulani who once dominated them is an excellent example of indigeneity conflicts in Africa. A great deal of violence has taken place in this region since the return to civilian rule in 1999.^{xix}

Similar confrontations elsewhere revolve around the issue of ethnic citizenship and its implications for contemporary economic and political life. In most cases, as exemplified by the Dagomba-Kokomba conflict in northern Ghana and the Ife-Modakeke conflict in southwestern Nigeria, quarrels about land and chieftaincy rights are often tied to the identity of the groups involved, whether they are indigenous to the territory in dispute and freeborn, or originally migrants or slaves.^{xx} Since community land rights are entrusted with traditional rulers as representatives of the ancestors, the recognition of chieftaincy titles in areas where two or several groups compete for land has been a major bone of contention. No chiefs, no land. Hence the need for each group to have recognized chiefs with a title to land in order to assert and affirm their citizenship rights.

In such cases, an emancipatory thrust is part of the quest by marginalized people for their own chiefs and land. It involves fighting for a group's right to emancipate itself from social relations of bondage or servitude from the pre-colonial and colonial pasts. And it calls for the creation of separate chiefdoms or local government councils and the granting of land rights to hitherto landless groups as a matter of fairness and justice. For whatever truth there might be to the designation of groups as former slaves versus free people, or strangers versus indigenes, there is no reason why people who have resided in an area for decades, and sometimes for a century or more, should be denied economic and political rights because of their original status. If Nigeria can find land for foreign enterprises and farmers, surely it can find land for its landless citizens

as well. Constitutional and legal reforms might be needed to allow the state to play a positive role with respect to this issue for conflict prevention and resolution.

The state would be justified in taking action in this regard because its legitimacy is based, not on indigeneity or ethnic citizenship, but on territorial citizenship. It would be recalled that the struggle for decolonization in Black Africa was initially carried out under the banner of pan-Africanism, whose roots in the African diaspora of North America and the Caribbean had given rise to the pan-African project of a single nation under one continental state or, failing this, of several regional federations.^{xxi} At the other extreme, there were reactionary nationalists dreaming of reviving pre-colonial nations, as in the case of the Kongo leaders of the Union of the People of Northern Angola (UPNA) and the *Alliance des Bakongo* (ABAKO) in the Belgian Congo, who once toyed with the idea of recreating the Kongo kingdom.^{xxii} On the whole, however, the political map of Africa represents the failure of these diametrically opposed projects and the triumph of the territorial state of colonial creation. Both the pan-African nation and the pre-colonial nation did not have well-organized class forces capable of realizing them as political projects.^{xxiii}

The territorial nation-state, on the other hand, corresponded to the neocolonial strategy of imperialism, whose interests would be better served by a large number of weak and impoverished states, on the one hand, and to the narrow class interests of the African petty bourgeoisie, on the other, for whom the more states were established, the more chances there were for presidential, ministerial and other high-level state positions to occupy.^{xxiv} As Amilcar Cabral has pointed out, decolonization was in many ways the result of the convergence of interests between the metropolitan or imperialist bourgeoisie and the African petty bourgeoisie.^{xxv}

Contrary to the predictions of the prophets of doom, who saw nothing but the disintegration of these admittedly artificial creations, the former colonial territories have proven resilient as new sites of nationhood and citizenship. A major reason for this is that in addition to the petty bourgeoisie, the other social classes of African society had developed some emotional

attachment to the new political community, even before independence. This was particularly true of the proletarianized and semi-proletarianized masses of the working people who had migrated to urban and industrial centers outside of their ethnic homelands. Their class interests as workers and informal sector entrepreneurs were better served within a territorial entity in which they felt at home and secure with respect to jobs, resources and means of sustainable livelihood. They were also distinguishable from people from neighboring colonial territories by cultural practices and preferences with reference to the major language of communication, popular urban music, football teams, dress styles, etc. Thus, if the petty bourgeoisie was the standard bearer of territorial nationalism, these popular classes were among its active supporters.

Given its grounding in territorial nationalism and its commitment to pan-Africanism, the postcolonial state has a legitimate interest in weighing the claims of indigeneity against those of the larger nation in a fair and just manner. It should be able to protect the rights of indigenous peoples without denying non-indigenous citizens access to elective office, state employment, and land.

Citizenship and Ethnic Wars

Less numerous than cases of intercommunal violence but more deadly with respect to their objectives and levels of violence are situations of exclusion involving ethnic wars. By “ethnic wars” I refer to those violent conflicts taking the form of “final solution” scenarios for purposes of excluding the other once and for all, namely, ethnic cleansing and genocide. As the most extreme manifestations of identity-based conflicts, ethnic wars require the full weight of the state and its backing for the criminal actions of both state and non-state actors.

By definition, ethnic cleansing is the forcible removal of people of a given ethnic group from a geographical area in which they have been declared undesirable. As the special rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission noted in his 1995 report on Serbian policy in the Balkans, “population displacements are not the consequence of the war but its very purpose.”^{xxvi} All means necessary, including the destruction of their property, torture, rape and murder are used to

scare people into running away. The surviving victims then become refugees or internally displaced persons.

As for genocide, it is defined in international law as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.”^{xxvii} By this definition, a genocidal act does not have to be necessarily of holocaust proportions, and both the act itself and incitement to it are punishable under international law. While genocide involves ethnic cleansing, it is different from the latter in seeking to go beyond population displacement to population destruction.

Africa has had its share of exclusion through ethnic wars, particularly in the Great Lakes Region. With his rule undermined by the deliberations of the Sovereign National Conference in 1992, President Mobutu Sese Seko and his cronies resorted to ethnic cleansing in the Congo (then known as Zaire) in order to destabilize and weaken the democracy movement.^{xxviii} Hoping to obtain maximum impact in this regard by focusing on the extremely rich and strategic provinces of Kivu and Katanga, they chose as their initial targets the people of Rwandan origin in North Kivu and the people from the two Kasai provinces living and working in Katanga.

In the first case, the Mobutu regime exploited the grievances of the indigenous population, who were engaged in competition for land and other resources with citizens, migrants and refugees of Rwandan origin, both Hutu and Tutsi, who were commonly known as *Banyarwanda*. The latter were accused of seeking to dominate the indigenous groups, and the allegiances as well as the legal documents of those among them who were citizens were called into question, making them people of “doubtful nationality.” Thousands were forced to flee to security across the border, and they found refuge in Rwanda. In 1996, when Mobutu's associates tried to repeat the same experience with the Congolese Tutsi of South Kivu, who call themselves *Banyamulenge*, the latter's resistance provided Rwanda the excuse it needed to intervene in Congolese affairs with the pretext of trying to prevent genocide.

Ethnic cleansing occurred on a much larger scale in Katanga. Approximately one million Kasaians were expelled from cities and towns in which some families had lived since the beginning of mineral exploitation in Katanga during the second decade of the 20th century. To regain their homelands in Kasai, some of the victims were forced into a long trek of up to 1,000 kilometers during which thousands perished of exhaustion, hunger and attacks by wild animals. Those who waited for trains were subjected to unsanitary living conditions around railway stations; overcrowded and slow moving trains that often derailed because of old and faulty equipment and lack of maintenance; and attacks on and off trains by the armed militia of the *Union des républicains et des fédéralistes indépendants* (UFERI), the party of onetime Prime Minister Jean Nguza Karl I Bond and Governor Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza.

Supported by the provincial government – and behind it – the Mobutu regime, JUFERI, the youth wing of UFERI, constituted themselves into the attack dogs and death squads of ethnic cleansing against the Kasaians, whom they called “*bilulu*” or “insects” in Kiswahili. This meant that those targeted for death or expulsion were not perceived as citizens, let alone as human. Demonizing and animalizing the targets of ethnic cleansing and genocide allow the perpetrators to feel justified in their cause and behavior, since the beings being cleansed or killed are “insects” or “cockroaches” rather than human beings.^{xxix}

That Governor Kyungu, who is part Portuguese and part Luba-Katanga, could take upon himself the task of expelling from Katanga a Luba-Kasai population whose cherished pre-colonial cradle is found in Katanga, clearly shows that ethnic wars have more to do with conflicts over power and resources than with conflicting definitions of citizenship. The problem here, since the founding of the *Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga* (CONAKAT) in 1958, was the idea that the wealth of Katanga should first and foremost benefit the indigenous ethnic groups of the province, or the “authentic Katangans.” Citizenship was therefore conceptualized at three different levels: ethnic citizenship, Katangan citizenship, and Congolese citizenship.

As a matter of fact, history was repeating itself, as this was the second time since independence that Kasaians were being expelled from Katanga. Ironically, the architect of the first ethnic cleansing in 1960-62 was Godefroid Munongo, Katanga's interior minister and a descendant of

King Msiri, the Nyamwezi trader who founded the state of Garenganze in the 19th century. Although he was a Congolese of Tanzanian origin, Munongo felt more of an "authentic Katangan" than the Luba-Kasai, who actually originated from Katanga.

With the anti-Hutu genocide of 1972 in Burundi and the anti-Tutsi genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, these two countries have given us the best manifestations of this kind of ethnic war in Africa. The roots of genocide in both countries are to be found in the history of ethnic identity construction and mobilization under colonial rule. Originally, the categories "Hutu" and "Tutsi" were not ethnic. They referred to social ranks associated with occupation and proximity to the royal court and its representations in the provinces.

The Belgian colonialists had given preference to the Tutsi in education and civil service employment and relied on them as their auxiliaries in the colonial exploitation and oppression in Rwanda and Burundi until the mid-1950s. Since the Tutsi élite became heavily involved in the struggle for independence, the colonialists felt the need to create and promote a Hutu counter-élite as a counterweight to the Tutsi. The Hutu took advantage of this promotion and succeeded in removing the Tutsi as a dominant group in Rwanda in 1959. In Burundi, on the other hand, the Tutsi minority retained exclusive control over state power for 40 years from independence in 1962, so as to prevent its marginalization in a manner comparable to what happened to the Tutsi of Rwanda between 1962 and 1994.

Genocide was selectively used in this endeavor in 1972, as the entire Hutu intellectual élite from professionals to secondary school students was targeted. Following his first coup d'état in 1987, Major Pierre Buyoya attempted to end the cycle of violence by developing some form of power sharing between the two groups. With the democratization process then taking place across Africa, general elections were held in June 1993. A new political party, the *Front pour la démocratie au Burundi* (FRODEBU), won them and its Hutu leader, Melchior Ndadaye, became Burundi's first democratically elected president. He was assassinated by Tutsi military officers who controlled the Burundian army on October 21, 1993, 100 days after taking office.

Since the perpetrators of this crime were never brought to justice and punished, Ndadaye's assassination reinforced the reality of impunity in the Great Lakes Region, as it sent yet another clear signal to mischief makers that you can get away with murder. This became a double stimulant to Hutu extremists in Rwanda. They were reinforced in their faith in the self-fulfilling prophecy that the Tutsi cannot be trusted, on the one hand, and comforted in their expectations of impunity, on the other. Thus, since both Rwanda and Burundi have a similar ethnic make-up, major developments in one country are likely to have an impact in the other.^{xxx}

In Rwanda, the genocide of 1994 was preceded by deteriorating economic, social and political conditions. David Newbury has identified two major and interrelated variables of the conflict situation, among others. The first was the drastic fall in the world market price of coffee, the country's major export commodity, which deepened the economic crisis and increased the unemployment ranks. The second was the increasingly large number of young men with nothing to do in both the modern and traditional sectors of the economy. In the modern sector, educational opportunities were limited, in terms of both availability and the money needed to pay fees for those available. In the traditional sector, land scarcity and the lack of money made it difficult, if not impossible, for young men to establish themselves as land-owning farmers and thus meet the customary requirements for marriage.^{xxxi} With nothing to do and no hope for the future, Tutsi youths joined the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) in Uganda, while the more numerous Hutu youths were vulnerable to the anti-Tutsi propaganda of Hutu Power extremists and joined the death squads of the regime such as the *interahamwe* militia.

CONCLUSION

Africa needs to broaden the boundaries of citizenship from indigeneity to incorporate citizens who are non-indigenes in the political and economic life of the sub-national and local government areas in which they live. This should be done with due regard to respect for individual and social rights, including the right of indigenous peoples to own their ancestral

lands, but also in accordance with the national interest and pan-African solidarity. For the crisis of postcolonial citizenship has less to do with indigeneity per se as with the constraints of poverty and the political manipulation of identity differences.

In a diverse society, rivalries and conflicts are bound to arise. In many ways, they help to pinpoint the society's fault lines and areas in which change is necessary. Competition for power and resources will always be a feature of any normal situation. A society without conflicts, or one without lines of social cleavage, can exist only in utopias. In the real world, particularly under the current constraints of globalization, conflicts cannot be ruled out, and they may even be salutary with respect to fighting oppression and injustice, as in the cases of the emancipatory drive of oppressed minorities discussed in this paper.

The nature of the economic and social environment and the mode of political governance have a lot to do with the causes and dynamics of conflicts in Africa. Whether they are related to entitlements or to real or perceived oppression based on identity, conflicts can be prevented or resolved by dealing with their root causes. Identity itself is not such a cause, since identities are historically constructed. Given the fact that individuals have multiple identities, ethnicity or any other single identity cannot constitute an insurmountable obstacle to a process of nation-building in which diversity is recognized as positive. However, for this to succeed, it must be accompanied by a process of state building in which priority is given to eradicating poverty and providing all citizens with social and economic opportunities in a fair and equitable manner.

For this to happen, there is need for strengthening the democratization process and citizen participation in the construction of a more stable and equitable political order. This should include the promotion of a paradigm shift on the nature of the state, which needs to be seen not as a private network of relations built around the ruler and his entourage, who have their turn to eat the national cake, but as a set of impersonal institutions serving the general interest. In this new paradigm, state institutions should become more responsive and accountable to their constituents through greater patriotism; a democratic culture of decision-making that places emphasis on consultations with civil society; and improved service delivery. Finally, all of this requires increased citizen participation in the management of public affairs, including conflict

mitigation and resolution, the setting of local priorities through participatory budgeting, and monitoring the performance of state agencies through citizen panels such as civilian police review boards.

ⁱ C. Northcote Parkinson, *The Evolution of Political Thought* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1958), p. 7.

ⁱⁱⁱ Chantal Mouffe, "Citizenship," in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 136.

ⁱⁱⁱ Lance Massey, "On the Origin of Citizenship in Education: Isocrates, Rhetoric, and Kairos," *Journal of Public Affairs* (Southwest Missouri State University), <http://cicero.smsu.edu/journal/articles97/massey.html> p. 2.

^{iv} Ibid, p. 3.

^v The classic, though controversial, work on Bantu ontology is Placide Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy* (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1959). For a brief summary of the political history of Bantu Africa, see Théophile Obenga, "Histoire du monde bantu," in Théophile Obenga and Simao Souindoula (eds.) *Racines Bantu/Bantu Roots* (Libreville: CICIBA, 1991), pp. 121-150.

^{vi} Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, "The State and Democracy in Africa," in Geroges Nzongola-Ntalaja and Margaret C. Lee (eds.) *The State and Democracy in Africa* (Harare: AAPS Books, 1997; Trenton: Africa World Press, 1998), pp. 11-12.

^{vii} In a July 2001 discussion in Abuja on the controversy over the *indigene/non-indigene* distinction in the States of the Nigerian federation, Professor J. Isawa Elaigwu, a prominent Nigerian political scientist, remarked that the question of citizenship and entitlements in Nigeria cannot be the same as in federal systems in Europe and North America because of the African attachment to ancestral lands.

^{viii} This is a major theme of both of his major works, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) and *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

^{ix} Max Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Colonial Africa* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955).

- x Kayembe Nzongola, *Tshiluba Proverbs with English Equivalentents* (Kananga, 1992), p. 134.
- xi Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract* (1762), cited in Parkinson, *The Evolution of Political Thought*, pp. 205 and 311.
- xii Bruce J. Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism," *African Affairs*, Vol. 97, No. 388 (July 1998), p. 310.
- xiii Jan Vansina, *The Children of Woot: A History of the Kuba Peoples* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).
- xiv Mouffe, "Citizenship," p. 137. Emphasis added.
- xv Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 400. Italics mine, emphasis in the original.
- xvi *Cape Argus* (Cape Town), January 4, 2002,
- xvii Ibid.
- xviii Ibid.
- xix For a comprehensive look at intercommunal violence in Nigeria see Onigu Otite and Isaac Olawale Albert (eds.) *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books for Academic Associates Peaceworks, 1999); Rotimi T. Suberu, *Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1996).
- xx On the Ife-Modakeke conflict, see Isaac Olawale Albert, "Ife-Modakeke Crisis," in Otite and Albert, *Community Conflicts in Nigeria*, pp. 142-183. Information on the Dagomba-Kokomba conflict was obtained in March 1999 in Accra, Ghana during a preparatory consultation for International IDEA on "Enhancing National Capacity for Conflict Management in West Africa."
- xxi It must be admitted that by the end of the 1950s, there were few political leaders still advocating this lofty goal: Kwame Nkrumah, who defended the idea of a "United States of Africa;" Barthélemy Boganda, the Oubangi-Chari (CAR) leader who campaigned for the "United States of Latin Africa" (for the French, Belgian, Portuguese and Spanish colonies of Central Africa) and died in a mysterious plane crash on the eve of independence; Léopold Sédar Senghor and Modibo Keita, who attempted to salvage a major portion of French West Africa through the

short-lived Mali Federation; and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who unsuccessfully sought to have Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda achieve independence together in a kind of federal union.

^{xxii} It was at the Accra All-African Peoples Conference in 1958 that UPNA leader Holden Roberto was convinced by the likes of Frantz Fanon to drop the ethnic anachronism of his nationalist group. He removed the N from the group's name, making it UPA or Union of the People of Angola. The group later became known as the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), but it remained primarily a Kongo political grouping.

^{xxiii} Even in the cases of Lesotho and Swaziland, it was the prevailing logic of granting independence to separate colonial territories as they were rather than the strength of royalist forces that explains their preservation as ancient monarchies. Had the strength and prestige of the monarchy been one of the criteria for determining units to which independence could be given, surely the Kingdom of Buganda would have qualified.

^{xxiv} Thus, French West Africa was transformed into eight separate countries, French Equatorial Africa into four, and the Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi into three. Formerly a part of German East Africa, Rwanda and Burundi became a League of Nations mandate under Belgian supervision and eventually a United Nations trust territory. However, Belgium had for practical administrative purposes annexed them to the Congo.

^{xxv} Amilcar Cabral, "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea," in Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 86.

^{xxvi} Tadeusz Mazowiecki, cited in Marc Semo, "Nettoyage ethnique, but de guerre serbe," *Libération*, March 30, 1999, <http://www.liberation.fr/kosovo/cles/cle990330.html>

^{xxvii} Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 260A (III), December 9, 1948.

^{xxviii} For a detailed analysis of this period, see Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 189-213.

^{xxix} In Rwanda, the Tutsi were known as "*inyenzi*" (or "cockroaches" in Kinyarwanda).

^{xxx} On the impact of Ndadaye's assassination on Rwanda, see René Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), pp. 85-86.

^{xxxi} David Newbury, "Understanding Genocide," *African Studies Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (April 1998), pp. 73-97.

Chapter 3

INDIGENEITY AND BELONGING IN NIGERIA FROM PRE-COLONIAL TIMES TO 1960

ARMSTRONG MATIU ADEJO

Introduction

There is apparently no doubt that the process, problems and prospects of national unity or issues of national integration have long constituted a seminal theme of academic discourse, and even general interest, on political engineering in a multi-ethnic state like Nigeria. One specific issue out of these is the question of indigeneity that has raised a lot of controversy and conflicts in the country. The indigeneity question has thrown up critical matters about the *national question* such as those on settlers/indigenes, citizenship and conflicts in the polity.

The national question is sometimes explained as the perennial debate on how to order the relations between different ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups in their assessment of national political, economic and social assets¹. Part of the debate is reflected in the people not being sure how they belong to the 'modern' post colonial Nigerian' nation-state and whether they are expected to have any stake, commitment or obligations to the state. Commentators on the *national question* have offered several explanations as to the source or the factors responsible for the problems of disunity and ineffective integration. A principal position is that the unity, as well

as the disunity of Nigeria, is, in part, a reflection of the form and character of colonial rule and the change the country had undergone since 1900².

National integration is conceived as a two dimensional process involving territorial or horizontal integration as well as political or vertical integration. How to grapple and understand these dimensions require serious historical approach for the understanding of Nigeria's political history. It must be stated that ignorance and stereotypes have also been factors hindering Nigeria's unity because national unity has not always been a child of natural growth but invariably a product of its history; an attribute that requires deliberate cultivation in the context of the people's history and culture.

Some Conceptual/Definitional Clarifications

An attempt at conceptual/definitional statements of some critical issues relevant to this discussion is necessary to be able to appreciate some of the issues raised in the latter part of this paper. We shall briefly look at the concept of a nation, political culture, political community and indigeneity.

A nation, in its generic term, is derived from a Latin verb 'natio', which means to be born, and it originally connotes a group of people born in the same place³. The Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary defines a nation as '*a body of people marked of common descent, language, culture or historical tradition*'. The concept of cultural *nation* however poses one of the major problems in the humanities since there is no consensus on how to define it. One base line would be to say that the members of a cultural nation are aware of constituting an ethical-political body bound together in terms of a number of cultural features such as language, religion, tradition etc. A nation could be said to be a large body of people, associated with a particular territory that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or to possess a government. The term is also used to identify a *tribe* or nationality in ethno-cultural sense or to refer to the people of internationally sovereign state. In recent times, a '*nation*' is either synonymous with a state or its inhabitants or it denotes a human group bound together by common solidarity.

Remi Anifowose notes that the word '*nation*' has two distinct meanings, i.e. a political unit (a state) and an ethnological unity (a race)⁴. In a political unit sense it is a juridically organized nation or a nation organized for action under legal rules⁵. In ethnological sense it is a group of people who form a distinct community by inhabiting a definite territory and recognized themselves as possessing a relatively homogenous set of cultural traits.

In the evolution of a state, the attainment of nationhood and statehood are critical points to consider. According to Ali Mazrui, statehood is about central command; it is ultimately a problem of structure, authority and control while nationhood is about collective empathy⁶. Nationhood is ultimately a problem of culture, identity and consciousness; it is about who is in control and who is a fellow compatriot. For instance, as Mazrui points out, Somalia has been a nation without a state; the people combined to speak a substantial shared language, a shared religion, shared clan-culture and a shared sense of being Somalia. Conversely, a country like Ethiopia, until recently could be said to be a state without a nation while a place like Eritrea is in search of both nationhood and statehood. For our purpose, Nigeria is a multi-national state made up of ethnic groups who do not only vary in size but also in the distribution of power, influence and resources. Admittedly, as Elaigwu notes, such a state is marked by aggressive ethnic nationalism as various groups push for the realization of their sub-national self-determination⁷. Their demands often challenge, directly, the centre's demand for national self-determination and integration. Consequently, multi-national states often adopt federalism as a technique to manage their competing interests. The federal system is thus often a compromise solution between two types of self-determination; that of maintaining a supranational framework of government which guarantees security for the nation-state and that of the self-determination of the component groups to retain their identities. While this concept of federalism may be clear enough, the rationale behind its formation, as we shall see later in this paper, requires explanation because the problems associated with it are sufficiently complex.

Related to the above issues are matters of ethnic group and ethnicity which constitute grave issues in discussing Nigeria's political history. An ethnic group is conceived as a group of people whose members identify with each other, through a common heritage that is real or assumed, sharing cultural characteristics. This shared heritage may be based upon putative ancestry, history, kinship, religion, language and shared territory. This has meaning to the individual only

if he or she identifies with it as a basis for 'primordial' social identity. Ethnic identity in this regard refers to a person's sense of belonging to an ethnic group and it is drawn from the realization that a person's thought, perception, feelings and behavior are consistent with those of other members of the ethnic group. It is this measure of loyalty or attachment which is termed ethnicity as a characteristic of an ethnic group. Out of this, distinct cultural, political and economic behaviours are developed, most often as a weapon of offence or defence in a competitive process⁸.

For Nigeria, the colonial regime seized every opportunity to spread the propaganda that Nigerians did not have a common destiny with respect to political independence because they were separated by differences in history and tradition. Sir Hugh Clifford, Governor of Nigeria in 1920, helped to strengthen this when he said that he was⁹

...entirely convinced of the right, for example, of the people of Egbaland... or any of the great Emirates of the North... to maintain that each of them is, in a very real sense, a nation... it is the task of the government of Nigeria to build and fortify these national institutions.

The colonial government sustained a disposition that facilitated ethnic mobilization and polarization. For instance, in 1910 the colonial state promulgated the Land and Native Rights Ordinance which formally proclaimed some land in the North as Native Land to be controlled and administered by the colonial governor. This law was manipulated to limit the number of others migrating to the North¹⁰.

A major corollary of the above discussion has to do with political culture. Political culture refers to those aspects of a culture which have impact of some sort on political traditional, behaviour, political institutions and their operations. Roy Macridis defines it as "commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules"¹¹. This construction is in line with Lucian Pye's position which holds that the political culture of a people is:

The set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provides the underlying

assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideas and the operating norms of a polity”¹².

All these postulations indicate that political culture deals with the images, beliefs and values which provide people with the means for perceiving, interpreting and evaluating the physical and the social aspects of the political life of a nation. In essence, it is possible, through it, to see the nature of the society's orientation towards problem-solving, orientation to collective action, orientation to the political system and orientation to other people. Political culture serves as a framework for perception and orientation towards political life; it determines the standards to be applied in judging political institutions as to whether they are good, just and rational. It also defines what is good government, what goals ought to be pursued by the community; including the standard of conduct appropriate for public officials, the rights and responsibility of citizens and the role of individuals and institutions in the political process.

The concept of a political community inadvertently emerges within these considerations. A political community, according to James Skillen, is government accountable to citizens and citizens under government¹³. Robert Nisbet however says it is a society centred in and dominated by the state¹⁴.

In a simple term, a political community is a community of humans with self-regulating mechanisms; although people have different words to refer to the political order in which they live. It could be called state, nation, community, republic, kingdom, commonwealth etc. However, in some cases, these political entities are defined by a constitution (basic law) which specifies the tasks and limits of government in the state. The state is the only community that is inherently coercive and because of that it must be diluted, emasculated and chained¹⁵. The purpose of a constitution, in the political community, is to mark off the boundaries of the political order and to specify the responsibilities of government and the people so that arbitrary government can be eliminated.

The most worrisome issue, however, is the nature of the state and what its constitution should constitute. As James Skillen aptly noted, not many states have adequately answered what a constitution should constitute because they have mostly attempted two primary things; viz,

laying down electoral procedures and to distinguish the levels and or branches of government; and secondly, that of listing a number of protected rights that the people hold independent of government¹⁶. What they have not done, according to Skillen, is to clarify the identify and purpose of the commonwealth itself because a constitutional state or republic needs more definition that simply a description of its government offices, a listing of prior individual rights and an articulation of some procedural rules for elections and conduct of government.

A political community should exist not in order for the 'people' to use government to do anything they want but rather so that citizens and government may establish and sustain a just public legal order which is upheld by laws that assure all citizens of fair treatment. This is because people are always more than simply citizens. They are people whose talents and vocations may involve many dimensions, that is, political, economic and social. Citizens living under government do constitute a real community defined as a public-legal community and all its members, who should be called citizens, should have a right to share in the fruits and benefits of its commonwealth¹⁷.

The next major conceptual matter is that of indigeneity (and belonging). These concepts are intimately entwined, woven together in conversation about attachment to place, about nationalism and about 'soil, blood and identity'¹⁸. Indigeneity comes from being an *indigene* or *being indigenous*. The intimacy between indigeneity and belonging 'leads to slippages of meaning, and to the raw and salty conflicts that sometimes flare out of contesting definitions'. In a simple term, an *indigene* is conceived as a *native*; one who first settled in an area and has the right of claim over land, grazing field and other sites of historical importance including chieftaincy of the area¹⁹. Joseph Rinyom says that indigeneship is "an attachment to an ancestral tribal home which happens to be the origin of one's being within a given geographical, national, regional or even local demarcation"²⁰.

The adjective from 'indigene' is 'indigenous', which means that which exists as *native* or existing naturally in a particular region, environment or country. We can talk of *indigenous people*, who are people, communities and nations who claim a historical continuity and cultural affinity with societies endemic to their original territories that developed prior to exposure to the larger connected civilization associated with western culture²¹. These societies therefore consider themselves distinct from other societies which have contested their cultural sovereignty and self-

determination. Characteristically, indigeneous societies, in any location or region of the world, range from those who have been significantly exposed to the expansionary or colonizing activities of other societies through to those who still remain in comparative isolation from any external influence. Other related terms for indigenous people include *aborigines, native people, autochthonous, and first people*.

Most observers would admit that when it comes to land, especially in the Nigerian context, indigeneity begets belonging because, to be indigenous is, after all, to be autochthonous, 'to be born of the land'. For Nigeria, the concept of 'indigene' and its corollary 'settler', have become phenomena that have kept this nation on the precipice for decades. Who an indigene is in a particular area could be difficult to define, especially in the light of the migrations of people over time, across cultures and space. This is also so because it is common historical knowledge, as we shall see later, that only very few Nigerian ethnic groups could lay claim to being continuous sole residents of their current *homelands* for a period exceeding a millennium, including those with a tradition of origin indicating that they had sprang up from the ground in the environment they now occupy²². A settler is seen as latter inhabitant of an area, who seemingly has residency right but not customary and political rights; that is, to claim land, chieftaincy, control over customs and traditions. What this means is that indigeneship of a particular society or region confers certain rights which others should not enjoy by virtue of being settlers or migrants or strangers.

Those considered 'settlers' have consistently maintained that having settled in a place for a long period it is not proper to refer to them as settlers but rather as indigenes and that while their "kiths and kins could be located elsewhere, they could not really trace their roots appropriately, neither could they fit properly with the old society they or their forebears left several years ago"²³. In essence, as those settlers grow to be five or six or seven generations deep the concept of indigeneity is increasingly contested. They may even ask as to 'how many generation does it take to become indigenous to a chosen of homeland'? This position is always, however, countered by the indigenes; that no matter the number of years a settler had lived in a place, he or she still remains a settler because it is difficult for a settler to become a native.

Against the backdrop of the indigeneity question which Nigerian has been experiencing, it is not difficult to conclude that the *indigene/settler* phenomena will continue to remain contentious

because it could be argued that the dividing line between indigene/settler is very thin, more so that an indigene somewhere could be a settler in another place. Equally, the settler/indigene question is not restricted or confined to or between ethnic groups only because even ethnically 'homogenous' groups still refer and treat some members of the same group as settlers within the same sub-ethnic identity group. The phenomenon is an age long problem and one that has drawn the people closer to repeating the cliché 'is Nigeria a nation' in recent times and, unlike in the pre-colonial, this development has assumed a more deleterious dimension on national integration due to the obvious manipulation by individuals and groups in our type of political community.

The Obvious Excuses Offered for Problems Generated by Indigeneity and Belonging Question

Several historical, political, economic and social forces have been stated to be multiple obstructions to Nigerian unity and they are responsible for the controversies over indigeneity and the attendant conflicts in our political system. We shall attempt to highlight the obvious ones often advanced for the nation's inability to make credible headway.

There was apparent frustration with the emergence of Nigeria in 1914 as reflected in the type of commentaries the main papers in circulation put forward, as well as the type of mindset the political elite threw up. For instance, on January 13 1914, just about two weeks after the Amalgamation, the *Chronicle* said that "union of names does not mean or involve a union of customs and manners"²⁴. The *Times of Nigeria* of May 5, 1914 followed with a terse statement that "the amalgamation of 1914 is broadly squeaking the conquest and subjugation of southern Nigeria by Northern Nigeria."²⁵ Years later the ensuring mindset, largely constructed on ethnic perception, emerged clearly in the statement from Tafawa Balewa, in reference to the Nigerian federation, that it is "only British intention in Nigeria"²⁶ and Obafemi Awolowo noted that "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression"²⁷.

These statements, on their own value, are true but the hidden strength in them were insalubrious to an emergent nation-state. Ethnicity became a prominent issue when in the contest for power, the elite saw ethnicity and the issue of origin and settlement location as weapons to gain ascendancy. We do not contest the fact that the British colonial authorities encouraged vertical

relations between the individuals and communities since horizontal relations would have nailed the colonial confinement earlier than envisaged. The excuse was easily picked that the “British created a union but not unity” because the elite did not interact properly long enough before independence to work out acceptable mechanisms of conflict resolution. Given the competitive setting in which they found themselves, Nigerian politicians withdraw into their ethnic/ethno-regional or geo-ethnic shells in order to mobilize following for effective competition. Where people came from became very potent instrument for reward systems or exclusion.

The political system which evolved greatly manifested this division, with an elite mal-integration that occurred in the process of building a nation-state. The argument paraded, one which a reasonable number of Nigerians latched onto, is that Nigeria is a multi-ethnic state, a commonwealth of separate and diverse autonomous nations which would find genuine integration difficult. The negative aspects of Nigeria’s ethnic character became the continuous subject of reference. It is this argument which sustains the force of persistent impression that insists on the artificiality of Nigeria and that not only does the artificiality of our creation continue to militate against efforts at achieving national unity, the very colonial experience which laid the foundation for the artificial creation left a heritage of ethno-centricity and divisiveness which constitute veritable obstacles to our search for national unity and stability²⁸.

Taken thoughtfully, these arguments form part of the larger misconception which prevent us from knowing the real people with whom we must live and work. Nigerians have almost become contented to make do with stereotypes, a condition which reinforce ethnocentrism, consolidating arguments by some for the break up of the federation into independent nationality units. The consequences of our inability to soberly understand history has thus been horrendous. The Nigerian nation-state has been less helpful in this matter, especially as it bothers on the relationship between the state and the ethnic groups. Some of the aspects of this relationship that compound indigeneity problem include, but not limited to, the state’s aggressive accumulation of power and resources, depriving communities of their autonomy and power hierarchies; policies which led to loss of traditional means of production, especially over land and water resources; and structural changes in the economy which exposed a reasonable percentage of the people to several shocks in the development process. Invariably, government policies that enhanced the importance of indigeneity have heightened inter-communal divisions because they have served

to erode the very meaning and importance of national citizenship, subordinating it in many respects to Nigerian's ethnicity and ancestry.

Aspects of Indigeneity and Belonging in Nigerian History

The traditions of origin of Nigerian peoples are of varying degrees and forms. In history, five categories of traditions of origin in Nigeria could be identified, especially on the basis of their central points of emphasis or what could be called the core of each tradition. These are traditions of origin through migration and marriage; traditions of origin in terms of migration and relationship with other Nigerian groups; traditions of origin from a common ancestor; traditions of origin through migration from the east, and traditions of origin as independent or autonomous emergence. There may be arguments as to the limitations of such oral traditions, especially on the ground that they could be contradictory, subject to alteration, lacking accurate chronology and only revealing a fraction of the events but they however, constitute remarkable basis for the reconstruction of Nigerian history.

Such traditions of origin and settlement, backed up by recent archaeological, linguistic and geographical studies, help to defrock the assumption that the existence of different cultural units in Nigeria implies the isolation of the various social groups and the lack of reasonable interactions. Before the colonial forces came and established a colonial state, a reasonable segment of the peoples who eventually came under the emergent Nigerian nation-state had, in varying degrees, known each other and interacted reasonably. Some acquaintance with some of the salient historical aspects could be extremely useful as they point to the fact that the traditions of origin, migration and settlement indicate that our peoples were not isolated, 'pure tribes' as often advanced by the uninformed²⁹.

The population of the northern parts of Nigeria today is a hybrid of several stock of ethnic groups that emerged over the years in the region. The Fulani, for instance, moved into this areas from the 12th century onwards, and moved among an 'accommodating' population of the Hausa-speaking group. The Hausa and Kanuri have ancestral connections alluded to in the Bayajidah legend. In this legend, as with the theory that lies behind the *Ebi system* in treating the origins of the Yoruba Kingdom, we find that sons of a common father each founded settlements that

constituted a clan, a chieftain or even a Kingdom³⁰. Equally, the stories of origin and migration of the Idoma, Jukun, Igala and Nupe have a series of complex traditions of ancestral migrations which indicate ethnic interactions. Those who constitute the Nupe, Idoma, Igala, Abakwariga, Alago, Ebira of whom we may want to ascribe differences in ethnic constitution today may not have separated from each other in more than a thousand years ago. As a matter of fact, it was as a result of pressure from within and without that the Idoma began to migrate from the Kwararafa Empire at about the middle of the 16th century³¹.

The founding of the Benin dynasty and the Yoruba influence go a long way to also substantiate assertions that our peoples are not as isolated as we are tempted to believe. After founding the Benin dynasty, Oranmiyan left Benin to found old Oyo on the outskirts of Nupe and Borgu. The long process of adventure and interaction also meant years of admixture of population and despite the hybrid nature of their origins, nothing stopped the people of old Oyo Empire from becoming identified as Oyo Yoruba that fought against Nupe and Borgu³². What is then so inherently impossible about today's hybrid peoples of Nigeria developing into real Nigerians, united on certain common goals and philosophies?.

Cultural affinities and a heritage of common sojourning in the Kisra legend connect peoples from the Lake Chad Basin to Bussa in the Middle Niger. This is a chain of migrations which does not necessarily imply physical migration but might be referring to diffusion of cultural traits over wide areas. Such traits together with voluntary migrations and settlements were clearly visible in the history of northern Igbo and people of Igala Kingdom. That is why Adediran noted that most ethnic groups in Nigeria:

...have myths of ancestral migration from the 'North' or 'East' the historicity of which can be rightly questioned but which can be taken as indicative of similarities in aspects of their socio-political culture³³.

Linguistic affinity between the various ethnic groups are also suggestive of the fact that at some time in the past Nigerian ethnic communities were geographically contiguous or had a considerable degree of social interaction.

Glottochronology had indicated that many of the ethnic groups were so closely related in the past that they spoke the same language³⁴. Such a relationship is clearly seen between the Igala and Idoma, and between Igala and Yoruba. A majority of Nigerian ethnic groups speak languages that belong to the three major linguistic group³⁵. Between one geo-cultural group and the other, the ethnic boundaries were thus not sharply defined as there were zones of transactions. Hausa merchants were to be found all over the region as far south as the frontiers with the forest zones. Intricate systems of trade scouters cut across Igboland, Ibibio, Idoma, Igala, Yorubaland, Borgu, Nupe, Hasua and Kanuri territories. The northern Igbo that moved into Igala were heavily Igalanised and the Igala, by the decline of the slave trade, experience same in Igboland. Such socio-economic interactions had political results such as Igala titles existing in northern Igboland. In the same manner, Benin socio-political institutions exist in western Igboland; likewise the Egungun festival in Yoruba, borrowed by old Oyo from Nupe, is now more popular in Yorubaland than in its original society. How could such not be harnessed for building cultural bridges and encouraging national unity?

The same could be said of the states/kingdoms that emerged in Nigeria. Their emergence involved a fusion of different peoples and accommodation of foreigners. Kanuri empire comprised Hausa, Jukun, Shuwa Arab and the Bulala. Old Oyo accommodated Nupe and Borgu. Edo Empire of Benin had within its political azimuth western Igbo, Yoruba and western Niger Delta³⁶. These multi-ethnic states adopted deliberate policies which promoted ethnic integration, and their efforts at significant cultural accommodation were bolstered by inter-marriages which were major cementing factors in inter-personal and inter-group relations. Bilingualism equally helped to promote integration and unity. In this regard, the Hausa hegemony created a *pax* within what turned out to be Northern Nigeria. The Aro hegemony also created such a *pax* east of the Niger as the Igbo made attempts to integrate the various communities within their region – facilitated as it were by Igbo as lingual-franca.

Even archaeological evidence points to the pristine spread of our people. Evidence from the middle Benue Valley admittedly ties in with those from other zones with a high illuminating potential for some emerging perspectives on early Nigerian history. Nok culture finds found elsewhere within middle Benue Valley in this regard become significant. As Igirgi notes, concerning the available evidence of Nok related artifacts in the Lower Benue,

...although, the Katsina-Ala finds did not feature other Nok culture constituents besides pottery, this could be a factor of the extent of the research so far. Notwithstanding, the terracotta figurines and pottery on their strength suggest affinity to an artistic or cultural tradition which apparently was widespread over what is now Central Nigeria³⁷.

It is clear that some people in the middle Benue Valley participated in this ancient culture whose distribution implies a widespread phenomenon in this early history of the Nigerian region.

On other fronts, the historical antecedents are fortified by developments in the 19th century; a period which could be aptly described as a *revolutionary period* when Nigerian societies came under serious pressure. The Sokoto jihad and the Yoruba civil wars stood out. Accepted as it may be argued that they did contribute to instability, they led to new ascending philosophies that helped integration. The Fulani in Sokoto Caliphate created a *pax* using Islam as a cohesive factor, striving to integrate various communities. Equally, as from mid 19th century, Christianity actually broke down ethnic boundaries several parts of Nigeria.

We have seen that the British had the force to establish structures which propped their regimes, and facilitate their administration, they also created new administrative units as districts, divisions, provinces and regions. The concept of these units were novel to our people, but over time, our people became attached to them. Strong loyalties had been built up around the existing structure so much so that people could fight over them irrespective of their ethnic homogeneity. Nigerians could equally be made, given the right leadership and ideological orientation, to develop strong loyalty to the larger structure called Nigeria.

Lessons for National Integration and Unity

The share force of historical and other related evidence available to us indicated that the deployment of indigeneity, along with its twin matter of 'belonging' cannot be rigid instrument for exclusion of Nigerians from the commonwealth. There is not doubt that colonialism had a lot to do with what emerged as the *Nigerian question*, viz, that it did not encourage a uniform policy on social issues such as education, residency and administration (for example, the existence of

sabon gari for 'native foreigners' and *Tudun Wada* for non-indigenous northerners), that this created serious differential spatial and social impact on the economy and politics of the new nation-state of Nigeria; that the uneven spread of western education played a role in defining the relationships and balance of power between ethnic groups and regional blocs and that colonialism was to a large extent about institutional and ethnic separation.

Colonialism from the aggregation of the issues above, incorporated segments of the pre-colonial power elites and transformed them into components of and agents for the regime. Patterns of inter-group relations and new structures of power between groups emerged. Just as Enoch Oyejide noted, the Nigerian state (at independence) and since independence has remained largely like its colonial predecessor, like the private property of a few "and because its power, like the colonial authority, is so pervasive and the benefits derivable from its control so immense, the struggle for the control of the state power has always been intense and those engaged in it have had no difficulty in exploitation even some ethnic differences to attract these benefits"³⁸.

Nigerian history however instructs us to see our difficulties and the excuses offered as points we can assail. Other multi-ethnic states have been able to forge ahead positively without being tied down by destructive ignorance of the past. A few points can further illuminate why indigeneity, especially on the grounds of race, language and settlements should not deny us the benefits of integration and unity.

The assumption, for instance, of Nigeria as a unviable nation-state because it is an artificial amalgam of incompatible and antagonistic racial groups, who have virtually nothing in common, has been stated to have no scientific base. Enoch Oyejide, citing Prof Kay Williamson, one of the world's historical linguists, stated that languages which constitute in most cases, the most important single basis of the identity of an ethnic group, have never been fixed, immutable, unchanging phenomena; that languages change and are transformed. Accordingly, ethnic groups, nations and nationality are not natural or biologically fixed entities but historical formation which are changed by the historical process³⁹.

In line with the same argument Olukoju, for instance, reveals that none of the large linguistic or ethnic groups in Nigeria such as Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa existed as a political entity or even as a cultural unit in the form in which we know them today⁴⁰. He noted that not until the 19th century,

the Yoruba, for example, identified themselves simply in terms of their towns, villages or sub-ethnic groups such as the Ijebu, Egba or Ekiti. In the same vein, despite the bonds of the Hausa language and Islam, the Hausa-speaking people never formed a polity that brought all of them together until the emergence of the Sokoto caliphate.

Prof. K. O. Dike and Ekejiuba, in Olayemi Akinwumi⁴¹, had earlier asserted that the Igbo is a nationality that was formed in the 20th century. According to them:

“It is often forgotten or merely mentioned in the footnote that Igbo is a modern ethnic category which many of the constituent groups have only recently and often reluctantly accepted as their ethnic identity, often on political and administrative grounds. During the period covered by our study, the now twelve million or more Igbo distributed over 30,000 square miles of territory east and west of the Niger were variously referred to either as cultural groups (for example Nri, Isuama, Ezza or Otanzu) or by ecological zones in which they are found (e.g. Olu or Oru i.e. the river line people of Adagbe, people of the flood plain; Enugu, people who live on the hills; Aniocha, people who live on heavily leached and eroded soils; Ohozara, people of the Savannah) or as occupational groups some as Opi egbe, people who fashion guns; Ndiuzu or Umudioka, blacksmiths, artists and carvers. Since Igbo was used at this time pejoratively to refer to the densely populated uplands, the major sources of slaves and by extension to slaves, it is not surprising that many of these groups have been reluctant to accept the Igbo identity.

Ethnic groups, nations and nationalities are therefore not natural or biologically fixed entities but historical formations which undergo changes by historical processes.

For example, in explaining the nature of ethnic composition of the Niger Delta, Kenneth Dike puts a lot of emphasis on the ethnic heterogeneity of the population up to the extent of arguing that

In the peopling of the Delta no one Nigerian tribe had monopoly. Benis, Ijaws, Sobos, Jerkins, Ekoi, Ibibio, Efik and even the northern Nigerian tribes were represented⁴².

By Dike's postulation, this produced polities which would not be regarded as tribes. He reveals:

More over, city-state is more appropriate designation than tribal state, since the period of migration disorganized the tribal entities and the slave further accentuated the mingling of peoples. In the 19th century, therefore, the Delta States were grouped not by considerations of kinship but by contiguity and in the period under survey, citizenship came increasingly to depend not on descent, but on residence⁴³.

This is also why there is no genetic basis for the racialisation of Nigerian ethnic groups.

Peter Uche Isichie states:

"Many years have gone by since historians first appreciated the value of genetic evidence from the study of blood constituents in historical analysis. Blood constituents lie entirely outside human volition, the light they shed on past relationship is therefore invaluable. The frequency of any varies from population to population, but they are known to be almost identical in population related to one another. The incidence of any particular gene in any population remains relatively constant and stable for many centuries and this has provided the basis for genetic studies in various population"⁴⁴

With reference to the Nigerian circumstance, Peter Isichie still reveals that:

"A cursory look at the provisional genetic map of Nigeria constructed from the available data shows that there is some similarity in the genetic constitution of most of Nigeria's people. So it is possible that the original people in the area now regarded as Nigeria were descended from the same ancestral stock and that the difference in the genetic paths within the country may be due to bombardment by external genes... Nigeria's

people are descended from quite small Stone Age population living pretty much within the country's present boundaries⁴⁵.

Despite these scientific and historical revelations the ethnic question still fashion instruments to define exclusivity and inclusivity, on the basis of indigeneity. Some obvious clauses we put in our constitution do not help matters. The constitution (especially sections 25, 26, 27; sections 33-43) recognizes citizenship by birth or naturalization and it also recognizes the right of citizen to free movement, association, settlement, religion in any part of the country but on key political appointment, such as minister, the constitution contradicts itself where it emphasizes on indigeneity of a person for appointment as ministers of the federal republic. Section 147 (2) and (3) says "provided that in giving effect to the provisions aforesaid, the President shall appoint at least one minister from each state who shall be an indigene of such a state".

This and other considerations have made the bond of indigeneity stronger than that of citizenship and as one analyst puts it, the ethnic factor is at the front burner of Nigerian citizens to the extent that denying them the right to indigeneity is like removing oxygen from the system.

Ignorance and stereotypism are twin matters that fuel ethnicity and they are employed widely to distort the complex realities of society and history of Nigeria in order to serve particular agenda. Our indigeneity question and the level of ethnicity it breeds puts the nation always on the edge. For instance, ethnic politics has no time for democracy, because you are either with your people or you are with the enemy. Late Bala Usman described it as fascist as it is observed in violence and the threat of it⁴⁶. He advised that for us to clearly understand the nature of the forces that work against us and which undermine our capacity to control our destiny, we have to grasp the nature and the forms of the historical process of the formation our nations, nationalities, ethnic groups and polities.

Conclusion

If indigeneity and the colour it has assumed is a product of our history, especially the nature of our colonial formation, we need history to resolve it because history holds the key to that

understanding in a way that no discipline can claim. If this nation must grow beyond ignorance and stereotype, we must diligently seek knowledge about Nigeria's multi-farious people.

History, as Professor Adiele Afigbo, in a National Merit Award Lecture of 1999, noted produces the cultural nationalist and this could be under three significant modes helpful to national intergretation and development. One is history as antiquarianism; that is, history is studied for purpose of understanding the past in its own terms; secondly, history as enwisdomisation which emphasis history as important for impartation of wisdom, that is knowledge, understanding, balance and serenity based on the claim that the historian has responsibility to the well-being of society; and thirdly, that of history as instrumentalist or interventionist mode which conceptualizes history as "an instrument for engineering a brave new world. In all these there is a cultural dimension to the building of national consciousness in which the historian can play a critical role⁴⁷ .

It is important to note that, in a federal system like ours, people cannot for long be separated into rigid compartments. That the colonial state we inherited was not an ethnically cohesive state is not an excuse in perpetuality for the failure of our people to integrate effectively. Our cultural heterogeneity and the accident of our location and settlement cannot ordinarily prevent the evolution of a national identity. In many places these have actually promoted political, social, economic and cultural integration.

National unity, as Obari Ikime advised, wherever it has been successfully established has not always been a child of natural growth. It requires a deepening of knowledge and understanding of the various culture groups and peoples, the promotion of a spirit of tolerance, the development and evolution of a philosophy or ideology that can sustain and nurture the idea of national unity.

In the same vein our educational policy must project, at all levels, the knowledge of the constituent parts of this country. It should encourage travel and exposure which can eliminate ignorance and promote deeper understanding about Nigeria's various peoples and culture. A situation where institutions and people struggle, unobtrusively to delete history from the list of courses offered in institutions of learning in Nigeria, does not augur well for the nation because if you neglect history, history will neglect you. In this light, the study of history should be mandatory right from secondary school and should be taught by people rightly equipped for this

assignment. When we get to learn about the frustrations and triumphs of our ancestors, their own successes and failures become more understandable and we shall begin to see our lives in historical perspective with the past and the present merging into a continuous chain of events for the advancement of our nation and people. We will definitely have to move away from the lamentations of our people such as what Femi Aribisala noted in 1988 and which has hardly altered. He ruefully said:

“I certainly know of no value that I can describe as being widely accepted without contradiction in Nigeria... values, such as excellence, merit, equality and justice continue to be questioned... while in other societies they are regarded as articles of faith... Until we reach a consensus about national values to which we can appeal or refer without fear of contradiction, we will not be able to establish solid institutions and mechanisms to protect and promote our national interest⁴⁸ .

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Chapter Four

INDIGENEITY AND THE BIFURCATION OF CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS IN NIGERIA: THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION

Jibrin IBRAHIM

Introduction

Democracies make sense only if the polity is committed to defending and promoting the rights of all citizens. Federalism has meaning only if all groups within the federating units have equal rights and there is no hierarchy between groups with more or less rights than the others. In Nigeria however, our democratic federalism is facing serious threat from the gradual imposition of a hierarchy of rights in which one category, defined as indigenes have superior rights to the other category defined as settlers. This has created serious contestation of social, legal and political authority as indigenes and settlers contest to impose their might over the other or to defend their right to full citizenship.

Following repeated violent conflicts and massacres between indigenes and settlers in Jos and in Plateau state in general, a delegation of civil society organisations from all over the country visited Jos on a fact finding mission to understand the dynamics of the situation in which citizenship hierarchies were being developed on the basis of indigeneity. During the visit, the paramount ruler in Jos, Gbom Gwon Jos, Da Jacob Buba Gyang asserted that the hausa-Fulani only started settling in Jos in 1900 and are therefore clearly not indigenes. This perspective suggests that people so defined as settlers can never become full members of the community if 110 years of residence cannot convert Hausa-Fulani “settlers” to “indigenes.” In setting the tone for this paper, it is worthwhile quoting at length from the report of the mission.

The situation in Jos implicates the future of citizenship in Nigeria. In 1994, the Aribiton Fiberesima Commission of Inquiry defined an “Indigene” of Jos as “one whose ancestors were natives of Jos, beyond living memory. This does not include any person who may not remember from where his father or grandfather left his native home for Jos as a fixed home, domiciled there as of choice for life, or is ignorant about from where his family moved to Jos permanently in quest of better living or in the process of his business”.¹ On this basis, it concluded that the Fulanis and Hausas of Jos were merely “citizens” of Jos and not indigenes. Building on this, in 2004, the Plateau State Peace Conference resolved that “Indigeneship should be peculiar to a people who are the first to have settled *permanently* in a particular area and who are often considered as ‘natives’.”¹ In particular, the conference determined that “*Indigene Certificates should only be issued to Afizere, Anaguta, and Berom in Jos North Local Government Area in line with the definition of indigeneship.*”¹

These conclusions and decisions are central to the problem in Jos in three ways. First, neither the Commission nor its successors defined the legal implications of “indigeneship” as distinct from “citizenship” of Jos. Secondly, this definition of indigeneship privileges sedentary communities and does not take account of the peculiar character of pastoralist Fulanis as a mostly pastoralist community that does not establish itself in a place by building sedentary populations. Taken to its logical conclusion, this could be a basis for excluding the pastoralist Fulani from any state in Nigeria or beyond. It is not surprising that the Fulani should feel endangered by this. Third, in the constitutional practice of Nigeria, entitlement to proof of citizenship rests on proof of indigeneship of one of the Local Governments/States of Nigeria. Being ineligible to be considered indigenes of the Jos in which their ancestors before them have lived and transacted livelihood for several generations, the Fulani are unable to gain access to **Certificates of Indigeneship** with which to prove their entitlement to passports or to enlistment or appointment to or admission in federal and state institutions. This could render the pastoralist Fulanis of Jos North somewhat stateless.

Simply put this has become existential among many pastoralist Fulanis who consider it as putting them in a situation to choose between their country and their livelihood.

The problem of settlers and indigenes is not peculiar to Plateau state. Indeed, it is a major problem in virtually all states of the country even if the level of violence related to the issue differs from state to state.

Resolving the Dilemma of Citizenship and Rights

Our point of departure is that the language of indigenous communities makes sense in many parts of the world such as the Americas, Australia and Southern Africa where European settlers invaded the territories, massacred the indigenous or autochthonous communities they found there and disposed and oppressed the survivors. In many African countries however, the language of indigenous communities, defined as autochthons that are not settlers, has been used to deprive other indigenous Africans of their citizenship rights.

Our argument is that in essence, the growth of formal democracy and citizenship rights is being checkmated by complex identity conflicts in which rights and entitlements of some groups are being whittled down by other groups who are able to use the ideology of difference and xenophobic tools to reduce the citizenship rights of the other so that theirs could be enhanced. We note that all over Nigeria, rapid processes through which social and political actors at the national and transnational levels are constructing hierarchies of citizenship that reduce the rights of other Nigerians. The result is a growing gap between sets of citizens with full rights and others with subaltern rights.

Nigeria is a multiethnic and multireligious country inhabited by about 470 ethnic groups. These groups are not only distinguished by language, customs and myths of origin, but they also vary in size, power and influence, making Nigeria a classic example of a country with unequal ethnic relations. The country is also marked by cultural, geographical and religious heterogeneity, and above all, by a long history of migrations which makes virtually all Nigerians to be settlers. It is

in recognition of this that the architects of modern Nigeria, especially the early nationalists settled for a federal system of government as a mechanism for coping with problems associated with the deep ethnic and religious divisions that exist.

Over the years, as part of the efforts to cope with the problems of a multi-ethnic society and to accommodate differences in the true spirit of “unity in diversity”, policy makers have adopted a number of measures. Some of these measures include the creation of new states and local governments and the entrenchment of certain provisions in the constitution to guarantee fairness and equity such as the “federal character” principle enshrined in the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Consociational measures of this type which involve some elements of power sharing and a deliberate attempt to regulate competition and access to resources/opportunities as a means of protecting groups considered to be relatively disadvantaged are not alien to federal systems.

However, in the Nigerian context this has had a boomerang effect in the sense that problems, which they are meant to solve, are reinforced. Consociational measures or related policies that emphasise “ethnic arithmetic” are meant to moderate the divisive nature of ethnic and regional competition for power and opportunities. Unfortunately, in the Nigerian situation, especially due to the manner in which they have been implemented, the result is the heightening of ethnic tension and ill feelings. A good example of such measures which has created more problems than it was intended to solve is the provisions in the constitution regarding the implementation of the federal character principle which in practice limits existing opportunities to those defined as “indigenes”. The consequence is that millions of Nigerians who find themselves residents in places other than where they can claim ‘indigeneity’ or where they are accepted as “indigenes” are labelled as “strangers” and “settlers”. Nigerians so defined are subjected to all kinds of exclusions and deprivations, which differentiate them from the “natives”, and members of the “host communities”. What this does immediately is to place obstacles on the path of Nigerians who are so labelled from the enjoyment of their full citizenship rights, which are formally guaranteed in the elaborate provisions in the constitution regarding the Fundamental Rights of citizens. This outcome completely blocks possibilities of deepening civil and political rights of individuals and groups in the country as people stigmatised as settlers are perpetually denied their civil and human rights.

The Mamdani Principles: The Indigene/Settler Antipodes

Professor Mahmoud Mamdani is one of the leading African intellectuals that has closely examined the linked concept of indigene/settler and has enunciated a number of principles that are germane to the Nigerian case. There are three main principles that can be derived from his numerous publications on the subject:

- i. The two categories – indigenes/settlers are interdependent as one defines the other. Settlers exist because some people have succeeded in defining themselves as indigenes in order to exclude others who they have defined as settlers.
- ii. Settlers are not defined by immigration, as virtually all African groups and peoples have migrated over time. The concept of settler is a political definition attributed on the basis of conquest, state power and law – customary and modern.
- iii. The settler can never become an indigene because the basis of the differentiation is the denial of civic citizenship through a political imposition of a permanent and exclusionary tribal or religious label.

This means that the known historical methods of gaining citizenship through migration, immersion in the language, culture and norms of the new community through time are excluded. The implication of these principles is that as long as we continue with the affirmation of the indigene/settler divide, our dreams of deepening democratic governance will remain elusive. When we look at the most spectacular cases of indigene/settler conflicts in Nigeria in recent times, the negative effects of this politics of permanent exclusion becomes obvious. The longstanding fratricidal war between the Hausa and the Kataf (Atyab) in Zango-Kataf in southern Kaduna, the protracted Jukun/Tiv conflict in Wukari, and the Chamba and Kuteb conflict in Taraba as well as the deadly confrontation in Nasarawa between the Bassa and Epira are all cases of this political decision to permanently deny citizenship to the other, defined as a settler.

This is true even in situations where anthropological evidence suggests that the two groups are of the same ethnic origin as the examples of the Ife/Modakeke crisis in which both groups are Yoruba and the Umuleri/Aguleri conflict in which both groups are Igbo, have clearly shown. The sheer weight of human tragedy that has accompanied these conflicts in terms of deaths of thousands of people, the destruction of property and the displacement of population draw attention, not only to the security threat they pose to the state, but the potential danger they pose to the country's nascent democracy. Although the basis of the crisis of citizenship is in Nigeria's colonial and post-colonial history, and the conflicts arising from it had been there before the recent return to democratic rule, the general expectation is that democracy should provide the most congenial environment for finding lasting and enduring solutions to the problem. Surprisingly, this has not been the case as clearly borne out by the numerous examples of communal violence and ethno-religious conflicts that have appeared to exert enormous stress on the new democratic experiment in the country.

There has been a steady rise in communal tensions and conflicts since the introduction of the indigeneity clause into Nigerian public law through the 1979 Constitution. Since then, numerous cabals of local political elite have devoted considerable resources and time to defining themselves as indigenes, natives and autochthons while defining others in their communities as settlers, migrants and strangers. With the return of democratic rule in 1999, there has been an explosion rather than a reduction of political and religious conflicts. As the number of conflicts and the death toll and destruction of property increases, the strains on democratic governance and indeed political stability have been enormous.

On 19th May 2004, the Nigerian Senate and House of Representatives voted massively to give validity to a state of emergency that had been declared by President Olusegun Obasanjo on Plateau State. The President had suspended the State Governor, Deputy Governor and House of Assembly for six-months citing the rights conferred on him to do so by section 305 of the

Constitution. For the declaration to enter into force the President needed the support of at least two-thirds of the National Assembly and he got it.

The reasons the President gave for taking such a drastic action are the following. The breakdown of law and order in Plateau state and its ripple effects with violence or the threat of violence growing in neighbouring states such as Bauchi, Nassarawa, Taraba, Kano, Gombe, Kaduna and Benue. The President also cited the state governor's lack of:

“Interest, desire, commitment, credibility and capacity to promote reconciliation, rehabilitation, forgiveness, peace, harmony and stability” (President Obasanjo's Address to the Nation, 18/05/04).

The Plateau state governor, Joshua Dariye was reported to be making incendiary remarks questioning the citizenship of the Hausa-Fulani Muslim population in Plateau state, who he insisted were settlers, as the following quotes indicate:

“Jos, capital of Plateau state is owned by the natives. Simple. Every Hausa man in Jos is a settler whether he likes it or not.”

“Even if I spend 150 years in Bukuru, I cannot become an indigene of Du.”

“It is an Alqaeda agenda to bring down Plateau state... The ulama were chased out of Kaduna during the Babangida regime. If they were so good why were they sent out of Kaduna? And they came to form their headquarters in Jos.”

(Quotes from “What Dariye Did Say” Weekly Trust, 15th May 2004)

The religious dimension of this conflict has been insidious as the indigenes strongly believe that there is an orchestrated plan by Muslim extremist to use force to dispossess them of their land and political power. The result has been a continuation of massacres and revenge massacres of innocent people labelled as indigenes or settlers.

The 1999 Constitution, Citizenship and Rights

The provisions on Citizenship and Fundamental Rights in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are contained in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The most salient provisions are as follows. Chapter 3, which focuses on Citizenship basically contains provisions relating to citizenship by birth, registration and naturalisation in addition to provisions relating to dual citizenship, renunciation and deprivation of citizenship. While chapter 4 provides a detailed checklist of the fundamental rights, which are the entitlements of Nigerian citizens. These include the right to life, right to the dignity of the human person, the right to personal liberty as well as the right to fair hearing and the right to family and private life. Others are: the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, right to freedom of expression and the press, the right to freedom from discrimination, the right to freedom of movement and the right to acquire and own immovable property.

As can be gleaned from the above, there is nothing to suggest that the enjoyment of these rights have discriminatory application. A reading of other relevant provisions of the constitution lends credence to the point that the promotion of the political objectives of national integration and cohesion are of central concern to the constitution. For instance, Chapter 2, Section 14 (3) provides as follows:

The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies.

Section 14 (4) calls on the states and local governments in the country to implement the federal character principle. Furthermore, Section 15 (3) of the same chapter states that: "For the purpose of promoting national integration, it shall be the duty of the state to (a) provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services throughout the Federation; (b) secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation." It is also instructive to note that the Constitution allows anyone to contest election anywhere he/she wishes, as indigeneity is not a requirement for election into such bodies as the Senate, the Federal House of Representatives, or the State Houses of Assembly. The 1999 Constitution goes further to encourage "inter-marriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious, ethnic or linguistic associations or ties in Section 15 (3c).

What seem problematic however are the constitutional provisions regarding the implementation of the federal character principle? The issues of federal character and quota system have their origins in the recommendations of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) in 1976, which had reasoned that there was need to give every ethnic group in the country a sense of belonging. At the risk of repetition, Section 14 (3) of the 1979 Constitution which captures the reasoning of the CDC defined the objective of federal character as ensuring that the

"Composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies, and the conduct of its affairs, shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria, and the need to promote national unity, and also to command loyalty, thereby ensuring that there

shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic groups or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies".

However, this provision has made it more convenient for the aspiring politicians and ambitious elite to hang on to birth and descent criteria to determine citizenship.

In this sense the most problematic aspect of the issue of citizenship derives from the way in which the 'indigeneity' clause in the 1979 constitution has tended to legitimise discriminatory practices against Nigerians who reside within a state, which is "not their own". According to the constitution, "indigeneship" of a state is conferred on a person whose parents or grandparents were members of a community indigenous to a particular state. We shall return to the specific ways in which the issue of "indigenes" and "natives" have provided practical obstacles to the implementation of the rights conferred on Nigerians by their citizenship of the Nigerian state.

The 1999 Constitution apparently in recognition of the controversy generated by the "indigeneity" clause in the 1979 Constitution has no definitional clause. However, the Constitution still requires the implementation of the federal character principle. The interpretation of Section 147 regarding the appointment of Ministers shows clearly that the notion of "indigeneity" has not been expunged from the constitution. It states: *"Provided that in giving effect to the provisions aforesaid the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each state, who shall be an indigene of such state."*

What this means in effect is that, Nigerians who cannot prove that they are indigenes of a state cannot be appointed into such positions no matter the length of their residence.

The implication is that a tension exists between the formal provisions in the constitution on citizenship and fundamental rights on the one hand, and the practical application of these rights because of the reality of difference introduced by the politically introduced dichotomy between elites seeking to increase their power by defining themselves as "indigenes" and "natives" through

the definition of others as “settlers” and strangers. These categories have tended to undermine the very essence of Nigerian citizenship in the sense that one is not really a citizen of Nigeria, but only a citizen of the place to which he/she is indigenous. The result is that it has created a multi-layered system of citizenship as follows:

- i. Those most privileged are those who belong to the indigenous communities of the state in which they reside.
- ii. Those citizens who are indigenes of other states are less favoured.
- iii. The least favoured are those citizens who are unable to prove that they belong to a community indigenous to any state in Nigeria.
- iv. Women who are married to men from states other their own are in a dilemma, as they can neither be accepted in their “states of origin” or that of their husbands.

In addition to these, it is particularly difficult for migrants in rural locations to have access to farmlands because indigeneity implies membership of the local ethnic community. The system gives undue power to the traditional authorities and power brokers in regulating access to land understood as the collective, natural possession of the ethnic group.

The categories of “indigenes,” “settlers”, and “natives” are social and political constructions of the Nigerian power elite in their search for legitimacy within the local community/state and their quest for access to power and resources. In the ordinary meaning of the words, “indigenes” and “natives” simply refer to a region or country of birth - aborigines and autochthones. In countries such as the United States of America and Australia with a unique history of conquest of indigenous populations such as the native Indians (United States) and Aborigines (Australia), it may be more or less straightforward to use these categories to delineate between the natives and conquerors or settlers. Such usage does not make sense in Nigeria given the country’s peculiar history of state formation, constant migration of people and population shifts in the period prior to and after colonisation.

Indeed, a major study of our region – West African Long Term Perspective Study (1994) undertaken by the African Development Bank and the Club du Sahel revealed that West Africa was had become a region of migrants and settlers with two profound modes of migration that had completely transformed the population dynamics of the region. The first is movement from the Sahel to the middle belt and forest zones, which has produced profoundly cosmopolitan towns and cities. The second is movement from rural to urban areas, which has turned the region into an urban majority zone. By 1990, almost 50% of the people in Nigeria had moved from rural to urban settlements in the post independence period. When we factor in the precolonial migration patterns to current trends, it becomes clear that the great majority of Nigerians, and indeed West Africans are settlers, not indigenes of the places in which they live and work.

In spite of this fact, self-declared indigenes and natives are pitched against settlers in deadly confrontations over access to local power, resources and questions of identity. These labels have become potent instruments for the negative mobilisation of peoples' sentiments and feelings in ways that undermine the national political objectives of integration and the evolution of a harmonious political community. Given the peculiar history of Nigeria just alluded to, every group resorts to history in order to prove its claim to the indigeneity of some specific local political space which is therefore, the major source of communal violence and ethno-religious conflicts in both urban and rural Nigeria.

Citizenship is applicable to a person endowed with full political and civil rights in a state. It defines the political, civil and social rights attributable to the individual as a member of a state. In the modern state, the acquisition of citizenship can be through birth (the law of blood), law of place, and through naturalisation. The notion of citizenship was developed in the context of the bourgeois revolution and the ascendancy of liberalism. The idea evolved with the collapse of feudalism and the medieval state, which limited the rights, and freedom of the individual. The rights and freedom, which were won and secured with the birth of the modern state therefore, transformed the individual

from subject to citizen. Citizenship is thus defined in terms of the special status granted by the state to its members and expresses at the formal level, the equality of all before the state.

In the contemporary Nigerian context, the discourse on citizenship and the application of citizens' rights often generate political tension and violence because it is intricately tied with the issue of ethnic identity, ethnicity and religion. This is the case in so far as indigeneity is tied to membership of a particular local ethnic community. There are three reasons why ethnicity is problematic in relation to the discourse on identity and citizenship:

Ethnic identity is not a fixed form of identity. Although it may appear as a natural community distinguished by a common language, ancestry and myth of origin as well as a common consciousness of being one in relation to others, it is not a static category. It is therefore, subject to frequent reconstitution and redefinition. It is interesting to note for example, that from what the British colonialist identified as 90 ethnic groups in the early part of the last century, the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria has expanded to over 470. Ethnic identity has had a constant history of redefinition, recomposition and reconstitution.

Nigeria is characterised by a state of unequal ethnic relations reflecting an intense unequal competition for state resources. The most important resource in the country is of course state power itself, particularly its coercive and resource allocating elements. Finally, there were historical processes of integration and migrations of various communal groups that were in place before the intrusion of colonialism. This often makes it difficult to establish which group can claim the "native" or "indigenous" status of a place at the expense of others.

What all this means is that the ethnic category on which the definition of citizenship hinges is a very fluid category. It partly explains why the political disputations arising from contradictory notions of citizenship often leads to conflict and violence. In some instances, the groups at conflict over such

claims are not necessarily from different ethnic groups. The groups at conflict may thus be sub-ethnic communities of the same ethnic groups as is the case of the recurrent Ife/Modakeke conflict.

What needs to be emphasised is the fact that after several decades of colonial capitalist development, and the tremendous expansion of infrastructure across the country as well as increasing cultural diffusion, Nigeria cannot simply be reduced to a mere geographical expression. These conflicts relate to the crisis of citizenship in the sense in which groups at conflict deploy or even twist history in the contestation of identity by using such to establish "indigeneity" over a particular political space which could be a state or a local government area. In most of the recorded cases located within semi-urban and rural locations, attempts are often made to establish 'indigeneity' over a local government or any other local political and economic space. A few illustrations will shed some light.

The use of history of migration, early patterns of settlement or local history about patterns of power and domination among the different ethnic groups in establishing "indigenous" claims are evident in virtually all the cases. On the Mambilla Plateau, the series of attacks in the early 1980s on the Bansa and Kamba by the Mambilla is hinged on this conception of citizenship. The Mambilla who laid indigenous claim over the entire Mambilla Plateau do so precisely on the historical claim that their settlement predated the arrival of other ethnic groups such as the Fulani, Bansa and Kamba. For the Bansa and the Kamba whose presence on the Plateau is more or less recent, the bulk of them have arrived in the post-second world war period, it is a lot easier to label them as "aliens". It is in this context that one understands the basis of exclusion that the so-called indigenous group seeks to subject the stranger elements.

The situation in Zango-Kataf is fairly unique and more complex as centuries of interaction between the Hausa on the one hand, and the other communal groups such as Bajju and Kataf (Atyab) have failed to produce the basis of a more enduring harmonious community life. In this respect the situation differs from other cases where the adoption of Islamic religion and inter-marriages have

attenuated the level of social and cultural distance between "immigrant" Hausa population and the "host" communities. What one finds in the Zango-Kataf area of southern Kaduna is the tendency for ethnic boundaries to remain impervious to social and cultural exchanges such as marriages across ethnic and religious boundaries.

The representation made to the Cudjoe Commission by the Kataf following the violence of February 1992 is largely hinged on the claim that the land belonged to the Kataf who accommodated Hausa immigrants on generous terms. By the traditional system of land holding, the Kataf claim, such land in principle should revert to the original owners. However, this historical claim to indigeneity is contradicted by the position of the Hausa community who claimed centuries of effective residency.

Similar claims by "indigenous" groups aimed at excluding "strangers" appear to be central in the communal conflicts between the Kuteb and Chamba in Takum Local Government Area of Taraba state and the unending circle of communal clashes in Nasarawa involving the Ebira, Bassa and Gbagyi. These cases illustrate the enormous difficulty of resorting to history in the contest over identity. The difficulty arises from the fact that there can be no such a thing as eternal historical facts. There is the tendency for facts to be either carefully selected or for the same set of facts to be subjected to conflicting interpretations.

Take the Kuteb/Chamba conflict for example. Although a number of ethnic groups such as Hausa, Jukun, Kuteb and Chamba are found in the Takum area, the major contest has been between the Kuteb and Chamba. From available historical evidence both Kuteb and Chamba had taken effective residency of the area around Takum prior to the colonial intervention. However, in the present context of contestation over the "ownership" of Takum, each of the two communal groups has resorted to different accounts of history to bolster its claim. The Chamba account, which is strongly challenged by the Kuteb appeared to have been the version initially accepted by the colonial authorities, suggests the Chamba as a warrior group, conquered and displaced the more numerous

Kuteb around 1830. The Kuteb on the other hand, who make a strong historical claim over the area in addition to being the most populous in Takum area refute the claim by the Chamba to have conquered them at any point in history, and even cite colonial records in support of their position. The Chamba whom they claim migrated from the Cameroons were given a place to settle by the Kuteb.

The rule of the Kuteb in Takum was later codified by the government of the Northern region in 1963. The situation was however, reversed in 1975 when the Chamba, apparently using their influence in the military government that followed the collapse of the First Republic, got the then Benue Plateau state government to amend the 1963 law. The amendment ensured the eligibility of two Chamba families to contest and ascend to the Ukwé throne, increased the representation of the Chamba and Jukun on the Kings Selection Committee to three, while reducing that of the Kuteb to two thus ensuring advantage for the Chamba.

In 1976, a riot broke out between the Chamba and Kuteb in Takum. The cause of the riot was the alleged manipulation of electoral wards by the Secretary of Takum local government, a Chamba, to give electoral advantage to Chamba contestants. The victory of a Chamba candidate where the Kuteb constitute the majority was not acceptable to the latter. Some of the allegations were later confirmed by a government panel, which had been set up to investigate the communal disturbances. However, renewed violence between the two communal groups has its roots in the process of democratising the local government, which commenced in 1987. The numerical strength of the Kuteb had conferred on them electoral advantage in the elections that had been organised since then until the outbreak of violence in 1997. Although it would appear on the surface as tension between democratisation and multi-ethnic existence, it has a deeper basis in contestation over identity and for control of local power and resources.

The crisis in Ife/Modakeke is fuelled by the same dynamics despite the fact that it pitches one sub-Yoruba group against another. The Modakeke who are believed to be refugees from the Yoruba

wars that followed the breakdown of the Old Oyo empire are said to have come from Oyo. Political tension and conflicts leading to the death of thousands of people had characterised the relationship between the two communal groups over the last two decades. The reasons for the conflict between the two communities seem to have been generated by disagreements over the creation of new local government areas. It goes to show that the question of access to local power is at the core of the unending conflict between the two communities.

In putting forward proposals for ensuring harmony and a just balance between constitutional provisions on citizenship and rights and their practical applications, three pertinent observations are necessary:

First, there is a clear dilemma between individual and group rights in Nigeria's constitutional history. The basic foundation of a liberal democratic order is the rights and freedom attached to the individual as a legal entity. Citizens' rights are primarily conceived as individual rights. At the same time, given the existence of deep divisions in the society along ethnic, religious and regional lines giving rise to "minority" and "majority" identities, there is also need to provide constitutional guarantees for disadvantaged groups as the "federal character" and "quota" provisions have sought to do. But there appears to be a greater obsession with group rights to the detriment of individual rights in the Nigerian debate.

Secondly, the notion of 'indigeneity' entrenched in the 1979 Constitution is at variance with the Nigerian public law tradition. It has seriously compromised the definition of citizenship in the Independence Constitution, which conferred citizenship on all those whose communities had been in the Nigerian territory by October 1 1960. The indigeneity struggle is now leading to the questioning of the citizenship of groups who have been in the Nigerian area even before the colonisation of the country in 1900.

Thirdly, we now have a situation in which a significant number of Nigerians are being excluded from access to certain rights and privileges conferred by public institutions. They include employment in the public service, government contracts, admission in schools, access to privileges such as scholarships, training opportunities, health facilities and even access to vital resources such as land and water (for farming, grazing and fishing). It is vital for the political health of the country that the constitutional provisions that have been used to buttress discrimination against other Nigerians be addressed with urgency.

Citizenship and Constitutional Reform Issues

The concept of indigene should be completely deleted from the Nigerian Constitution because it produces a majority of losers rather than winners. Since the majority of Nigerians are settlers, there is a need to address the issue of residency rights for Nigerian citizens in the places where they live and work. There should be a constitutional provision, which provides that a Nigerian citizen who has resided continuously for a period of five years in any state of the federation and performs his/her civic duties including paying taxes, shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges of the state. This will be in accord with the practice in most federations, and will strengthen efforts at national integration. When this provision is made, it would mean that anybody who has spend five years in a state can have any political appointment and access to all rights and privileges currently restricted to indigenes.

Given the numerous problems suffered by women who have married outside their states of origin, there is need for specific protection. The Constitution should state in express terms that a woman married to any man from a state other than her own should have the rights to choose which of the states to claim as her own. Similarly, there is need to amend Section 26 (2) (a) such as to give foreign men married to Nigerians the opportunity to acquire citizenship, a right foreign women married to Nigerian men already have.

At a more general level, it would be useful to devise means for the promotion of social citizenship in the country. The provisions on social and economic rights, which are not justiciable should be made justiciable. This is important because poverty and the lack of access of most Nigerians to the basic means of livelihood is the primary cause of a lot of communal strife we have been having in Nigeria. Of course the Nigerian state does not currently have the capacity to provide all the needs of the population. What is being proposed is a constitutional devise similar to the one in the South African Constitution that would compel the government to provide for social needs to the extent of its capacity. The South African constitutional devise also involves the entrenchment of independent commissions to monitor the implementation of the said social and economic rights.

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Chapter Five

Identity Conflicts: Belonging and Exclusion in Zangon Katab

Toure Kazah-Toure

Introduction

Identity based contestations and conflicts became dominant features of the historical, social and political processes in Zangon Katab, from the late 19th century into present times. The ethnic groups in the area are the Angan (Kamantan), Atyap (Katab or Kataf), Bajju (Kaje), Ikulu, Fulbe (Fulani), Hausa, and Tacherak (Kachecere).¹ Until the 1950s most of the population of the local majorities were largely followers of African traditional religion(s), but later converted and are presently predominantly Christians. For the Hausa and the Fulbe(Fulani), who are the local minorities, they have been predominantly Muslims for long. Perhaps, due to historical, religious and political reasons, the majority ethnic communities have principally perceived the Fulbe as allies of the Hausa. But in reality the Fulbe, physically and socially, have been living together in settlements with the other five ethnic groups, than they have with the Hausa. There have been

inter-marriages, mostly of the women from the other groups to the Fulbe and partly to the Hausa. Perhaps due to religion, by which Muslim men are allowed to marry of women of other faiths (but not so Muslim women to men that are not Muslims), Fulbe women have not been marrying in the other communities but to the Hausa. In spite of various affinities the question of religion has become difficult to be separated from ethnicity in most of the contestations.

For decades, in the 20th century, there were complaints, protests, and revolts – by the majority communities that perceived themselves as being dominated and marginalized by the minority. Central issues included aristocratic oppression, political exclusion and economic marginalization. Political and other complex conflicts, some of which got violent several times, kept on exploding. Perceived political dominance and the control of economic power by the Hausa gave rise to the expression of struggles in ethnic/religious terms. Occupying central stage in the dynamics of conflicts has been the issue of power relations. Dominant local state institutions came to be associated with the Hausa and Muslims.

The leadership has also been changing over the decades. In the local majority communities, peasants were the main activists in challenging what they defined as Hausa monopoly during the colonial period. The post 1960 phase was marked by a shift in the class character of the leadership. Elite with experience in state institutions, such as the bureaucracy, military and in the private sector, took over with much more passion. The form of agitation – in spite of the complexity of the conflicts – became centrally occupied by identity drives to control power in local affairs and the re-definition of citizenship along constructed realm of “indigenes” and “settlers”. Conflicts related to claims and counter-claim over ownership and control of resources such as land, chieftaincy institutions, local government councils and markets.

Pre-Colonial Relations and Conflicts

Settlement of the Hausa people is traceable to circa 1700, with the establishment of a mid-way base for traders from the Hausa kingdoms – later the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate from 1804 – on their way to or from the forest zone of the Nigerian area. Prominent features of ethnic

relations were the series of incessant slave raids, by the emirates to the north, on the communal polities. However, none of the ethnic communities has a tradition of conquest over any of the other groups. Colonial sources, such as the anthropological study by V. Spurway, show that the Zazzau (or Zaria) Emirate was unable to establish effective political control over the inhabitants (Spurway 1932). It was in the course of British colonization that the Zaria aristocratic dominance was imposed on all the communities, through the third tier of colonial administration which was the Native Authority System.

As at the mid-19th century Zazzau and the smaller communal polities to its immediate south had relationships. Zazzau was an emirate within the Sokoto Caliphate. Its population was in majority Hausa, Fulbe and Muslims. Found in Zangon Katab were several autonomous small communal polities. The ethnic groups were of the semi-Bantu family of the Niger-Congo languages. A common feature was that they shared the same traits and culture, and belonged to what Harold D. Gunn classifies as the “Katab group of tribes” (Gunn 1956: 36). The Hausa settlement of Zango was established in the middle of circa 18th century as a mid-way base for long distance traders.

A crucial issue, in the relationship between Zazzau and the ethnic communities in the area is in connection with claims of pre-colonial conquest and subjugation. C.O. Migeod maintains that all the ethnic groups “had already come under Fulani rule before the advent of the British” (Migeod 1915). This contradicts the position of another colonial officer, C.W. Orr, who argues that before the colonial period the Hausa of Zango settlement owed allegiance to Kauru, which was a vassal polity of Zazzau, but not so the other communities (Orr 1904). He states that the chief of Kauru had no control over the polities occupying the vast land between Kauru and Zango (Orr 1907). In the area itself, the Hausa and other ethnic groups have no tradition of conquest or subjugation. In pre-colonial times only the Hausa owed allegiance and paid taxes to Kauru. Even the Zaria Native Authority, which gave credence to the pre-colonial territorial claims, contradicted its position by categorically stating that before “the introduction of British administration there were no cohesive units” in the area (Political Affairs 1958- 65).

Colonial historiography attributes some of the slave raids against ethnic communities in the area, by the ruling circles of Zazzau, to failure to pay tribute. The “punitive expeditions” were not connected with payment of tribute, because the polities were at no time subjugated by

Zazzau and, therefore, not its vassals. In circa 1849 the ruler of Zaria, Mohman Sani, launched a slave raid on the Bajju community. Under the leadership of Audu, Zazzau carried a similar raid in 1858. Y. Kirkpatrick anthropological study brings the picture out clearly that in the course of these raids, the Bajju people resisted and suffered heavy losses as many captives were taken as slaves to Zaria and elsewhere (Kirkpatrick 1926).

The process of external slave raiding can be located in the differences pertaining to the levels of development of socio-economic systems in the contrasting territories of the emirates and the communal formations in the area. In the emirates feudal ruling classes used slaves, as a separate labour force, for working on their estates. But due to the communal nature of the Zangon Katab communities, with the low level of development of productive forces, there was a very narrow scope for the exploitation of slave labour. The socio-economic and political systems did not have internal market for slaves. Few slaves found were basically captives taken during inter-communal wars over land and hunting grounds. Others were captured in the process of counter-attack against Hausa slave raiders. Z. A. Bonat shows that incipient element of slavery in these communal social formations was an integral part of household labour (Bonat 1985).

During the last years of the 19th century, Zaria (Zazzau) had intensified raids and expansionist designs. A massive military offensive was unleashed on the peoples in 1897 by the ruler of Zazzau, Mohammed Lawal (Kwasau), principally directed at the Atyap and partly affected the Ikulu community. According to the account of Spurway it was the most "rigorous fighting ever seen" and the attack was allegedly necessitated by Atyap continuous attacks on Fulbe cattle, refusal to pay tax and tribute, and outright rebellion. Spurway stresses that the "story still tells of the river Kaduna running blood – over 1000 are reported to have been slain" and the enclave of Zango was cleared of the Hausa population for fear of reprisal (Spurway 1932).

Non-payment of tax and tribute do not hold as reasons for the aggression, because the communities invaded were not subjects of an external power and thus did not owe such obligations. With the evacuation of the Hausa population, in 1897, things changed. The Hausa could no longer live securely in the area, and travelling along the trading routes became unsafe, until the arrival of British colonialists in 1903. The massive attack of 1897 was a peak in the series of organized external raids to capture slaves and for booty. Several Atyap villages were

left in ruins. Oral sources put casualties much higher than the 1,000 given in colonial sources, and hundreds were transported to Zaria as slaves. As a form of resistance to external aggression, some sections of Atyap community intensified migration to neighbouring polities with hilly terrain, such as Kagoro, which provided hiding places and thus more security ((Kazah-Toure 1995)).

Continuous military attacks by Zazzau and the resultant devastation did not put down the resistance by the Atyap, while they could not repulse the external raids completely. Between circa 1900 and 1902 the leading warrior and commander of the Atyap forces, Marok Gandu, was captured by the Zazzau invaders. This culminated in his capture and execution, by impaling on the stake. A resultant development was the serious weakening of the nerve of the resistance on the eve of British invasion (Kazah-Toure 1995).

Economic relations between Zazzau and the non-centralized polities were not limited to slave raiding but also had an important dimension of beneficial interactions. In commerce, Hausa merchants recruited agents in the different communities to facilitate trading activities. Local trading representatives moved into the villages in search for items of trade such as livestock, grains, honey, *Kabido* (rain coats) and so on. In exchange the Hausa sold leather works, potash, kolanuts and clothing (Brandt 1939). Among the local agents of Hausa merchants, elements serving foreign interest emerged. P. F. Brandt points out that by the late 19th century, some of members of this nascent stratum had started taking titles from the Hausa. They were not tax collectors on behalf of Hausa rulers of Kauru nor were they political leaders. As Brandt states, they did not enjoy any recognition as chiefs within their communities (Brandt 1939). Important is the reality of the times that class differentiation, and contradictory socio-economic interests, had begun to emerge in the so-called stateless communities.

Colonialism and Ethnicity

British imperialist incursions, with intention of colonizing the peoples, started in January 1900. Colonel Kemball of the West African Frontier force (WAFF) encroached on some villages of the

Bajju community. The Bajju interpreted the encroachment as a territorial violation and thus offered physical resistance. In the skirmishes that ensued, the British troops burnt and destroyed some villages (Adeleye 1971: 244). When the British established Zaria Province in 1902, Zangon Katab area was made part of it. With the British conquest of Zaria town itself in 1902, the colonialists started using the new provincial capital as a military base for their invasion elsewhere. In March 1903, the British started a major military offensive against the communities on the alleged basis that they were hostile and attacking passers-by on the caravan routes.

Colonial forces entered the Atyap community on April 3, 1903, and there was no physical opposition by the people at that stage. For M. M. Tukur the reason for this non-resistance was that after learning about “the fate of their neighbours, the people of Zangon Katab, refused to initiate a fight”, but they rather “gave the British submissive treatment they demanded” (Tukur 1979: 161). Factors that led to non-resistance by the Atyap were more complex than this. Firstly, Zaria military aggression of 1897 had weakened their capacity to resist. Secondly, the British capitalized on their having knowledge of the situation on the ground by putting out feelers, before arrival, that they were coming with the intention to stop the slave raids (Kazah-Toure 1995).

It was a different scenario by the time colonial invaders got to Kajju – the homeland of the Bajju people – where the community rose in a stiff-armed resistance. The Bajju were not lacking in terms of high mobilization of the people to defend their territory in the face of the offensive by foreign invaders. Major Eustace Crawley, the commander of the invading troops reported that the Bajju “showed considerable resistance” (Crawley 1903). The British troops burnt a number of towns and villages, took many prisoners, looted property, killed 45 people and left hundreds of others wounded (Crawley 1903).

In the process of imposing colonialism on the so-called acephalous communities some of the emirate aristocracies, which surrendered to the European without a fight, became part of the invaders fighting arsenal to be used in crushing the resistance. In June 1915 the Emir of Jema'a toured some Bajju villages, placed under his jurisdiction for the first time by the British, to collect taxes. For their part, the people saw the activities of the emir in the same light as those of the Europeans. On June 15, 1915, the emir and his party of 120 men were attacked at Katchit by the Bajju resisters. In the process 7 of the emir's men were killed and 13 others were wounded. A

British military force was despatched to the area. The Bajju went into collaboration with the Kaningkon ethnic group, and offered a joint armed resistance that was crushed by the British invaders (Sciortino 1915).

Colonialism introduced a new district system in 1907. That year a Hausa district head was posted from Zaria to Zangon Katab, for the first time, as the most leading colonial official in the area, to lord it over all the ethnic groups. Initially, the district head could not operate beyond Zango town (the district capital) and was based in Kauru, because of the opposition in the majority communities. Powers were given to the district head to recruit persons from the different ethnic groups into the lowest positions, as village and hamlet heads. This was within policy drawn by F.D. Lugard – for Northern Nigeria – which stipulated that “individuals with leadership potentials” from the “backward tribes” were to be recruited and groomed as the “representatives” of their communities (Lugard 1970: 11). Those picked in the Zangon Katab area were mainly agents of the Hausa merchants in the pre-colonial.

What was expected of a district head was an unshaken allegiance to the colonial order, good performance as required by the office, ability and integrity. The duties of native authority officials included the conscription of forced labour, supervision of labour in all construction sectors, assessment and collection of taxes, taking head count of people, commandeering foodstuffs from peasants for labour camps, maintenance of law and order and keeping surveillance over the movement of strangers in their area of jurisdiction (Intelligence Report 1929).

Basis and Nature of Contestations in Relation to some Cultural Dimensions

With the advent of colonialism the Hausa and Muslims were, officially, portrayed as superior to the “pagans”. Rulers from the former were imposed on ethnic communities that were different in terms of language, religion, and culture. In the administrative arrangement the Angan, Ikulu, Bajju, Atyap, and Tacherak village and hamlet heads were subordinated to the Hausa ruling circles. The colonialists, however, ensured that only a Hausa village head was taking charge of

the affairs in Zango (Administration Policy 1921-35). Unlike the pagan village heads, that had official Hausa intermediaries (*Jakadu*) in their dealing with the district head, the village head of Zango had direct access to the district head in all dealings and interactions. In all arrangement, the Fulbe were the only group not controlling land and territory. They only had titular village representatives answerable to the Hausa district head and not to the village heads of the communities in which they lived. The Fulbe were in the weakest position, both in terms of power relations and in the general scheme of things. Partly due to their representatives being only answerable to the district head and because they were Muslims, the majority ethnic groups perceived the Fulbe as allies the Hausa.

The class and ethnic questions were closely linked, leading to a more complex situation. Until the 1950s no British official was physically based in the district. Native authority officials, district staff, and hargers-on of the aristocracy were Hausa and Muslims in a population of 50,000 to 60,000 (Mckinney 1985). As at 1946 there was no single "pagan" and non-Hausa among the district salaried staff. C. V. Mckinney does emphasize that none of the district salaried staff could understand or speak any of the other languages apart from Hausa (Mckinney 1985). In terms of class formation the kind of socio-economic system, in addition to policies of native authority, resulted in the local relatively rich class being created mainly among the Hausa.

A deliberate colonial policy introduced segregation of the Hausa people, and their physical separation, from the people of other ethnic groups. As part of this the authorities transferred the entire town of Zango to a new site, five kilometres away from the old settlement, in the centre/heartland of the Atyap community. Movement to a new location started in 1915 and by 1920 the authorities had confiscated land, belonging to various Atyap clans and families, and entrusted these to the district head. The process of land expropriation/grabbing by the colonial authorities from Atyap peasants and given to the Hausa community was to remain a major factor in igniting ethnic conflict (Zango Katab 1946). The local majority groups were barred from building houses and living in Zango town itself, which was carved out for the Hausa only. People of the former ethnic groups were compelled to supply forced labour on the private farms of leading Hausa district officials. Hausa commoners were subjected to this form of exploitation and oppression elsewhere, but not in Zangon Katab.

Ordinary folk, including Hausa commoners, of the various ethnic groups were conscripted for official forced labour. The difference was that illegal exaction, by the Hausa rulers, was directed at the other ethnic groups in discriminatory terms. People from the local majorities were drafted in the construction and clearing of markets, and making renovations on houses of district officials that were all Hausa (Zango Katab 1946). Only women in the other communities, and not the Hausa and Fulbe women, were forced to sweep markets, provide firewood, and carry loads on their heads for the Hausa officials for long distances while travelling or on tour. People of ethnic communities, to the exclusion of the Hausa and Fulbe, were continuously forced to supply grains and livestock for the consumption of district ruling officials – even during the years of drought and famine. The Fulbe were subjected to serious exploitation and extortion through the collection of cattle tax. Traders from the local majorities were denied stalls at the Zango market (Kazah-Toure 1995). The Hausa community did experience little of these extortion, illegal exploitative practices, and ethnic discrimination in context.

For the people in the majority communities the “Muslim court” or “native court” was an oppressive institution, which they massively boycotted. In 1924 the Resident of Zaria Province, E. H. Laing, stated that the attitude towards this court influenced the authorities “to establish a pagan court... to deal with matrimonial cases which form the bulk of the local litigation” (Laing 1924). Partly for the fact the “Muslim court” was not perceived as evolving from the culture of the majorities, and was not along their cultural ways of handling legal matters, there was a general preference by them to settle matters through some unofficial traditional channels. Within the Atyap community there was no agreement on the functions of the newly introduced “pagan court.” In 1928 the Atyap village head of Zaman Dabo, described by the Resident of Zaria as a loyal protégé of the Hausa district head, was appointed to preside over the “pagan court”. The credibility of the so-called pagan court was further undermined by the fact that a Hausa representative of the district head sat in it, supervised how it was run, and influenced decisions (Laing 1928).

Certainly, the introduction of this court was not a reform that had acceptability in the majority communities. In the Bajju community parasitic village heads used this variant of the “pagan court,” beyond the powers conferred on them, to repress people struggling against local

misrule and autocracy. J.A. Reynolds observes that Bajju village heads were fundamentally more concerned with protecting their personal interests “more than the welfare of the tribe” (Reynolds 1951). In the rare instances in which village heads sided with their communities, they were fired. In 1925, four Bajju village heads joined a community revolt directed against domination, oppression, and exploitation by the Hausa district rulers. Some sections of the community went on open defiance by refusal to supply forced labour and to pay taxes. They also demanded “to have a chief of their own as District Head” (Reynold 1951). Reaction to this was that the village heads involved were arrested and charged with causing disturbances and rioting. They were dismissed from their positions and imprisoned in Zaria (Reynolds 1951).

Atyap and Bajju Anti-Colonial Revolts in the 1920s to 1942

For the entire colonial epoch Zangon Katab was the most restive of all the districts in Zaria Province. It was a sort of melting pot, and it produced all sorts of contradictions. The dominant form the revolts took was ethnic. In its specificities was the question of a Hausa minority, in the district, having dominance in local administration and the economy, over the majority ethnic communities.

In 1910 a peasant revolt broke out in Atyap community against forced labour and taxation. Resident J.W. Gills states that the people showed an “open resentment against their district head” (Gills 1910). The colonial government did not provide for any other mechanism than repression by force. Thus, the uprising was suppressed by quick military intervention. Arrests were made and the leaders of the revolt were imprisoned. The high level of forced labour demand had resulted in a fall in subsistence production, which led to food shortages. Another revolt erupted in 1913, in the course of which some Atyap village heads refused to recruit forced labour and did not collect taxes from their people. For this they were sacked, arrested and sent to jail in Zaria (Fremantle 1913).

A significant shift was witnessed, in 1922, in an alliance of the Bajju and Atyap communities in waging a joint anti-colonial struggle. It involved non-payment of taxes, non-

compliance with forced labour demands and physical attacks on Hausa district officials. The centre of this anti-colonial resistance was the Atyap community. Troops were despatched to Zango to protect the town and to suppress the uprising. The leader of the revolt, Gankon Tagama, fled “to Bauchi or Nassarawa and could not be traced” (Laing 1922). As a result of the popular resistance, the colonialists were forced to make concession by reducing the amount of tax paid. Atyap tax was cut down by £544 and 16 shillings in order “to bring the incidence more in line with those of their neighbours in Nassarawa and Zaria” (Laing 1922).

The Bajju anti-colonial movement gathered momentum as from the late 1930s. While colonial exploitation and oppression accelerated in the Second World War years, the anti-colonial struggles increased. The core of the leadership Bajju resistance were the youth, some having converted from the traditional African religion to Christianity. The thorniest issues of the times were tyranny, brutalization and oppression, by the Hausa native authority officials against the Bajju people. In a petition, sent to the Resident of Zaria Province in November 1940, the leader of the movement, Usman Sakwat, stated that “...again I am not prepared to control any Hausa people but my countrymen” and “let the Hausa control themselves and let me control my father’s land” (Petitions of ...Sokop 1940-42). One limitation of this struggle was the viewing of the British as neutral third party, due to the form colonial domination took in which the Hausa aristocrats were in charge. Obviously, the Bajju militants did not grasp the reality that the native authority rulers were in the employ of the British..

In the course of the struggle the Bajju activists were writing petitions to the higher authorities, waging agitation and mobilizing the community on the path of civil disobedience. They demonstrated against the misrule and rejected the orders of district officials. Therefore, the local authorities could not function effectively or carry out duties in the Bajju community. After investigations, the Zaria provincial authorities reported to the colonial government of Northern Nigeria that Usman Sakwat “has succeeded in fomenting local agitation in the Kaje (Bajju) area and has been strongly backed by clerks in Kafanchan and certain mission trained elements” (Petitions of ...Sokop 1940-42). On September 2, 1942 Usman Sakwat was arrested, chained, beaten, and tortured on the orders of the District Head of Zangon Katab. He was arraigned before the highest “native court” in Zaria on two charges. Firstly, for refusing to obey lawful order from the native authority, and, secondly, for conduct that caused a breach of peace. Legal

representations was denied, and it was considered to “be a serious blunder” for bail to be granted. Members of the movement were portrayed as misguided, frustrated, extremists, and were painted as being entirely members of the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) and the details were well documented (Petition of Sokop 1940-42).

As marionettes of the Hausa aristocrats, the Bajju village heads held the position that the Usman Sakwat led “irredentist movement” was “a dangerous thing undermining native authority and causing unrest in the tribe”. In addition they wanted both the native aristocrats of Zaria and the British “to take firm action and wish to have Usman removed from the district” (Petition of Sokop 1940-42). The village heads told the British authorities that the Bajju people did not aspire for chieftdom or a Bajju district head. At that point the SIM establishment too denounced Usman Sakwat, expelled him from the church, and advised the authorities to deport and exile him from the Bajju community (Petition of Sokop 1940-42). British propaganda did much in trying to belittle the Bajju anti-colonial movement by claiming that it had just about 400 active members, representing just about 10 percent “of tax paying males.” The reality was that the movement had a popular base. This can be seen from the fact that in the face of extreme difficulties of the times, Bajju people made sacrifices and contributed over £80 to pay a lawyer to defend Usman Sakwat. Even the British authorities accepted that the contributions “were voluntary and not collected under false pretences” (Petition of Sokop 1940-42).

On October 15, 1942, Usman Sakwat was found guilty and sentenced to two months imprisonment. There was an appeal on the judgement passed by the Zaria native court, by the defence at the high court, but it was not heard until after Usman Sakwat had served the prison term and it was dismissed. Colonial authorities sent troops to intimidate the Bajju community and wanted to use section 18 (8) of the Criminal Code to send Usman Sakwat on exile from the area. However, there was much unity in the struggle in the community. For fear of aggravating the situation, the British did not carry out their intentions (Petition of Sokop 1940-42).

Bajju Revolt of 1946

Usman Sakwat and other activists continued with the struggle, leading to another revolt in 1946. A central reason for the uprising was the demand for Bajju chieftdom. It was stressed that the Bajju community wanted to be granted a complete break from Hausa dominance, right from the district to the provincial levels. On June 1, 1946, the Resident of Zaria moved into the area with troops to crush the revolt and arrests were made. Usman Sakwat and leading activists were taken to Zaria.

According to J. A. Reynolds the Usman Sakwat led movement came out in an open struggle and reiterated to the British authorities that their battle was directed at "Hausa oppression" (Reynolds 1951). The general feeling in Bajju community was that, "with their own chief their needs would be more vigorously pressed and a better return for their taxes assured" (Reynold 1951). On September 6, 1946 Usman Sakwat and 12 other Bajju nationalists were each sentenced "to 12 months imprisonment with hard labour on charges of riot" (Zangon Katab 1946). Slander by the authorities, imprisonment, unleashed suffering and betrayal from within the ethnic group later took a hard toll on Usman Sakwat. By the 1950s he had been largely isolated from the mainstream of the emergent elite and was replaced by younger and more educated agitators. Hardship, years of toiling, torture and betrayal contributed to deteriorating health that resulted in Usman Sakwat,s death in the late 1950s.

Right from the late 1930s the people kept questioning their continuous payment of taxes if there were no schools, dispensaries, jobs, and amenities to show for. Also, there was resistance to forced labour, land expropriation and discriminatory practices. All this culminated in an explosive Bajju prevolt in 1946. It contradicts the position of J.S. Coleman, that the peasantry in Northern Nigeria was inept and mute in relation to nationalist politics until the early 1950s (Coleman 1971: 254).

The authorities waged a campaign to distort the historical basis of the Atyap 1946 uprising. They held that it was a product of instigation by missionary adherents (Zangon Katab 1946). The Emir of Zaria alleged a neighbouring Kagoro connection, blaming the chief of Kagoro for all the troubles in the Atyap community and elsewhere in the district. Although the Resident of Zaria Province did not buy this line completely, he accepted that some degree of influence has been coming from outside the district (Zango Katab 1946).

The Atyap Revolt of May 1946

The May 1946 Atyab revolt centred on civil disobedience including refusal to pay taxes, boycott of the Zango main market and non-compliance with orders of the authorities. Some militants were out to physically attack and expel the Hausa inhabitants of Zango town. Immediate cause of the Atyap uprising was linked with an incident in Zango market in March 1946. Atyap women were molested and beaten up by some Hausa youth, after the women had resisted the compulsory sweeping of the Zango market. A leading clan leader, one Mamman Mutum, led some elders in sending a protest letter to the Zaria provincial administration stating that it should be certain time to what they described as “Hausa/Muslim dominance” in Atyap affairs. In addition they also complained about decades “oppression at the hands of Hausawa” (Zangon Katab 1946). On the other hand a group of converts to Christianity cried out that they were denied preaching in Zango town. Although they showed sympathy towards the grievances of their community, they dissociated themselves from any violent action that might occur. Provincial officials dismissed the issues raised by the Atyap community (Zangon Katab 1946).

By May 1946 the machinery of district administration had been paralyzed and the revolt was total. It was targeted at the Hausa community. The counter-operation aimed at a crackdown, by the authorities, came on May 21, 1946. Squadrons of soldiers were moved from Kaduna and Jos to quell the uprising. As at then only two school teachers had been produced, by the colonial authorities, in the Atyap community, for the entire period of British colonization. They were transferred out of the district. Mamman Mutum and over 100 people were arrested and later charged at the Zaria “native court” for various offences under the “Native Authority Ordinance”. On August 17, 1946, Mamman and “25 others were convicted of offence against Taxation Ordinance” and sentenced to “3 months imprisonment with hard labour.” Another 6 persons were “convicted of riotous assembly, unlawfully assaulting police, and resisting authority”. Their sentences were between “2-6 months imprisonment with hard labour” (Zangon Katab 1946). It is worth noting that it was the same native authority aristocrats, whom these resisters fought against, that presided over the trial and passing of the prison sentences. While serving the jail

terms the Atyap prisoners were beaten, given cruel treatment, and generally dehumanized by prison agents of the Zaria rulers. Torture and terrible conditions in prison led to the death of Mamman Mutum and 3 others in prison (Kazah-Toure 2003). However, this did not deter the protests. In 1951 the absence of addressing the issues led to another wave of protest. Furthermore, another set of Atyap activists were sentenced to six months imprisonment in Zaria including Ndung Mamman, a son of the late Mamman Mutum.

Ethno-Religious Agitation and Politics in the 1950s

In alliance with several ethnic organizations in Southern Zaria (now called Southern Kaduna) the leading elite, among the local majorities, participated actively in both the politics of the Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League that transformed into the Middle Zone League (MZL). In the last 11 years of the colonial period Zango Katab district was a crucial nerve of waging struggle by many minorities in Northern Nigeria. The leaders were mostly Christian evangelists and school teachers. According to J. H. Boer both the SIM and the Sudan United Mission (SUM) had a strong role and influence on the MZL agitation and politics (Boer 1979: 336, 392 and 409). Zangon Katab area was a stronghold of the Nerzit Movement, which was the politically constructed name for the majority Southern Zaria ethnic groups, within the politics of the MZL (Political Bodies 1958).

As a cardinal objective the MZL emphasized unity among the communities that were predominantly non-Hausa. In January 1954 some principal British officers, who were on tour, were confronted by a Bajju demonstration that was organized by the Bajju MZL branch led by Aruwan Neyu. The demonstrators instantly demanded for the creation of a district for the Bajju community and presented a candidate to be made their district head and to be sworn in at once. An emphasis was placed that they did not want a Hausa and a Muslim to be their ruler (Administration of Southern Zaria 1954).

In the wake of the uprising the Emir of Zaria insisted that he would only go to Zangon Katab on condition that the Resident of Zaria was physically present with him and accompanied by soldiers. Other local majority ethnic groups were up in arms, alongside the Bajju, in a joint

revolt against aristocrats. So strong was the revolt that district officials had to be evacuated for some time. The protesters were out to use arms to attack and expel the 7,000 Hausa population of Zango. Troops were moved from Jos, in Plateau Province, and neighbouring Kachia to quell the uprising (Administration of Southern Zaria 1954).

What took the lead in the area during the decolonization phase was a sort of ethnic politics fuelled by ethno-nationalism. Civic nationalism was not rooted in the district, unlike in Northern Zaria. Due to all this, the anti-feudal and anti-British Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) could not make significant impact because its principal focus was liberation for the commoner classes and partly due to the local ethnicization campaign against the Hausa and Muslims. According to Shekarau Kau Layyah the MZL focused on ethnic domination, as opposed to NEPU that was blaming the rich for the problems of the poor. He claims that the NEPU did not address the question of ethno-religious domination, which was the most crucial in Zangon Katab (Interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah).² The MZL did everything to make the local majority ethnic groups susceptible to propaganda by tagging NEPU as a Muslim and Hausa party and depicting the few, from the local majorities that went into the radical party, as agents of Hausa and Muslim domination. At the same time most of the Hausa population of Zango town perceived the Zaria native authority rulers, and the NPC, as their saviours and protectors. Until 1959 the district was in the firm grip of the MZL. Later a relative radical wing that was called the United Middle Belt Congress/Action Group alliance (UMBC/AG) displaced the MZL, when the MZL vacillated and formed alliance with the NPC

With intensified struggles for reforms, the British political officers began to blame the Hausa rulers for the problems the colonialists created in the first place. In 1954 a district officer, Derrick B. Wright, stated that the agitation for what the local majorities called self-determination would continue unless the Zaria aristocracies did “something to alter what appears to be their standard attitude towards Southern Zaria” (Administration of Southern Zaria 1954). The truth is that whatever misrule was carried out by the Zaria rulers, the British were the final authorities in decision making and they did not employ mechanisms to tackle the ethno-religious problem.

Reform introduced, in connection with ethnic relations, was the establishment of Village Group Councils for all the local majority ethnic groups in 1955. A president of council was appointed for each community, with village heads placed under his leadership. All the presidents

of the various ethnic Village Group Councils were subordinated to the district head. Also, the village head of Zango town was placed higher than his counterparts of other ethnic communities, because he continued to be directly under the district head with the unofficial status like a president of council. The reforms did not go deep and did not involve the opinion of people in the communities. Only persons connected with the native authority and the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) were appointed to head of the Village Group Councils. In 1956 the Emir of Zaria posted a new district head, John Abbas Tafida, to Zangon Katab. He was a Christian as well as a member of one of the Zaria ruling dynasties (Yahaya 1980:77). But the card of a deploying a Hausa Christian and aristocrat, to appease the local majorities peoples, did not work. For the majority communities simply viewed him as another Hausa overlord not representing them. They kept demanding for an "indigene" to be appointed. However, nothing changed for them up to the time of independence for Nigeria in 1960.

Political Development and Social Provisioning: The Immediate Post-Independence Years

A significant development in the immediate post-independence years was the level of intolerance demonstrated by the ruling NPC in dealing with the opposition political parties. The NPC government brought all native authorities closer and subordinated them to it. The entire Zaria Native Authority structure was converted, at the different layers, into a machinery to pursue the objectives of the party of government. There was a recruitment of few members of the NPC, from the smaller ethnic communities in the province, into the service of the Zaria Native Authority.

A new district head, Yahaya Pate, a leading member of the NPC, was posted to Zangon Katab. One task he executed well was the clampdown on the UMBC/AG opposition, which was more solid in the area than elsewhere in Zaria Province. There was so much repression of political opponents. In relation to recruitment of village heads, total allegiance was demanded. In spite of this, A. D. Yahaya maintains that the district head achieved much in terms of taking development projects to the majority communities than was previously done (Yahaya 1980: 181-185).

Between 1959 and 1966 the voluntary agencies had by far gone ahead of the government in the field of education. The government did not establish a single post-primary school until the late 1970s. In the same period the Roman Catholic Missions (RCM) had established 3 secondary schools. One other secondary school was founded by a Nigerian humanist, Dr. Samaila Ndayako, which he named Tafawa Balewa Memorial College. The only hospital in the district was owned by the RCM, located in Zonkwa.

By the 1970s there were sections of the Zangon Katab elite that emerged in different sectors. They were of the view owing much of their rise in society to the Christian missionaries than anyone else. According to a report by a committee, education in government schools tended to produce elite with a less sectarian outlook. The mission schools had a tendency of subtle promotion of anti-Hausa and anti-Muslim prejudice, and their products were relatively kept at bay from the public service by the authorities until the 1970s (CRLP 1995).

The immediate post independence years witnessed the base of the ruling NPC built around the structure of government, and the rich Hausa merchants. The rich class was largely made up of individuals that moved into Zango as from the 1930s. This was through the NA connection, and this section enjoyed a lot of state patronage in contracts and other businesses unlike the Hausa commoners. Historically, most of the Hausa people, with no roots of origin elsewhere apart from Zango, were largely poor and landless peasants.

Ironically it was with collapsed of the First Republic and the military coming to power in Nigeria that the grip of the aristocratic ruling circles was relatively reduced in 1968. By the 1970s the NA courts, prisons and police – hitherto controlled by the aristocracies – were reformed and subsequently placed under the jurisdiction of either the state or federal governments. Even though this new development did not lead to the creation of neither districts nor chiefdoms for the local majorities in Zangon Katab , it reduced the grip of Zaria dominant forces over them. In the wake of the 1966 military takeover, there were demands for the removal of Yahaya Pate as district head.

This concession was somehow granted in 1967 with the transfer of Yahaye Pate, from Zangon Katab district. A new district head, from the Atyap ethnic group and a Christian, Bala A. Dauke Gora, was appointed (Yahaya 1980:77). The decisive factor was that the Zaria NA did not

appoint someone from the outside the establishment. The Zaria aristocrats picked a loyalist who had contested the 1959 elections on the ticket of the NPC, was from one of Atyap village ruling houses and had served the Zaria NA up to holding the position of head of sanitary inspection section. But the majority ethnic groups maintained unity in accepting this limited concession due to the suspicion that the rulers of Zaria wanted to trigger divisions among them (Interview with Yohanna Madaki).³

For the first time even peasants from all the ethnic communities could walk into the district palace in Zango. The new development was sort of interpreted as a religious victory as Christian prayers were said in the palace to welcome the new district head. The Hausa community keenly observed all such actions. In the perception of the Hausa community, the majority ethnic groups began parading themselves in Zango town as if they were conquerors. The Hausa did not fail to notice the threat and the symbolism of some lost of local power. From the perspective of the leaders of the Hausa community from then on “they had no (fair) hearing in Zango and had to resort to depending on Zaria directly” (CRLP 1995).

Identity based conflicts in the 1970s

In 1970 the Village Group Councils were abolished. Official explanation given was that with the appointment of an “indigene” as the district head, there was no basis for the ethnic based group councils. In the new arrangement all village heads came under the direct control of the district head. The district head also began a process of dislodging Hausa and Muslim district junior staff and hangers-on. They were gradually being replaced with people from the local majority ethnic groups that were overwhelmingly Christians. It is important to also note that the new changes, under military rule, created rivalry between some leading factions of the local majority ethnic groups.

The Atsam⁴ (Chawai) village heads were vehemently opposed to their community being left in Zangon Katab District. They were not bothered about the issue of “indigenous” district headship. For them, the new reforms would only be meaningful if the Atsam community had a

district of their own. They expressed fears of being marginalized by the Bajju, Ikulu, Angan and Atyap ethnic groups.

Leading persons in the Hausa community were hostile and confrontational towards the new district head. According to Emmanuel Toro they felt they owed no allegiance to the district head and preferred to deal directly with the authorities in Zaria (Toro 1992:13). In addition, some of the Hausa business elite linked up with the leaders of Atsam community and supported their cause towards separation from Zangon Katab. This was not out of a genuine concern, because the Hausa elite did not give support to the Atsam agitation to have their own district before 1967, when there was a Hausa district head. On the other hand, the Atyap elite – despite their record of crying out for some autonomy – were not interested in the aspirations of the Atsam. Instead, the Atyap leaders blamed the Hausa community for inciting what they called the Atsam rebellion. As part of the general response some Atyap forces exploited the long term anti-Hausa sentiments, and mobilized some sections of the Atyap community to surround Zango town in 1971, with threats of attack on the Hausa (Mahmood 1992:13). Only a quick intervention of the authorities averted a physical clash.

In the absence of political parties – banned in 1966 – ethnic organizations took centre stage in local politics. To grasp the changes that occurred in the area in the wake of the military rule and the civil war, a certain development has to be observed. Zangon Katab witnessed a tremendous rise in recruitment of both non-commissioned and commissioned officers into the armed forces, especially among the local majority ethnic groups that were previously largely locked out of government employ. Paradoxically, the Nigerian civil war provided new opportunities for youth in the Zangon Katab communities.

A large number of youth enlisted into the military because of the job opportunities the war situation offered. Relative to their population, people from the area subsequently became a significant portion in the military, especially in the middle and lower ranks. Also, circumstances of the civil war brought about more access to education and other jobs for the majority ethnic groups. Between 1966 and the 1970s, they had taken a lead in the field of education. On the other hand, among the Hausa the post-1966 years consolidated a more prosperous business class such as contractors. All this was to be of significance in the conflicts of the early 1990s.

The 1976 local government reforms entrenched the elite of the majority ethnic groups in the running of local affairs. While the 1976 reforms abolished the native authority system, in reality the emirs and the emirate councils remained strong in determining many things. Through the Area Court system, and by serving the authoritarian military regimes, the aristocrats still had substantial influence in various spheres. These included the control of markets, influencing policies and decisions making by the military governors (such as key appointments of commissioners and other political appointments), determining where projects were to be located and which section of the communities social provisioning should go to.

The Zaria rulers retained powers in terms of appointment of district and village heads in Zangon Katab, in spite of the shift by appointing them from the local majority communities. The predominantly Christian communities intensified opposing the practice of their district and village heads paying homage to the Emir of Zaria during Muslim festivals (Audu and Kure 1992:15). However, the various struggles in the name of assertion of ethno-religious identity had their own complexities and dynamics.

The tussles for positions, on the basis of mere ethno-religious representation had, by the 1970s, become a weapon used by the various segments of the ruling classes throughout Nigeria. It turned out to be so in relation to competition for government appointments, patronage, and contracts and in having a share of the so-called scarce resources (Usman 1980:83-5). In contemporary times the battle for the creation of more chiefdoms and the agitation for more autonomy, the concerns and interest of the ordinary people in the communities are not primary – even though groupings championing the course claim to represent their people. Sections of the ruling classes use the traditional institutions and chieftaincy titles to partake in the process of primitive accumulation, in a multi-ethnic state, where ethno-religious chauvinism and sectarianism have been on the ascendancy (Ibrahim 1995).

During the Second Republic (1979-1983) parties that were drawn along the old pre-1966 trends dominated local politics in Zangon Katab. The Hausa were mainly in the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), which had some resemblance with the former NPC. The elite in the other ethnic groups largely supported the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), which drew much from the political tendency of the former MZL and UMBC. A broad coalition in opposition to the NPN – including

the NPP and other parties – contributed to the left-wing People’s Redemption Party (PRP), which was obviously a successor to NEPU, to win the governorship of Kaduna State.

Ethno-religious tensions were relatively lower during the PRP years in power, especially under the leadership Abdulkadir Balarabe Musa governor. According to C. C. Audu and Mallam Kure inter-ethno-religious relations improved during the years of the PRP being in power (Audu and Kure 1992:25). The government implemented people’s oriented policies, programmes, and projects in the fields of health, education, agriculture, taxation, provision of infrastructure and amenitie in Zangon Katab. The PRP did more for the communitie. As a deliberate policy and practice the PRP did much – within its limitations and context – to curtail the influence of the traditional rulers. The conservative forces – from different ethnic and religious groups – did much to stifle the efforts of the PRP.

A fact in the politics of the area in the 20th century is that Hausa dominant forces maintained being ethno-religious bigots, with no respect for the culture of the majority local ethnic groups. Equally, the dominant sections of the local majority communities continuously built their politics on anti-Hausa and anti-Muslim premise and manipulated most of the people along that dangerous ethno-religious line on every issue, even where such bearing did not exist.

Increased Identity based Rivalries under Structural Adjustment Programme(s)

The economic crisis started in Nigeria in the early 1980s. It heightened with the introduction of the structural adjustment policies, as from 1986. One implication of the crisis was the deterioration of inter-ethno-religious relations. As people’s fortunes increasingly dwindled, the enemies came to seen more from an ethno-religious perspective. Governments – at various levels – started relinquishing responsibilities. The country’s military dictators and their civilian collaborators were becoming more repressive and authoritarian. Occupier kinds of regimes were fast moving down the ladder in relation to the guarantee of minimum rights and protection of the citizenry. It is actually this collapse of state institutions that made those who have felt marginalized to increasingly fall back than ever on ethno-religious associations and organizations.

People in Zangon Katab area, like elsewhere in Nigeria, were enmeshed in serious difficulties. Schools, hospitals and other fees kept going up by the day. From the late 1980s peasant farmers started paying more for agricultural inputs, while the prices of consumer goods and services were escalating. A large number of workers were thrown back into the peasantry, in the communities, as a result of retrenchment in the different sectors. School leavers and university graduates swelled the number of the rural poor, as unemployment increased (Usang 1992:4). Furthermore, most of the elite were pauperized.

In Zangon Katab there was a high level of retirement of soldiers, both officers and rank-and-file. For the fact that the military has been a major employer for people in the communities, meant that they were hard hit. Retired soldiers started demanding for their share farmlands from family members. Shortages of farmlands became serious and made conflicts centred on land at the levels of the family and community. Former claims over land ownership resurfaced. As Yahaya Mahmood notes there was no concrete resettlement scheme for retired soldiers, and thus they somehow became restive (Mahmood 1992:17). While some of the military officers in the area of study were key figures in the regime that took-over in August 1985, under the leadership of General Ibrahim Babangida, some of later lost out and started falling back on community organizations as platforms for agitation.

Things like this mean much in the many ethnic communities, especially in a context in which progress is also seen in terms of the positions occupied in the state structure by what is referred to in a popular parlance as the son of the soil syndrome. Some of the retired military officers, to some extent in search of new relevance, joined ethno-religious organizations and became leading figures in politics. They were also seeing the vogue whereby top retired military officers elsewhere in Nigeria had gone back to their communities and taken traditional titles or became chiefs.

Shortly after the Kafanchan crisis in 1987, the federal military government created additional states and local governments. Katsina State was created out of Kaduna State, and Zangon Katab district was transformed into a local government. In the light of these new developments, there were reinvigorated demands for chiefdoms and districts. In 1989 the Bajju community started organizing demonstrations in support of the creation of their chiefdom. By early 1990 they were parading one of their leading businessmen as their chief and wanted the

state government to accord recognition to him. Bajju village heads refused to pay homage to the Emir of Zaria in that year (Audu and Kure 1992:15). While the Bajju were supported by the Atyap youth, the Atyap dominant circles were apparently but unofficially fence sitting. This was partly due the fact that the district head was Atyap, and the Bajju effort was viewed as an attempt to reduce the status of the district. Later on some leading elite among the Bajju turned to opportunism. They did capitulate by accepting the creation of 2 new districts for the Bajju and 1 district for both the Ikulu and Angan communities under the authority of the Emir of Zaria.

Ethno-Religious Politics in the Early 1990s

Rivalry and competition between the elite of the various communities intensified when the military formed and imposed two parties in the transitional programme. Most of the elite in the local majority communities joined the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Most of the Hausa elite went into the National Republic Convention (NRC). The SDP won the 1989 local government elections. A retired police officer, Juri Babang Ayok, from the Atyap group, was elected chairman of the local government council. Other principal positions were slated and principally shared on ethnic basis. In this game of ethnic politics the Atyap SDP fielded a Hausa candidate against a rival Hausa NRC candidate, that won, as councillor for the Zango town – which had a majority Atyap voters. In turn the Hausa community supported the Atyap candidate for the chairmanship of the local government, in a tussle against a rival Bajju NRC candidate (CRLP 1995).

Once the control of the local government was secured by the Atyap elite, that had been relatively quiet in terms of the demand for chieftdom as compared with the Bajju, they started a fresh agitation. In this effort for the control local political power the crucial issues of the miserable conditions of life of the people, the collapse of the cherished institutions, and the provision of social services as it affected the populace, were secondary. The cardinal objective of the elite was demand for chieftdom.

A problem the new leadership of the local government council inherited was the controversy over the relocation of the Zango town market. Back in 1986, when the area was still in Kachia Local Government, a decision had been taken to relocate the market. The Zaria Emirate Council, in collaboration with a section of Zango Hausa business interest, ensured that nothing materialized in moving the market to a new site. It was not only a terrain of economic dominance of the Hausa business people, but also a symbol of power for a long time. Right from the colonial times the market had been located on a strip of land, in the middle of the town, with no facilities, and no space for expansion (Kurada 1992:3). Just like in the case of exclusion from the Zango town, historically the Atyap kept complaining about economic and commercial marginalization in the market. Hausa business person monopolized the transport sector, in terms of commercial vehicles. There were efforts by some Atyap retired military officers to penetrate the transport sector, which was perceived in rivalry terms. The powerful merchants, in the Hausa community, had a monopoly of the market and, therefore, consistently opposed the construction of a new market at the outskirts of the town. This was for fear that the decades of enjoying economic dominance might come to end (Daudu 1992).

One of the main campaign issues of the SDP candidate, that eventually won the 1989 local government council election, was the transfer of the market. The inter-ethnic rivalry can be better appreciated in the context of the struggle by the Atyap business interests to break the monopoly of the market by Hausa business people (Mustapha 1997:212-217). Thus, politics by various dominant ethnic circles was linked to intra-class tussles in terms of commercial and other economic interests. That, to an extent, explains why immediately the new council chairman was sworn in, the local government Council moved fast to relocate the market, even without providing necessary facilities. A fast response came from the opposing side, as there was counter-move to stop the realization. A prominent Hausa businessman secured a court injunction restraining the council from going ahead with the relocation (Citizen 1992:11).

In the battle many in the Atyap community were mobilized on the basis that the dawn has come for a market they can control. At the opposing pole the dominant forces in Hausa community geared to resist relocating the market to a new site. In the contestations historical memories of the past were played back, reconstructed and stories were invented. Memories of the past of Atyap women forced to sweep the Zango market – and beaten up if they refused – and

forced labour conscription by Hausa native authority officials in the construction and maintaining the market, were all rekindled. Stories were told to younger people also of the market being the place where the Hausa rulers used to administer punishment on Atyap that resisted domination in the past. From a report of a committee it is very clear that the old Zango market represented an immense negative symbol in the psyche of many people in the Atyap community (CRLP 1995).

In the ethno-religious politics of the 20th century the general tendency of the majority factions of the elite was towards not maintaining a consistent and principled line. The elite were not for politics rooted in consistency of ideology and principles, but permanently trapped in the murky waters of ethnicity and clannish sectarianism. In the last two decades of the 20th century the dominant politicians (in the tradition of their vacillating predecessors in colonial and post-colonial politics) often, at the most crucial moments, switched over to the side they had presented to their communities as opponents.

It was what many of the local leaders of the SDP did, during the election for the state governor in December 1991, when they swung their political pendulum to the side of the rival NRC. Initially, they fielded an Atyap candidate to contest the primaries at the level of the SDP. After he lost out the elite unofficially abandoned their party's candidate for the governorship. They relapsed into primordialism in politics and pushed a line that it would be better to vote for a Hausa Muslim from Southern Kaduna, on the rival NRC ticket, than to vote a Hausa Muslim SDP candidate from Northern Kaduna. There was even the bit of stressing of some family connection of the NRC candidate in Zango town. In the end Zangon Katab local Government, one of the strongest bases of the SDP in the state, turned the other way to produce the highest number of votes scored by the candidate of the rival NRC – which enabled Dabo Lere to clinch the governorship of Kaduna State. It was less than two months, after the new NRC governor was sworn in, that the unprincipled ethnicist scheme collapsed. The area exploded in a violent ethnic conflict.

Security Failure, Sentiments, Sectarianism and the Atyab versus Hausa Conflicts of 1992

On February 6, 1992, a violent inter-ethnic clash started between the Atyap and the Hausa, even as the authorities had information in relation to the tension surrounding the movement of the market to a new site and the counter- action to check it. Yet, there was no security intervention. The first casualties were some Atyab people at the new market site. There was a swift counter-attack as Zango town was encircled and attacked by some Atyap . Many lives were lost. As noted in a report, there was a “lack of decisive and prompt action by government organs in the state” (Extract in Citizen 1992:15).

The conflict was worsened by the partisan pronouncements in some high government quarters, both at the national and state levels, in support of the Hausa community. According to, Abdul Raufu Mustapha the southern Nigeria based press with its a tradition of sensationalism of “anti-Hausa/Fulani hegemony” sided with the Atyap (Mustapha 1997: 218). Muslims organizations were in support of the Hausa, while the Christian organizations were promoting the Atyap cause. Dominant Atyap elite became desperate because of the strong family connection in Zango of both the secretary to the federal government and the governor of Kaduna State (Bungwon and Gimba 1992:3). Sentiments took-over and hardly were there serious attempts to checkmate the conflict from escalating.

Tension grew as the state government set up a Judicial Commission of Inquiry, and adequate security measures were not enforced in the area. On April 21, 1992 the 8 Atyap village heads wrote a letter to government that “all their lands” confiscated from the 1910s by the native authorities must be returned to the people. The Atyap village heads insisted that the Hausa should not be allowed to use the farmlands. If their letter was not a declaration of crisis, it was at least short of being a threat of expulsion of the Hausa from Zango town ((Report of the Zangon Kataf Market Riots...1992).

At that stage the man who secured the court injunction, in relation to restraining the local council from relocating the market, Danbala A.T. K., went on the BBC Hausa service to blame two retired Atyap military generals for being behind the conflict. Retired Major General Zamani Lekwot, responded through the same channel, denied the allegations and in the process described the Hausa as settlers in the area that are much welcomed by what he called the indigenous community (Report of the Zangon Kataf Market Riots...1992). One obvious thing is that the Atyap were not just a party in the conflict, they were also redefining citizenship from a

perspective. For them it was based on claims of being autochtones. This position can be placed within a national problematic, in which citizens are either defined as “settlers” or “indigenes” depending on the location and the political stakes. Zamani Lekwot later appeared before the judicial commission of inquiry and advocated that the solution to conflict was in the creation of chiefdoms for all ethnic groups in Kaduna state.

The representatives of the Hausa community maintained that the Atyap had for a long time nursed a sort of jealousy and hatred towards them, because of their economic prosperity. They also argued that it was not the Hausa of Zango town that had powers over the market and allocation of land for building houses, rather it was the Emirate Council in Zaria. More so, they insisted that Zaria has also marginalized them (the same way the other groups have been marginalized) because there are no industries, tertiary institutions, or other government projects in Zango town. A fundamental issue the Hausa community raised was as to why they were treated, by the Atyap and other local majorities, as if they were not citizens of the area. Also, a question was posed by the Hausa as to whether the Atyap had at any instance consulted them, attempted to involve them or ever sounded their opinion, in connection with the issue of local autonomy or chiefdom (CRLP 1995:10).

On the allegation that the Area Court system was favouring the Hausa and Muslims – in terms of the structure, hierarchy, personnel and how justice was interpreted – the Hausa community stated that they did not object to other ethnic and religious groups having court systems reflecting their values. However, they stressed that it was their right to retain something in line with the Muslim values (CRLP 1995: 10).

For their part the Atyap raised issues of alleged Hausa contempt towards them, exclusion from the Zango market, the neglect of their economic interests, an unfair judicial system against the predominant Christian population and refusal of the Hausa to cohabit with them in Zango town. The Atyap also demanded a solution (in their favour) in relation to the protracted land question. In addition there was the allegation of bias by the federal government, the Kaduna State government and the Emir of Zaria. All these were accused of siding with the Hausa and Muslims in the conflict. The accusations were based on the fact that all the three mentioned went to visit Zango, at different times, but by-passed both the local government chairman and the district head. That they went directly to pay condolences to the Hausa community in Zango,

without doing same to the Atyap. There was also the charge that relief materials were sent to the Hausa while nothing to the Atyap (CRLP 1995:92).

From the beginning of investigations the Atyap objected to the composition of the judicial commission of inquiry set up by the state government. Their position was that its membership, in ethno-religious composition, tilted in favour of the Hausa and alleged that some of the members were “Muslim fundamentalists”. Apparently, by the first week of May some Atyap leading elite and those sympathetic to them got a leak of the report of the judicial commission that indicted their community solely (Citizen 1992:13).

The judicial commission stated that from all evidence the logical conclusion was that the Atyap “as a group must have planned to attack the Hausa, and they did attack them on 6th February, 1992”. It stressed that the “market relocation is therefore nothing but a smokescreen” (Report of Zangon Kataf Market Riots...1992). Apart from blaming the entire ethnic group the commission of inquiry “strongly recommend that the activities of all Kataf (Atyap) ex-servicemen and retired officers, whether resident within or outside Zangon Kataf Local Government should be looked into and appropriate action taken” (Report of Zangon Kataf Market Riots...1992).

It seems that the entire Atyap ethnic group was blamed for the conflict. Also harsh was a verdict of being guilty to have been passed on the entire ex-servicemen of a community, both militants and those who never (not even remotely) associated themselves with the activities of the group. The leak of the report got fast to the grassroots of the two communities. It galvanized the Atyap in the most dangerous way and instilled great fear. The perception was that the government was going to deal with all the leading elite of their ethnic group, wherever they were. Provocation and counter-provocation intensified between the Hausa and Atyap communities, as they went about destroying each other’s farmlands.

On May 9, 1992, a Muslim leader in Zango, A. A. Jibrin, wrote a letter to the Sultan of Sokoto, the spiritual leader of Nigerian Muslims. In it were accounts of the situation in Zango and the predicament of the Hausa and Muslims. It stressed the danger of a bloodier conflict breaking out in which, if no measures were taken to check, Muslims will either kill or be killed in the process (Jibrin 1992). It seems somebody either within the state security apparatus or in

government also leaked this letter. The Atyap circulated copies of it widely and just launched propaganda on a portion that they interpreted as a planned jihad to start in Zango.

Despite the very serious signals and security reports, the government did nothing to keep the escalating tension in check. On May 15, 1992 a vicious and violent armed conflict erupted again between the Hausa and Atyap. For two day the two communities carried some kind of ethnic cleansing – with the Hausa suffering heavy casualties. A total of 1,528 people were officially counted dead, in the Hausa community (Report of Zangon Kataf Market Riots...1992). Figures for the Atyap casualties have been difficult to come by, because they were instantly picking their dead and burying, but they were much fewer.

By May 18, 1992, the conflict had spread and engulfed Kaduna, Zaria, Ikara and elsewhere. Once it went beyond Zangon Katab to other parts of Kaduna State, it assumed a religious dimension of Muslims versus Christians and the meaning of the conflict changed concretely. The whole conflict took the dimension of labels and some people who might never have heard the name Zangon Katab became victims. Many lives – put at about 350 elsewhere in the state – were lost as anarchy set in (Report of Zangon Kataf Market Riots...1992). Property and places of worship were affected. The military leader of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida, broadcast to the nation and called the conflict the civilian equivalent of a military coup against his regime. Zangon Katab instantly became the issue of the day in terms violent ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria.

President Ibrahim Babangida himself went to the destroyed and razed Zango town, where he openly wept and promised to deal with those behind the violent conflict. From then on the government's actions, at the federal and state levels, were not that of a third party or mediator. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Muslim organizations had taken sides. Throughout Nigeria it was mostly a question of supporting either the Hausa cause or the Atyap cause. The conflict mainly assumed a national dimension of Muslims versus Christians.

What followed was the massive arrest of prominent Atyap including traditional rulers, politicians, civil servants, retired soldiers, peasants and so on. They were held under the detention order without trial decree 2 of 1982, which could not be challenged anywhere legally or otherwise. Some Hausa were arrested, but this was limited to people suspected of

involvement in anarchy in Kaduna, Zaria Ikara and elsewhere. No prominent Hausa from Zangon Katab was arrested or detained anywhere. Even when the Vice-President of Nigeria issued detention orders for the arrest of some Hausa leaders of the Zango community, this was not carried out (CRLP 1995:92).⁵ It further shows that central key players of the regime became partisans, one way or the other, in the conflict.

The federal government established a tribunal with unlimited power, and the verdicts were not to be challenged even at the Supreme Court. Subsequently, a number of Atyap people were sentenced to death, while some were handed jail terms. The death sentences were later reviewed and reduced to jail terms by the Babangida led Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). In 1995 the government of General Sani Abacha released all those imprisoned in relation to the violent conflict. Same year the Kaduna State military government, of Colonel Lawal Jafaru Isa, created a chiefdom each for the Bajju and Atyap – with Zango town placed in the Atyap chiefdom. However, the Angan, Bekulu, Hausa, Tacherak and Fulbe and were included in two chiefdoms.

In 2000 the new civilian government in Kaduna State created two other chiefdoms for the Bekulu and Angan communities respectively. From 1995 the Hausa of Zango were asking what their status is in terms of citizenship and were complaining of exclusion from many spheres. This is a context that has come full circle, in which position of dominance has shifted. Some leading elite have gone full circle by embarking on expropriation/grabbing land from certain villagers in Zangon Katab, without any compensation and not for collective utilization but as individual property.

In March 2001 a violent conflict blew out between the Bajju and Ikulu over claims of “territorial” ownership of land and a town. Hausa dominance is no longer the issue but new historical and ahistorical claims are springing up, with a new dimension of inter-and-intra-ethnic rivalries, some of it drawing on clannish levels hitherto thought extinct.

In 1997 a petition was sent to government complaining about the alleged marginalization of the area, and indeed Southern Kaduna, in favour of Northern Kaduna. Part of the protest was that 3 government nominated members representing Kaduna State, at the 1995 national constitutional conference, were from the Northern Kaduna. The protest also stated that 3

members of Vision 2010 Committee – from the state – included none from the southern part. Linked with this was the accusation of false population figures for some parts of the state, by government officials, to the detriment of Zangon Katab . The 1991 census figures for the area were declared null and void by a census tribunal, after the state governor filled a case against the figures. This, so goes the argument, are the figures used in determining the number of polling boots and electoral constituencies – ranging from local government wards, the state house of assembly, Federal House of Representative and the Senate. The charge was also that of not appointing people from the area to top positions at the state and federal levels (Southern Kaduna Peoples Union 1977). From the coming to power of the new civilian government on May 29, 1999 the elite in the area re-enacted the old game of sharing public positions on ethno-religious basis.

Conclusion

The thrust is that complex conflicts have been continuously redrawing the political, economic and social landscapes in the various communities. Dominant analyses have failed to transcend explanations of conflict in terms of mere socio-cultural differences. Breaking ranks from the dominant perspective of locating the problematic in different identities themselves, we interpret the conflicts as products of more complex processes. The new phase is shattering the old held model. The symbols of Hausa and Muslim power dominance are no longer there, in the early 21st century, with the creation of chiefdoms for most of the ethnic communities in Zangon Katab.

Contestations are now on the ascendancy along reinvented clannish lines among the communities and there is a rise within the terrain of intra-religious rivalries. The elite are manipulating new weapons and creating new diversities, beyond the old and seemingly no longer relevant ones, for control of power in the various spheres. A concrete exposure of the fallacy of blaming the Hausa, Muslims and Zaria dominance, for all the ills in society, was demonstrated in the bloody Ikulu versus Bajju violent inter –ethnic/intra-religious conflict in 2001. In this battle which was extended to within certain churches, there were physical separation, splits along

ethnic lines, and members of the same religion killed their own. All these raise questions about rights, power relations, participation, definition of citizenship in the localities, local loyalties, control and distribution of resources as well as social provisioning, social equality and the democratic question in the local context.

Notes

¹ The common practice, in the context of Zangon Katab, is to call ethnic groups by the derogatory or what others use to refer to them, instead of the name each group calls itself in its language. In this paper, each ethnic group is referred to by the name it calls itself, while the name “imposed” by outsiders will be in brackets – when mention of the ethnic group is made for the first time.

² Interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, at his house in Samaru Katab, on October 13, 1989. He had been a teacher, politician and a UMBC/AG member of the Federal Parliament representing Zangon Katab East Constituency in the First Republic, but carpet-crossed to the NPC in 1965.

³ Interview with retired late Colonel Yohanna Madaki at his house in Kaduna in March 1998. A retired soldier, lawyer and former military governor of former Gongola and Benue states. He said that he was one of the soldiers from what is now Kaduna State that made presentations and lobbied the military regime as from July 1966 to introduce the reforms. Madaki, even in his early career in the military, claimed being closely linked with local groupings waging agitation in Zangon Katab. He was as at 1998 a private legal practitioner and a leading member of the ruling People Democratic Party (PDP).

⁴ Before 1934 the Atsam(Chawai) had a district of their own, called the Chawai district. Atsam rulers appointed by the colonialists were Muslims, while the majority of the Atsam people were followers of traditional African religion. The district was abolished and the Atsam (Chawai)

were transferred to Zangon Katab District in 1934, and they resented this. Eventually they were reverted to a Chawai District – to the pre-1934 status – in 1974.

⁵ This was corroborated in the interview with retired Col. Yohanna Madaki, Op.c

Chapter Six

SUB-ETHNIC IDENTITY AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: REVISITING THE AGULERI-UMULERI CONFLICT IN ANAMBRA STATE

Okechukwu Ibeanu

and

Peter Mbah

Introduction

Aguleri and Umuleri are two communities in the Anambra River escarpment. They are both located in the Anambra East Local Government Area of Anambra State. The State is largely homogenous in ethnic composition, being one of the States in the Igbo heartland. Unlike many multi-ethnic communities in Nigeria, it seems reasonable to assume that identity based conflicts would be minimal in such a setting of ethnic homogeneity. To the contrary, however, Aguleri and Umuleri have been engaged in an internecine struggle dating to the beginning of the last century.

Micro-ethnic identity conflicts are becoming increasingly common in Nigeria. Apart from the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict, the Ife-Modakeke conflict is also well-known. Still, there are many other serious intra-ethnic conflicts that remain largely unreported, yet have extremely serious consequences in terms of loss of lives and destruction of livelihoods. In the South-East Zone of Nigeria alone, a study conducted ten years ago recorded over seventy serious conflicts among Igbo sub-identities (Ibeanu and Onu, 2001: 51 - 54). While such conflicts may not attract as much academic attention as macro-ethnic conflicts, they are capable of yielding theoretical insights into identity formation, ethnic transformations and questions of citizenship in a dynamic setting like Nigeria.

Sub-ethnic identity conflicts in Nigeria certainly predate colonialism. However, they have been shaped and sharpened by colonialism and sustained by the structures of the post-colonial state. It was colonialism that set the pace for modernization and economic development in Nigeria, while dramatically changing existing patterns of social, political and economic interactions among ethnic groups and communities. Colonialism had far reaching and Janiform impact on ethnic group consciousness. Outside the gates, colonialism was conducive to the emergence of pan-ethnic identities, particularly in the competitive setting of urban areas (Nnoli, 1980). However, within the gates, colonialism encouraged micro-ethnic, often competitive identities. Within the Igbo ethnic group for instance, sub-ethnic identities such as Ado (the Onitsha Igbo), Wawa (the Northern Igbo of Enugu State), Jookwa (the Afikpo), Ohuhu (parts of central Igboland) Ezza (the Abakaliki areas) and Ijekebe (the old Onitsha colonial province) among others, could be identified. Still, this should not be seen as a denial of the existence of sub-ethnic divisions among the Igbo prior to colonialism. Indeed, B. Eluwa, a prominent Igbo educationist and politician was reported by Huntington as saying that in the 1950s prominent Igbo politicians were touring parts

of the Igbo country trying to convince people to accept a pan-Igbo identity and were met by baffled villagers who could not understand such an identity (Huntington, 1968). In this paper, we explore how in spite of a pan-Igbo identity, serious sub-ethnic identity conflicts have persisted. Using the Aguleri-Umuleri case, we hope to shed light on a layer of identity formation and the citizenship question in Nigeria that remains largely neglected.

Sub-ethnic identities among the Igbo are numerous, taking their origins variously from dialects of the Igbo language, clans, administrative districts and even towns. Although these sub-identities often have cultural, linguistic and geographical origins, they are subsequently cultivated and nurtured politically (Ibeanu, 2003:169). Take the example of the Wawa in the Enugu and Ebonyi areas, it has been noted that the word Wawa “has no significance other than its occurrence in many dialects in the area. Initially, it had no cultural connotation. However, careful cultivation of the identity by politicians from the area has raised it into a sub-ethnic identity accepted across the zone. This tendency to cultivate sub-ethnic identities and to mobilize grievances behind them for political and economic purposes, especially through the work of town and clan associations, has been very important in intra-ethnic conflicts in Igboland (Ibeanu, 2003).

One of the most important factors motivating conflicts among the Igbo is land. This is because of the spirituality of land in Igbo culture as expressed in the prominence of the deity *Ana*. It is also expressed in the general view that the land is the spiritual connector of the living, the dead and the unborn. Consequently, land is a very serious issue among the Igbo since it touches both the material and the spiritual, the very essence of Igbo ontology. Thus, land is something that is worth dying for. Nevertheless, this spiritual perspective affords a limited explanation of the violence that attends land disputes in the Igboland today. We think that presently the principal causal factors include the increasing commercialization of land, population pressure, collapse of traditional structures for gaining access to land and managing conflicts arising from it, as well as government rural development policies.

The study of the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict is significant, first, because it could serve as an experimental control for testing some assumptions underlying the study of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria, particularly those positing a link between ethnic/cultural differences and conflicts. Secondly, Aguleri-Umuleri conflict focuses attention on intra-ethnic conflicts, which have not

received adequate attention among research scholars of communal conflicts in Nigeria. Consequently, sub-ethnic identity has not featured very much in the study of ethnicity in Nigeria. Yet, such identity could become a strong basis for political mobilization and communal conflicts.

Explaining Sub-ethnic Conflicts

Recent studies have pointed out the surge of rural ethnicity in Nigeria. Hitherto, ethnicity was formulated as a predominantly urban phenomenon. Thus, Nnoli (1980) posits that the colonial urban centre with its insecurities and uncertainties for the migrant was the cradle of ethnicity in Nigeria. While the urban areas are the cradles of ethnicity, the rural areas are now its hotbed. At the heart of rural communal conflicts is the land question. Pressure on land resulting from a combination of expropriation, monetization, rising population density, degradation and resurgence of pre-colonial communal competition has raised land into a *primal casus belli* in rural conflicts. This is taking place in contexts in which formal, modern demarcation of boundaries remains unfashionable. Attempts by government to demarcate boundaries to keep warring communities apart have, almost as a rule, failed to bring a lasting solution to violence (Ibeanu, 2003:173).

Although land and material interests are the objective causes of intra-ethnic conflict, they do not completely explain their persistence. It does seem that there is a subjective dimension accounting for their persistence. We may describe this subjective dimension as “collective ethnic animosity”. By this we mean a sense of grievance shared by members of a micro-ethnic or macro-ethnic identity or a sustained sense of grievances towards another ethnic identity arising from long standing conflict between them. Consequently, while land is a major causal factor in sub-ethnic conflicts, it is “collective animosity” that explains their recurrence over time, as we shall see in the Aguleri-Umuleri case.

Sub-ethnic conflicts have not featured significantly in the analysis of identity and citizenship in Nigeria. Usually the focus is on conflict among ethnic groups. But adequate analysis of citizenship, particularly conflicts related to *indigeneity* in Nigeria should properly document not only the inter-ethnic level but also the intra-ethnic level of the problem. Communal conflicts including ethnic conflicts have been explained in two principal ways. While liberal scholarship sees them mainly as natural, innate, primordial and inevitable, radical scholars have often

portrayed them as constructed and manipulated by the ruling classes. Communal identity is, therefore, false consciousness. However, while the view that these sentiments are natural is highly presumptuous and ahistorical, the view that they constitute false consciousness, which is instrumentalised by ruling classes, is too voluntaristic to be fundamental. Ake (1985) tries to move the debate further by attributing the persistence of ethnic consciousness in post-colonial Nigeria to what he calls the limited penetration of capitalism and commodity relations. Consequently, he argues that where, as in the case of Nigeria, there is a limited atomization of society by capitalist penetration, the market ethic does not rule the lives of a vast majority of the population, especially in the rural areas and they remain mostly rooted in primordial formations, including ethnic groups and therefore ethnic consciousness. In other words, it is essentially the penetration of capital that destroys ethnic consciousness. Ake's formulation, without doubt, advances our understanding of the persistence of ethnic and other communal consciousness. But there are two major problems with his formulation. First is that in those areas of the formation where we could rightly say that capitalism has substantially penetrated (e.g. the urban areas), such sentiments remain quite strong. Second and more fundamental is that Ake describes only one form of capitalist commodity relations, namely, the free market/competitive type. While this may be conducive to the atomization of society and the growth of individualism, other forms of capitalist commodity relations such as monopoly and oligopoly may, in fact, hamper these processes.

The general point then is that while land and other material interests are the major immediate *casus belli* in sub-ethnic conflicts they do not explain the identities that form around them and how these identities acquire specificity and become the basis of intensification of conflict. For instance, although both the Aguleri and Umuleri agree that they are descended from Eri, their common descent has receded almost completely and they see themselves as distinct. It is paradoxical that the two communities at one and the same time claim common descent and yet different identities. This irony calls for an understanding of the character of identity formation and persistence. This could be done effectively by reconciling the **primordial/innate** and **constructionist/instrumentalist** perspectives. We need to transcend the portrayal of the two perspectives as opposing. In fact, they are two dimensions of a historical process of emergence and development of ethnic or sub-ethnic identities. To begin with, an ethnic identity exists where there is a large group of people defined by:

1. Their collective consciousness of belonging to a cultural, linguistic or other communal ensemble;
2. Their collective attachment to a specific geographical homeland; and
3. Their collective engagement in the propagation and transmission of that identity over a relatively long period of time.

On the other hand, a sub-ethnic identity exists where some members of an ethnic identity perceive the existence of distinct cultural, linguistic or other communal characteristic that they and/or others believe are uniquely possessed by them and not shared by all members of the larger ethnic identity.

All ethno-communal identities are in a sense constructed. However, the construction is not an event, as we perceive in many constructionist writings, but a long historical process. When communal traits arise, through both conscious and unintended actions of both group members and outsiders, and persist over a long historical period, they acquire *primordially* and appear rudiments of the existence of the communal identity. We may describe this as the *primordialization* of these traits. *Primordialisation* is usually achieved through conscious propagation of these traits as the unique possession of the group (Ibeanu, 2003:198). These traits may include language, myth of common ancestry, collective history, possession of a common geographical space or homeland, staple food, dance steps or dressing mode. Once these traits acquire *primordaility*, they become the basis of intensification of the identity and future construction/ reconstruction and *primordialisation* of the identity. This set of quadrangular activities, namely, construction of trait propagation, *primordialisation* and intensification are fraught with conflict as they are designed to exclude others, while maximizing benefits for the in-group. This is worsened in contexts of scarce resources as land, markets and job opportunities, which necessitate competition between the in-group and out-group. The two related factors of Eri ancestry and ownership of Out Ocha land lie at the roots of construction, propagation, *primordialisatioin* and intensification of different identities between Aguleri and Umuleri and, therefore, central to the conflict. However, it is the collective animosity that has developed between the two communities that accounts for the persistence of the conflict.

Aguleri-Umuleri Conflict: Interface of Material Interest and Animosity

Both Aguleri and Umuleri trace their descent to a common Eri ancestry. Eri ethnology or more correctly Eri mythology is widely canvassed in the Anambra River Valley. Indeed it goes further eastwards to Agukwu in Njikoka Local Government Area, Westwards as far as Ibuzo in Delta State and Northwards to Idah in Kogi State. In fact, some people even claim that “Eri is the progenitor of the Igbo, Edo and Igala races”. Eri genealogy has become a central factor in the Aguleri -Umuleri conflict. Paradoxically, rather than serve as a unifying force for the communities in forging common identity, it has become a very divisive one. This is not difficult to understand. Eri mythology predates the conflict. Consequently, each side tries to show that it is the authentic direct descendant of Eri. The reason is that applying the rule of primogeniture, the direct descendants of Eri must be the original occupier of the land. Yet neither side denies that the other is part of the Eri ancestry (Ibeanu, 2003:186). However, what is contested is which of the two communities primogenital in the Eri heritage is. For the Umuleri community, there is the head of the Eri clan. In recent times they have chosen to be called Umueri rather than Umuleri, the former translating into “children of Eri”. According to the Umuleri interpretation of genealogy, the patriarch, Eri was a great hunter, medicine man and polygamist. He married many wives, among them Iguedo. This union begot Ogbunike, Awkuzu, Umuleri and Nando. Aguleri hotly contests this claim. Their interpretation is that Umuleri are the descendants of Ulueri, the product of an illicit love affair between Okebo, an itinerant Arochukwu trader and Iguedo, the pretty daughter of Aguleri (Ibeanu, 2003). Consequently, Umuleri actually is Ulueri, which translates into “the children of Ulueri”. The claim that they are Umueri is, therefore, untenable.

Adiele Afigbo, the renowned professor of history, provides yet another interpretation. He suggests that Nri genealogical charts present three tribal segments. In the primary segment, Eri and his first wife had four male children namely, Nri, Aguleri, Igbariam and Amanuke. The secondary tribal segment is linked to Nri, the eldest son of Eri. He had five sons and one daughter, but only four of these sons were able to found communities that have survived to date. These are Agukwu, Enugu-ukwu, Nawfia and Enugu-Agidi. Finally, the tertiary tribal segment arises from the only daughter of Nri, Iguedo. She married and had four sons each of which was able to found a viable community. These are Awkuzu, Umuleri, and Umanya- they were

mentioned in this “tribal fraternity”, but were not properly fitted in this genealogical chart (Afigbo, 1981:92).

Most pre-colonial anthropologists in Nigeria propagated one myth/folktale of origin or another. Colonial anthropologists and historians, in the absence of other convenient methods of gathering historical data, often employed oral tradition in their work. Concerned principally with the ethnography of the communities, it became inevitable that myths of origin will feature greatly in their work. While this method served very important scientific purpose, it has also been manipulated to prove untenable pet theses of the anthropologists and, historians. These include various notions about the history, ethnography, migratory patterns and defining features of pre-colonial societies. Among other things, these pet theses served the purpose of dividing and ruling these societies as well as making “scientific sense” of many things in these societies, which the western background of these colonial administrators and anthropologists considered “unorthodox”. Unfortunately, the limits of these oral traditions as a basis of ethnographic and historical research are rarely addressed. Sponsored, sanctioned and propagated by colonial rule, the stereotype embedded in these myths became a veritable instrument for subordination of societies and elevating others. In the postcolonial environment, these myths and folklore, which in some cases have been perniciously elevated to the status of science, became a central factor in inter-communal conflicts.

The first recorded violent conflict occurred around 1904. Evidence suggests that it was a culmination of disaffection expressed by each community over the way the other sold or leased Out Ocha land to Levantine companies and other organizations. Otu Ocha, which is the central *casus belli* in the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict, is a river beach on the eastern side of the Anambra River, a tributary of the River Niger. It stretches out 92 meters inland. It became a popular port of call for white traders and missionaries as they intensified their drive into the Igbo hinterland in the 19th Century.

Understandably, the Royal Niger Company, now a chartered and limited liability company led the way. Towards the end of the 19th Century, the two communities, which together with the neighbours such as Nsugbe and Umuoba had used the beach amicably, began to compete to grant, sale and counter sale to Europeans, of land that historically was used commonly without problems. The Idigos, who became the ruling family in Aguleri, made the

first grant to the Roman Catholic Mission (RCM) in 1894 and renewed it in 1898. The land was later abandoned by the RCM in 1903 when it was given another land in Nkponwofia just outside Otu Ocha land. In 1891, Aguleri granted portions of Otu Ocha, known as Aguleri Igbo, to the Royal Niger Company. The company finding it difficult to pronounce Aguleri called the area "Gloria ibo". Not wishing to be left out of the benefits of giving land to Europeans, Umuleri, led by another ruling family called the Umuchezis, on 4th January, 1898, sold a very large chunk of Otu Ocha to the Royal Niger Company. Other European groups that acquired parts of Otu Ocha included the Church Missionary Society in 1920 to build a church, John Holt in 1926 and CFAO in 1931 (Ibeanu, 2003:192).

There is no doubt that behind this frenzy to sell or to lease land was a calculation of material benefits. One group of settlers on the land, the Umuoba Anam, at one point paid seven cows, eight hundred yams, and eight hundred fishes to Aguleri. In his 1955 judgment in one of nearly a dozen court cases over the Otu Ocha land, J.Hurely, the trial judge remarked:

When at last the Umuleris took exception to these dealings with the land and instituted the 1933 action, it was, as they then said, because they wanted rents which Aguleri was getting Perhaps they had not realized the value of leases to commercial firms before their own grant to Royal NIGER Company in 1894 had been made in exchange for a few cases of gunpowder and matches (sic) and some guns (Federal Court of Appeal, 1981: 13)

Clearly, the upsurge in the value of Otu Ocha land with the arrival of Europeans on River Anambra was a central causal factor in the conflict. Over one century later, Otu Ocha remains the central bone of contention (Ibeanu, 2003:192)

However, the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict, which started as a resource conflict over material interest in Otu Ocha land, is now an animosity conflict. An animosity conflict is one in which memories of past conflicts acquire a relative autonomy, and become significant in renewing and intensifying conflict. Animosity conflicts are likely to be prolonged conflicts in which the protagonists have memories of loss, hurt or humiliation. An animosity conflict often begins as resource conflict. However, over time the original course of the conflict becomes only apparent,

while bitter memories become the immediate course of new conflict. At the same time, fears of preemptory attacks by the opponent provide a very short fuse that ignites new round of conflicts. In fact, the situation becomes so combustible that a minor issue is sufficient to renew the conflict. In the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict, mere rumours that the Aguleri community was planning to use the head of an Umuleri person for the burial of Mike Edozie, a former chairman of Anambra East Local Government Area, was enough to call Umuleri to arms in 1999. Four years earlier, singing and dancing by Umuleri people chanting “Aguleri *ipo*”, which means Aguleri weaklings, was said to be one of the immediate causes of the 1995 conflagration.

An Analysis of the 1995 and 1999 Conflicts

The 1995 and 1999 flare-ups are located in the fourth peak of the ten-year cycle of the conflict. Those two break-outs demonstrate the increasing importance of animosity in the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict. An attempt by one Chief Dan Ekwevi, alias *Okwu oto ekene Eze*, a native of Umuleri, to build a petrol station in the contested Agu-akor land ostensibly triggered the violence on 30 September, 1995 (Ibeanu, 2003:195). A group of Aguleri youths had engaged some construction workers and Umuleri youths in a battle at the site. After the initial skirmish, Umuleri youths were said to have marched around Otu Ocha chanting “Aguleri *ipo*” (Aguleri weaklings) (Ibeanu, 2003). Later in the night, the violence escalated as Aguleri youths attacked Our Lady of Victory Catholic Church and the Umuleri Town Hall among others. The violence soon spread as youths from the two communities engaged each other in a counter-value four-day war in which public and private properties worth billions of naira were destroyed.

By the end of the week, the two communities reached a cease-fire agreement at the Nkisi Palace Hotel, Onitsha, following the personal intervention of Colonel Mike Attah, the military governor of Anambra state. Colonel Attah had visited Otu Ocha on 2 October, at the height of the mayhem. Three weeks later, on 25 October, he empanelled a three-man judicial commission of inquiry into the violence under the chairmanship of retired Justice Mosses O. Nweje. The government White Paper on the commission's report, which was released in February, 1977, found among other things that Chief Ekwevi's filling station was only used by Aguleri as “an excuse to attack Umuleri, when their earlier baits had failed to provoke an armed conflict with Umuleri.” According to the commission, the two communities had built up animosities against each other since the landmark Supreme Court case in 1984 practically sealed the hopes of either

side establishing exclusive ownership of Otu Ocha. The Nweje Commission particularly blamed the Aguleri community for various acts suggestive of war-mongering. These included the attack on Our Lady of Victory Church construction workers, destruction of the statue of the Blessed Virgin Mary at Agu-akor in 1994, destruction of signposts bearing Umuleri at Otu Ocha, establishment of a market/motor park at Agu-akor and brazen defiance of repeated appeals by the State Boundary Adjustment Committee to suspend development projects on the disputed land pending the demarcation of boundary between the two communities (Ibeanu, 2003:196). In fact, the Nweje Commission noted that Aguleri would have attacked Umuleri in December, 1994, had mobile policemen not been drafted to the area to maintain peace. Finally, the commission underscored the ill will that lay at the foundation of the conflict. According to the commission:

...the animosity between Aguleri and Umuleri was as a result of mutual suspicion, mistrust and jealousy and that any action by one side was immediately misconstrued by the other side as directed towards it. That syndrome made it impossible for the two parities to dialogue and resolve their differences amicably (Government of Anambra State, 1997:17).

Expectedly, the Aguleri community rejected these claims, describing the Nweje Commission findings as one sided and, therefore, incapable of solving the Aguleri/Umuleri crisis particularly as the findings and recommendations did not reflect the proceedings of the panel of inquiry.

Partly as a result of its rejection by the Aguleri community and partly as a result of political dynamics, including the replacement of Colonel Attah by Wing Commander Emmanuel Ukaegbu, the many recommendations of the Nweje Commission were not implemented. These were as follows:

1. Constitution of Otu Ocha into a Local Government Area all by itself.
2. That the Otu Ocha Local Government Area, when constituted, be divided into 20 to 24 wards numbered as Otu Ocha Ward I, Otu Ocha Ward II etc. in order to avoid either of the two communities claiming the wards.

3. The traditional rulers (*Igwe*) of Aguleri and Umuleri should relocate from Otu Ocha to their various inland towns, *Ime Obodo* or *Enu Obodo*, where they should observe their festivals *Ofala* and all civic and public functions.
4. That the celebration of “Aguleri Day” or “Umuleri Day” should be moved out of Otu Ocha to the various “ *Ime Obodo*” or “*Enu Obodo*”.
5. Institutions located at Otu Ocha should be identified as being situated at Otu Ocha and not Aguleri or Umuleri. For instance, St. Peter’s Church, Otu Ocha. Institutions which “because of similarity in names are only identified by the community to whom they belong e.g. banks and post offices, should elect either to change their names and drop their community or transfer their business premises to their parent inland towns”.
6. Buildings such as Town Halls should drop the word “town” and become designated as being located at Otu Ocha. For instance, Aguleri Town Hall becomes Aguleri Hall, Otu Ocha.
7. A law should be promulgated making it an offence punishable with three years imprisonment to put up any sign indicating that Otu Ocha belongs to any particular community.
8. Constitution of a body to demarcate with “heavy concrete beacons reinforced with rods” the boundary between Aguleri and Umuleri (Government of Anambra State, 1997:16).

The government accepted most of these recommendations. However, they were not implemented before Colonel Attah was replaced. His successor, Wing Commander Ukaegbu, considered the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict either inconsequential or too hot politically to handle.

On Good Friday, April 2, 1999, the peace of the graveyard that prevailed in Otu Ocha was broken. In Aguleri, Easter preparations were rather subdued as the community prepared for the funeral rites of Chief Mike Edozie, former chairman, Anambra Local Government Caretaker Committee. Umuleri community regarded Chief Edozie as the brain behind the attack against them by Aguleri in 1995. They accused him of using his office as caretaker committee chairman to arm Aguleri and ensure that the Divisional Police Command did nothing to stop the attacks. In fact, the Nweje panel roundly indicted Chief Edozie in its report. According to the government White Paper, “the commission found that Chief Mike Edozie, chairman, Anambra Local Government Caretaker Committee was fully aware of the planned attack on Umuleri by Aguleri

on 30th September, 1995 and could have stopped the attack, if he were not an Aguleri man”. The non-implementation of the White Paper of the Nweje panel did not go down well with the Umuleri community. They became even unhappy because Aguleri increasingly portrayed this non-implementation as a victory and humiliation of Umuleri. Consequently, Chief Edozie, who was indicted in the White Paper, became a hero in Aguleri. By contrast, he became a hate figure in Umuleri.

The funeral of Chief Edozie provided a good opportunity for the two communities to renew hostilities. The funeral procession marched through Otu Ocha and there were allegations that Aguleri youths in the cortege threatened to bury Chief Edozie with the head of an Umuleri man. This is a long-abandoned practice common among the Igbo in the olden days. It was a practice reserved for the burial of great warriors. In effect, Aguleri youths insinuated that Chief Edozie was a great warrior in the “defeat” of Umuleri in 1995. Umuleri resented this, and just as the “Aguleri *ipo*” song was the match in the tinder box in 1995, the threats to use an Umuleri head for the burial of Chief Edozie, however unlikely, served as a short fuse for the dynamite in 1999.

The socio-political environment at the time could not have been more conducive to the renewal of conflict. The military government was on its way out and showed little interest in intervening in a very politically charged issue. The police at Otu Ocha was very cautious, having been heavily criticized for its role in 1995. There was a general atmosphere of insecurity in Anambra State at the time, with the vigilante Bakassi Boys waging a relentless war with criminals around Onitsha and Nnewi. Moreover, there was free flow of small arms and political thugs used by politicians and their military patrons to prosecute the 1999 elections. In fact, it is widely held in the two communities that political thugs and criminals from Onitsha served as mercenaries in the violence (Ibeanu, 2003:198). Thus, Aguleri version of events holds that a notorious criminal from Umuleri, one Obanyeli Ikeli, organized and attacked people observing a night vigil for Chief Edozie on the night of 2nd April, 1999. Above all, because government did not implement its own White Paper on the 1995 crisis, which included the issue of sources of ammunition used in the conflict, many guns and equipment used in prosecuting the 1995 violence were still largely available in 1999. Incidentally, the Nweje Commission had found that

most of the arms used by Aguleri in 1995 “were amassed by Aguleri from the time of their conflict with Obale in Kogi state”. (Government of Anambra State, 1997:16)

This conjuncture of events foreboded a long and bloody war between the two communities. The war lasted from early April to the end of July 1999, probably the longest round of violence in the long history of the conflict. The 1999 violence was also characterized by involvement in the conflict of Umuoba Anam, a neighbouring community, on the side of Aguleri. Over the years, the Umuoba people have been largely neutral in the conflict. Their involvement has been given two different interpretations. The first, which is mainly offered by Umuoba people, is that they attacked Umuleri because their rampaging youth had murdered two of their people at Chief Edozie’s vigil. The second interpretation, which is prevalent in Umuleri, is that, Umuoba being settlers, were jealous of their achievements over the years. In addition, the Umuoba being settlers, were promised a share of the land to be taken in the conflict by Aguleri, if they assisted the latter in sacking Umuleri.

The 1995 and 1999 conflicts were devastating in terms of their material and human cost. Some estimates put the numbers of deaths as high as 1,000. Some reports hold that half a million people were displaced. It is difficult to confirm these figures. Generally, official figures of casualties are much lower. The police, through the area commander, Onitsha, in 1995 reported that they found only one body burnt beyond recognition. On its part, the Nweje panel found that four persons were killed during the armed conflict. Moreover, because the warriors put forward a façade of invincibility, it was necessary to report minimal casualties in order to maintain that image. Some of the youths that said they participated in the conflict told us that they took part in rituals that were meant to protect them from gunshots. The notice of *odi eshi* (impenetrable), which has now become popular across Igboland, gained prominence in the 1995 and 1999 conflicts.

Apart from the human cost, the material cost of the conflicts has also been staggering. The Nweje panel estimates that private houses and properties destroyed in the 1995 conflict were to the tune of #3 billion, most of them on the Umuleri side. Damage to major public buildings was in excess of N232 million. The material cost of the 1999 conflict was unprecedented in the history of Aguleri-Umuleri conflict. Looting was also said to be widespread, unlike in previous conflicts. The extensive loss of property in the conflict was partly due to the fact that the 1999

conflict war involved the three communities of Aguleri, Umuleri and Umuoba, unlike the twosome it used to be. The conflicts between the two communities in 1999 show that deaths, injuries, destruction of social facilities and reduction in economic well being have very high. However, destruction of social facilities, injuries and deaths ranked highest.

Concluding remarks

Using the Aguleri-Umuleri conflicts, we have attempted to show that an important layer of the citizenship question lies below the often talked about ethnic question. Intra-ethnic conflicts, as we have categorized these conflicts, again demonstrate the centrality of material issues in defining citizenship conflicts. In other words, indigenes and settlers are, contrary to common reasoning, principally economic categories. This point is extremely important in order to appreciate the limits of cultural explanations of these problems. This is not to deny the importance of cultural differences in defining these identities; instead it is to understand the intricate ways in which economic interests become part of the complex of construction, propagation, *primordialisation* and intensification of contradictory cultural identities, leading to ethnic (indigene-settler) conflicts.

Otu Ocha, the fertile land on the bank of the Anambra River is the central cause of the Aguleri-Umuleri conflict. The rising value of land, dating to the arrival of Levantine companies and Christian missions in the area, assured that Otu Ocha, which was commonly used by both communities since antiquity, would come to the centre of those bloody conflicts. Yet, while the ownership of Otu Ocha is the lasting cause of the conflict, the animosity arising from a lingering sense of deprivation, either perpetrated by Europeans or the post-colonial state, has assured its persistence. It is in the context of this animosity that Otu Ocha land has become a central basis for constructing, propagating, primordializing and intensifying the differences between the two communities. Thus, the conflict crosses what Nnoli (2003:16) calls the threshold of irreversibility. Over time, the difference between the two communities becomes only “natural” and the conflict syndrome is transmitted from generation to generation as part of the transmission of their separate identities.

The zero-sum solutions that have been predominantly pursued by the state since colonial times have not helped matters. Both in court judgments and in white papers of investigation panels, these solutions have applied standards of justice which only serve to exclude people and

deepen animosities. Not surprisingly, following the 1999 conflict traditional leaders in the area began to look for alternative solutions. One of the most interesting was the Anambra East Peace Council initiative. The thrust of this Initiative was to return to traditional means of settling disputes. After a series of meetings, the council announced a number of steps to ensure the return of peace. They pledged co-operation with the Araka Committee. At the same time, they called for immediate end to hostilities and return of persons displaced in the conflicts to their homes.

Finally, they set up a process of traditional oath taking and covenant to end the feuding and shedding of blood. Oath taking (*nghu iyi*) and blood covenant (*iko mme*) are common traditional practices in the Anambra River basin. The first involves swearing to powerful community deities and pledging a specified course of behaviour. Oath taking was a very powerful mechanism for behavioural change in traditional Igbo societies. The second arises in situations where there has been shedding of blood. It is a means of appeasing the Ana deity, which abhors the spilling of blood. *Iko mme* involves sacrifices and may also involve reparations taking the form of exchange of human beings to replace the dead (*nkechi mmadu*) or mere exchange of valuables and/or services. The fact that these practices, which had previously been widely abandoned, were reinvented in spite of the tremendous progress of Christianity in the area, including the recent beatification of Father Iwene Tansi of Aguleri, points to failure of previous approaches to solving the problem. Many Christians in the community and beyond have criticized the resort to “fetish practices” by the communities. However, the traditional leaders challenge critics to find better solutions to the century old conflict. Intentional or coincidental, the conflict has not flared up since the oath taking of 2000. However, what seems to have emerged from this is that more inclusive solutions drawing from traditional practices and underwritten by the state may well be the most lasting way of finally resolving the conflict.

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Chapter Seven

PRELIMINARY NOTES ON THE KANAWA IDENTITY: BEYOND “INDIGENEITY” CRISIS

IBRAHIM MUAZZAM

“Commerce is one of the very few areas of human endeavour in Kano where religion did not seem to discriminate Muslims and non-Muslims... Ideas influence commerce much as commerce is a career of ideas. The pre-colonial position of Kano as a centre of International Trade exposed it to diverse influences. Foreign Merchants, scholars and self-seekers came to Kano just as Kano people traveled outside Kano. Their activities altered the material life in Kano and influenced the Kano mind”

(Dahiru Yahya: 1989).

The above partially captures some of the reasons why the Kano people were not only able to evolve a Kanawa identity but also become more accommodative and flexible in terms of creating a society with “fluid identity” enlivened by cultural variety, reasonable diversity within vigorous unity. In terms of the evidence available the “Kanawa did not have their origin as a segment” of some racial or ethnic group. That is in spite of not being bound by any blood ties inherited from a common ancestor the Kasar Kano was by no means an area “empty of inhabitants”. The process of migration and emigration was critical in producing “social, economic and cultural systems with a high capacity to absorb, assimilate and acculturate which produced the Kanawa as a distinct nation of Hausa speaking people (Usman: 2006:152) The dialect of Hausa spoken by Kanawa is Kananci which is different from Zazzaganci, Katsinanci, Sakkwatanci, Guddiranci or Arewanci among others. The Kano Chronicle (KC) dated mid 17th century is not just a history of King lists but migration, trade and cultural diffusion relating Kano with many parts of Nigeria and West Africa. A recent study of KC by Shankar (2005) raised the question of how much one can learn about religious practices in “an environment where Muslims and Non-Muslims” were involved in a struggle over political authority and material resources but at other times worked together. One of his main and apt conclusions in his study was that the Kano Chronicle: “suggests that religious contest may not have persisted throughout the history of Kano. Indeed, religious difference was not paramount at many periods in Kano’s history. Hausa language, architecture and intellectual schemes show different ways of organizing and managing difference in the interest of national integration” (Shankar: 2005: 297).

It was during the reign of Yaji (1349-1385) that Islam became a state religion due to the massive influx of Wangarawa migrants from Mali who settled and found some wards in Kano the most famous being Madabo which had since then been a centre of Islamic learning attracting scholars from the whole of West Africa. The peak of Kano’s expansion and rapid institutional development crystallized during the reign of Muhammadu Rumfa (1463-1499). He gave support to Islamic scholars, built the famous Kurmi market and the palace known as Gidan Rumfa which is still in existence. It was during his reign that Kano came to have a written constitution or its Magna Carta *Taj ad-din Fima Yajib Ala al-Muluk* meaning crown of Religion concerning the obligation of princes. It was written by Sheikh Muhammad al-Maghili a North African Jurist and scholar from Tlemcen in Algeria. The *Taj-addin* provided a strategy for state craft and became a key text in the ideological formation of Kano political and religious institutions. We have need to

underpin the fact earlier stated that migration into Kano had been part of its history. During the reign of Usman Zamnagawa (1343-1349) Rumawa settlers (Tunisian mercenaries) were said to have even aligned with the palace. There was massive influx of Bornuan, Tropolitianian, Tuareg traders and Fulani clerics coming from Borno, Air and Tripoli with so many settling inside the city even before Muhammadu Rumfa's reign.

At almost every stage in the development of Kano, the rulers and people had almost no option but to develop a cosmopolitan view of state building where the flow of "commodities, ideas and people transcended continental, regional, ethnic and political boundaries". It was the development and facilitation of local production which made the state to become more accommodative as "Kano became a formidable economic centre." Staundinger observed in his visit toward the end of 1885 that "Kano is the capital of the richest and most flourishing province, of present day Hausaland..... Whereas one could get together barely five or ten sacks of cowrie shells in a large city in any other province, here one could find hundreds of sacks accumulated at several of the rich citizens houses. Indeed this currency is no longer sufficient for the trade and the Arabs already settle their bills largely with the Maria Theresa thaler... Kano is the trade emporium for the whole of Hausaland moreover the southern most market of the Arabs... large caravans from the different Tuareg tribes arrive with one of the most indispensable items of trade among all peoples – salt ... large ivory caravans returns to Kano from Adamawa ... all year around many intenerant traders arrive in Kano and so the traffic in the town never really dies down "(Moody: 1967:47). Kano was even then an important terminus and entrepot of Ghadames – Air – Kano route, Cyrenaica – Kufia – Wadai route, Morocco – Toademi – Timbuctu among others. Traders bring all articles of trade from "the English and the French, from Niger and the Benue together with all the European and local articles". Trade, migration and intermarriage led to patterns of settlement with some being occupational. The names of some wards in Kano metropolitan and its environs bears testimony to Kano being a melting pot socially, culturally and linguistically contributing to the evolution of Karawa identity. Some of these wards include Alkantara (Bridge in Arabic), Al-findiki (from Al-Funduq meaning an Inn in Arabic), Durumin Kulkul (Named after Abdullahi Kut-kut), Dukurawa, Zaitawa, Jingau, Kofar Wambai and Dandalin Turawa (where you find Arabs from Tripoli, Tunisia and Egypt whose earlier settlers were families of Bil Aluwa, Howeidy, Bugram among other). The Nupe were said to have settled in Kano by the late 15th century. Thus wards

like Tudun Nupawa, Manladan, Indabawa among others were of Nupe origin. Zangon Barebari, Gabari, Satatima, Koki, Mallam Ganari, Durumin Kaigama among other were peopled by Kanuri from Borno. Agadasawa, Durbin Arbabi, Arzai, Zango, Adakawa were wards whose settlers were at the initial stage mostly Tuaregs. Yakasai, Sagagi among others were set up by the Jukun or Kwararrafa people. Kabbawa (Kebbi), Mazankwarai (Sakkwatawa), Daurawa (Daura) Sudawa (Sudanese), Darma (Katsinawa), Garangamawa (Chadians), Lalokin Lemo (Hadejawa and Adarawa), Kabara, Garke, Jujin Yallabu, Madabo, Juma, Warure, Zage, Zaitawa (Wangara from Mali). The early settlers of Ayagi were mostly Yoruba people from Ogbomosho and Ilorin Muslim traders who came under the leadership of an “ itinerant Muslim scholar from Ilorin Muhammadu Jatau” who happened to be a close associate and classmate (in Quranic Education) of Emir Ibrahim Dabo (1819 – 1846). The Yoruba settled in Ayagi during the reign of Emir Ibrahim Dabo predominantly trading in Kolanuts, foodstuff and livestock. Up to today, there exists many “ Yoruba family compounds among them were Gidan Malam Sharu Hambali, Gidan Ladun, Gidan Salau, Gidan Malam Bako Sufi, Gidan Kufa, Gidan Kurmi, Gidan Mamman Jakara, Gidan Lemulamula “ (Olaniyi : 2004: 50). The descendents of Mallam Jatau have maintained the leadership of Sarkin Ayagi (Sarkin Yarabawa) since 1819 with Alhaji Salihu Baba Agba as the existing head. Some of the wards in Kano follow occupational residence with people having mixed ethnic origins. There are those based on occupational specialization. Thus, we have wards like Takalmawa (shoemakers), Mabuga (cloth ironing), Jujin Yallabu (embroiders and kolanut traders), Soron Dinki (Tailors), Tudun Makera (Smithing). Jaggars study of Kano city blacksmiths located in various wards underpin their mixed ethnic origin. He further stated “the blacksmithing groups are now fully acculturated mainly through intermarriages with the Hausa. All speak the Hausa language, from birth and refer to themselves as Kanawa... those smiths who are not of Hausa descent but of Kanuri, Fulani, Tuareg or Arab stock will if pressed admit these origins... Many retain some of their distinctive physical characteristics such as skin colour and facial scarification. The present Sarkin Makera (Chief of Blacksmiths) for example bears the Kanuri facial markings of his ancestors “(Jaggars: 1973:14). Traders and migrants did not only bring new techniques and influences which helped in changing the character of the metropolis but also became integrated along occupational rather than ethnic origins.

Even the Jihad in 1804 was not able to submerge Kano identity within the caliphate. It however strengthened it as a value regarded to be distinct from that of Sokoto (Paden: 1973, Mahdi: 1985; Smith: 1997). In Kano the Fulani even before the Jihad were part of Kano's government, had their education in Kano and some "remained with the King of Kano to the last day of the Jihad wars". Apart from the Fulbe who had strong connection with the Kano court, "most of the rich Fulbe clans, notably the Yerimawa, Jafunawa and several other clans simply refused to participate in the Jihad... During the war, more Hausa people fought against the King than the Fulbe "(Mahdi:1985: 119-120). Alkali Usman and Dan Mama who were Hausa were part of the leading figures of the Jihad movement in Kano (Smith: 1997).

Colonialism did bring in new items of trade, skills, ideas and people. Kano's exposure to all facets of colonial experience was not without its stresses, contests and tensions. Kano now became "a nodal point for colonial communication and transport system". As far back as 1915, "fifteen European firms, four Syrian and three southern Nigerian trading concerns had been established (Yahya: 1986:5). When Bovill arrived Kano in 1918 as an officer with the West African Frontier Force mounted infantry, he observed: "I had not seen Kano before, and my imagination was deeply stressed by the teeming life of the great city, especially by the vast cosmopolitan crowd which daily thronged the market drawn, it then seemed to me from over half of Africa "(Bovill:1970:XII). It was this fascination which led to his study published as *Caravans of the Old Sahara* in 1933 which later became *The Golden Trade of the Moors* published in 1958. As one of the objects of colonial authority was to differentiate 'citizens and subjects', the "settlers" town and that of the natives" to ensure social and economic atomization, the *Sabon Gari* (New Town) was created in 1913. In Kano, the earliest settler in *Sabon Gari* included people belonging to many Northern provinces classified as Hausa, there were Yoruba, Igbo, Nupe, Ghanains, Arabs, Cameroonians, Sierraleonians among others. The first Igbo migrant came to Kano in 1912 and that was "Pa Egbeonwu from Nnewi" who was the first settler (Awaji:1996). Some of the Igbo came working as clerks, soldiers with the West African Frontier Force and Railway workers. The Edo migrant community had Mr I.A. Guobadia as the first to settle in Sabon Gari in 1914. In fact Guobadia claimed "to have come to Kano from Kaduna on foot" and was the first to own a landed property in Kano situated at Ogbomosho Road. Other earlier Edo migrants included Madam Comfort Edhosa who came in 1920 and "later became the proprietor of the famous Ebuwa Hotel Odutola Street". She died in 1986 aged 79.

Madam Victoria Arhibonare who came in 1939 was the first “Edo lady to marry a Hausaman”. Others like Chief Joseph Ohi Imolarhe came in 1943 worked in several places and later with Kano Native Authority before retiring in 1980 after putting thirty two years in service. Most of the later Edo migrants are from Northern part of Edo (Du-sai:1986). The Ghanians were led by Mr. G.E. Eben France who came in 1916, J.T.D. Duncan and Christian Edward Bedford who came in 1918 and Alhaji Abdulwahid Amartey. The Sierra Leonean Community were led in arrival by Mr. Ballat-Hughes who came to the North in 1902. He became the “Chairman of Sabon Gari Board” and President of the Sabon Gari mixed court and the first businessman to operate a beer parlour and cinema house in Sabon Gari at New Road. The Yoruba and Nupe as we mentioned had been in Kano even before colonization. It was however Alhaji Muhammadu Salihu Olowo who first came to Kano from Ilesha in 1903 and resided first in Ayagi who first moved to Sabon Gari in 1916. Later came Sani Giwa, Sanyaolu, Ayo Biojo, Mr E.A. Odulami among others. Some of the Nupe who moved from the city to Sabon Gari were scholars. The most distinguished among them was Mallam Muhammadu Naibi Mai Dogongemu who in 1917 established an Arabic-Koranic school at Emir Road in Kano. The school still exists in its original premises and served as a training ground for many Moslem scholars. Among the Hausa elements who formed a Hausa association were Mallam Habu the Sarkin Hausawa, F.I. Musa and J.B. Ibrahim. In 1947 the Muslims in Sabon Gari vehemently protested against the demolition of plots that belonged to the Muslims. When the Native Authority attempted to relocate all the Muslims from Sabon Gari to Fagge and Tudun Wada in 1949 they wrote a letter strongly arguing against the attempt to separate them from their Christian neighbours. They argued: “It is rather painful to note that inspite of the fact that most of the original settlers of Sabon Gari were Moslems and some of us have lived since 1914, it is now considered necessary by the Native Authority to separate us from the Christians with whom we have lived in peace and harmony for a very long time (Bako: 2006: 5). In the light of these and subsequent developments we have to dig deeper to understand the unfortunate Kano riots in 1953 whose aftermath witnessed the relocation of many Muslim to areas outside Sabon Gari changing the composition of the setting.

Most of the Lebanese who migrated and settled in Kano and form part of the Kanawa community came in the 19th century. They were mostly Maronite Christians and the first merchants were Ferris and Michael George who came in 1906. The Isoko first came in 1934 as related by 90 year old Chief I.O. Odharo in 2002 at his residence in Sharada. As their population increased they like

many others moved to even settle in rural Kano in places like Bunkure and Rano (Emamezi: 2002): The Ibibio who occupy the Yankura section of Sabon Gari market and own most of salons and fashion designing institutions in Badawa arrived Kano in 1946 led by Late Chief Effiong Ekop (Nkanga: 1998). Most of those who arrived earlier were in Sabon Gari but now constitute one of the largest migrants in Badawa.

Badawa, a peri-urban community is an old precolonial settlement set up as the name implies by the Bedde who are a people in Yobe State. The old settlement is peopled by the Bedde, Hausa and Fulani as a typical Kano setting. As from 1970s there is now a changing pattern in settlement and socio-integration of many Nigerian communities in what is now new Badawa extension. New migrants such as Igbo, Tiv, Igala, Idoma, Ibibio, Ghanians, Bura, Higi, Ghanians, among others and mostly Christians live in the new extension, Tsauni, Unguwar Gaya and Zangon Tagwai. It is a model community not polarized by Muslim-Christian conflicts in spite of the abundance of churches, hotels and beer parlours. As Jigirya stated: "Badawa can be described as ... multi ethnic ... both Muslims and Christians ... live together peacefully despite their religious and ethnic differences (Jigirya: 1993:60). By the end of 1970 the Yoruba residents in Kurnar Asabe, Tudun Bojuwa and more in Bachirawa established various ethnic association and a huge town hall in Bachirawa. The place is now popularly called Unguwar Yorubawa (Yoruba ward). A new Sabon Gari as the new rich young Igbo are saying is on the rise at Jaba in Fagge Local Government as Giginyu is now Unguwar Bura-Babur.

It is the Kurama people found in Doguwar Ginginya of Kano also provide a good case study of the flexibility of the indigeneity issue to Kanawa. The Kurama also found in Kaduna, Plateau and Bauchi had been in Kano since pre-colonial times. According to the Kurama traditional beliefs, their language is called Tikurmi while the people are called Akurmi or Nuzume. They settled at Burum-Burum which in their language means soft soil while the Hausa were mostly at Maraku, Duguwar Giginya, Dariya, Dadinkowa among other places. They have a close association with the Jarawa and Sayawa who originally are from Bauchi and the Ammawa from Jos who are now all settled at Ririwai. Only few of the Kurama participated in the tin mining with the Hausa people in Ririwai. They initially proved impregnable to conversion both by the Muslim before colonization and Christian missionaries after colonization insisting that they have their traditional religion – Uchimtu. It was later as a result of intensive missionary activities by

Pastor Yahaya from Western Kuradu and Pastor Buzu Kaduna who is an Asuruba from South-Zaria all evangelist of the Baptist Church from Kaduna that Chinge Gauraka, Sale Sallau and Dauda Sallau converted to Christianity. The Kurama established villages like Nigada, Karaurau, Shiburu, Uranmale, Timori, Npem, Kwansara which have specific meanings in their language. (Abdu: 1992). As a result of their stay close to the Hausa, “the Kurama people began to speak Hausa Language, dress like Hausas” but not completely discarding their culture. Today some of them are Muslims while many are Christians and still maintaining their traditional ways of life. They are part of the Kanawa enjoying full “indigeneity”.

All culture is a contamination and a hybrid as every identity is relational and constructed not inscribed in nature. We discover who we are through interaction with others. Kano’s ability to absorb and integrate was not just because of its being a historic centre of commercial activity but also a ritual city of old and later attracting scholars and traders from many parts of Nigeria, Africa and beyond. It also became a centre of resistance in pre-colonial and post colonial times. The culture and language of the Kanawa is even facilitated by intergroup conflict and relations. What we attempted to show above is not just the variety but the fact that what one observes in the city over one-hundred and twenty four wards and the immediate environs is the level of integration which is still ongoing. There is no denying the fact observed by Bilkisu Yusuf (2003) that some people prefer to maintain the “Sabon Gari syndrome” of perceiving that they will not be welcome to some places which they have not been banned. The preservation of their individual or group cultural background is a matter of their choice. Notions of history, past and roots helped in shaping values and belief that show the way forward. When people emigrate to communities they come to be productive and contributing members of their chosen society. What they need is opportunity, fairness, equal treatment and not paternalism. Indulging in unabashedly filiopietistic and dangerous game of heightened ethnicity entails the risk of excessive fantasy, editing the past and glossing even a harsh reality into a coveted memory. Essentializing identities with a grammar of power which is paratactic can only lead to ontological imperialism, war, ethnic and cultural cleansing. What we need is to find common ground having broad faith in the human spirit and dignity despite difference connecting values across all dividing lines. We need to ensure social justice by viewing communities as places of learning, engagement through collective problem solving taking youths out of streets as battle fields compelling them into meeting rooms with ideas that can positively impact on communities. We have to learn to tear

down walls and build bridges between communities that should see the world through a door not a key hole, light candle than continue abusing darkness.

Presented at National Workshop on Citizenship and Indigeneity Conflicts in Nigeria Organized by Centre for Democracy and Development, CCDD), Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) and Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) at Abuja 8th and 9th February, 2011.

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Chapter Eight
HISTORICAL INSIGHTS ON PLATEAU INDIGENE-SETTLER SYNDROME, 1902 -
2011

MONDAY YAKIBAN MANGVWAT

A. DEFINITION OF TERMS/CONCEPTS

Without consulting the dictionary, I define an indigene as a person or group who are native to a place. They cannot trace their origin to any other place outside of where they are found. They are autochthonous to the place.

On the other hand a settler is a person or group that has migrated from a migrant source to settle in another place on a permanent basis. The migration and settlement may be local, regional or even continental – South Africa, Canada, Australia, USA – to mention

the most known ones. What happens in the new habitat is a matter for their subsequent history. They could get assimilated into the populations of the new habitat or conquer them and annihilate them (e.g. the Ainos in Japan, the Red Indians in America) or remain a separate enclave as the white minorities tried to do in S. Africa. The Jos settler phenomenon is a local case. I refer to it as a syndrome because of the lingering complex socio-economic, political and religious problems which have arisen in the juxtaposition of indigenes and settlers on the Jos Plateau.

The term Hausa-Fulani is a generic term covering an amalgam of numerous Fulani, Hausa, Nupe, Kanuri, Terawa, Katsinawa, Kanawa, Zazzagawa etc groups from Northern Nigeria who were invariably Moslems.¹ Scientifically, there is no tribe known as Hausa-Fulani both of which are clearly different tribal and linguistic groups. In anthropological and linguistic terms, the Fulanis speak Fulfulde while the Hausawa are referred to as Habe. Indeed, I am aware that in some quarters, the historiography of the Moslem North is periodized into: mulkin Habe, mulkin Fulani and mulkin Nasara. At the heat of the settler versus indigene contestations, the Hausa-Fulani forged a new identity known as Jasawa and formed the Jasawa Development Association (JDA) to promote and protect their interest in Jos. This militant organization was held by both Justices Fiberesima and Niki Tobi Panels to be partly responsible for the malignant ethno-religious crises in Jos¹.

By historical insight, I believe the organizers mean an analysis of the historical processes, forces and factors at work which have, through time, produced the syndrome of settler-indigene tension and conflict on the Jos Plateau which has escalated in contemporary times defying solution by successive governments both state and federal; both military and civilian governments. The reason for this is because the settlers and indigenes and Plateau State are being used as a testing ground for a larger Nigerian problem which must be addressed sooner than later. This is the National Question. All these provisions in our constitution concerning the Directive Principles of State, Federal Character, citizen, indigene, zoning etc are a reflection of the recognition of the centrality of the National Question in modeling a federal democratic polity in Nigeria. So much for the definition and clarification of terms/concepts

B. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

Any attempt aimed at understanding the authentic history of Jos city and the Jos Plateau in the last one hundred years must focus sharply on the discovery and exploitation of tin ore on a world scale. Elsewhere, I have argued that the history of the Jos Plateau from 1902 to the present can be philosophically posited in terms of tin determinism. This is so because of the following reasons.

- i) The timing of the conquest of the Jos Plateau was informed by known presence of tin ore.
- ii) The extreme violence visited on polities of the Jos Plateau during the conquest was informed by same. Because mining leases to prospecting mining companies would require land confiscation from the natives, their conquest must be excessively brutal to force them into total submission.
- iii) The colonial economy, along with the division of labour which it introduced, was informed by the needs of the tin industry. This was a crude “ethnic” division of labour in which permanent tin labour was based on immigrants from outside the Plateau while the Plateau native peasantry were retained as migrant or seasonal labourers to enable them produce crops to feed the huge populations of the tin industry as well as meet their tax obligations to the colonial state.
- iv) Ultimately, the class configuration which emerged by independence down to the present is largely a reflection of the colonial economy based on the tin industry intruded by Christian missionary education and conversion. This has meant that, over the years of Christian activity, the bulk of the Jos Plateau native population had become Christian while the Hausawa settler population is Moslem. Notwithstanding these broad categorizations some Jos Plateau natives have converted to Islam.¹

C. ORIGIN, GROWTH AND ESCALATION OF ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS

Of course pre-colonial conflicts existed among the various Jos Plateau polities sometimes leading to wars but these belonged to a different historical epoch. These were not

between indigenes and settlers which was a colonial phenomenon precisely because prior to colonial conquest and rule, there were no “settlers” on the Jos Plateau to worry anybody.

With colonial rule came the creation and establishment of Naraguta Division, later Jos Division and Jos Township Ordinance (1915). Furthermore, both Naraguta and Jos Divisions were administered as part of Bauchi Province until 1925.¹ This had meant that native authority workers were posted to Jos from Bauchi in addition to local recruitments. Over time, Hausa Village Areas system created at the inception of colonial rule as a temporary measure of articulating indirect rule in Jos developed a certain autonomy of its own with the Hausa-Fulani settler community leaders taking on the title of sarki (king or ruler). These title holders were initially sent from Bauchi but later, after Barde’s indictment in 1921, were chosen from among the Hausa-Fulani settler community in Jos.¹

The colonial administration of former Naraguta Division, Jos Division, including Jos Township as part of Bauchi Province, together with the evolution of a local sarauta system among the Hausa-Fulani helped in no small way in making the settlers “believe” or contend that they founded and owned the town. In point of fact however, the so-called claim on the ownership of Jos town by the Hausawa settlers cannot simply stand because they themselves were a colonial creation. If, as the colonial records make clear, the name Jos is a Hausa corruption of the native name Guash (others say, Jot) for the same settlement is correct and we have no cause to doubt what the British conquerors found on ground, then it means that the Hausawa settlers could not have been the founders of an existing settlement whose name they misrendered from Guash or Jot to Jos. They simply augmented its population and function under colonial rule.¹

At any rate, the more serious contention on ground at the moment, which many Nigerians even researchers do not seem to be aware of, has to do with in whose domain was Jos or Guash located? This is a very hot issue being contested by the three ethnic groups – Afizere, Anaguta and Berom – the authentic owners of Jos. Aspects of this issue (over Kabong) have climbed all the way to the Supreme Court. The Hausa-Fulani settlers are

not a party in contention on the question of “in whose domain was Jos established” simply because they are not stakeholders in the answer to that question.

Finally, it is to be noted and emphasized that the question of ownership of Jos have authoritatively been settled by all the Judicial Commissions/Panels of Inquiry on the recurring Jos crises and Plateau State Peace Summit, without doubt, in favour of the three contenting indigenous ethnic group – Afizere, Anaguta and Berom. The first of these panels (1994) headed by Justice J. Aribiton Fiberesima (Rtd) emphatically concluded:

... In the light of the above consideration or careful thought, we concede to the claim of the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere tribes, and to declare that they are the “Indigenes” of Jos. But as to the Hausa-Fulani people’s assumption, we make bold, on the evidence at our disposal, to advise them that they can qualify only as “Citizens” of Jos.¹

Justice Niki Tobi, reaching the same conclusion with Justice Fiberesima on the true indigenes and owners of Jos, went further to advise the Hausa-Fulani elders to educate their youth on the true indigenes and owners of Jos. The Report states:

It is the feeling of the Commission that as long as the Elders do not tell The Youth the true story of ownership, half truths as contained in Exhibit 339 Will continue to threaten peace in this great city and cause violence and crisis. The Elders owe posterity a duty to tell the youth that the Hausas were not the founders of Jos and therefore, not the owners of the city. They should also tell the youth where they came from so that the youth may know their ancestral homes or routes.¹

In the same vein, the Plateau State Peace Conference, an elaborate and important concluding activity of General Chris Alli, the Sole Administrator of Plateau State during the state of emergency convened the “Mother-of-All-Conferences” in search of lasting peace in the state. It was made up of representatives of all the ethnic groups in Plateau State, including the Hausa-

Fulani settlers. After days of deliberations on a wide range of issues causing disharmony, rancor and violence, resolved amongst others, that the true indigenes and owners of Jos were the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere.¹

In the light of these authoritative sources, any further references to the Hausa-Fulani as the founders and owners of Jos is plain mischief-making and provocation of the native owners.

It is to be noted that settler-indigene tension and conflict were minimal under colonial administration despite the fact that the phenomenon was a colonial creation. This was so because of the following reasons.

- i) Colonial power which created the phenomenon and could suppress it without any consequence was in existence.
- ii) During the early colonial period, the indigenes were found largely in their rural homesteads in the hills and foothills of the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom lands. Very few of them bothered to leave their homes and farmlands to settle in either Bukuru or Jos or, indeed, any of the mining camps infested with alien populations.¹ So the settler populations had a field day in the cities of Bukuru and Jos as well as the mining camps – Barakin Ladi, Dorowa, Bisichi, Gana Ropp, Tenti etc.
- iii) The creation of Plateau Province, in 1926, as one of the provinces of the Northern Regional government whose implementation of indirect rule system exhibited open preferences and favour to the emirate provinces vis-à-vis non-emirate provinces. The colonial administration believed that the Sokoto Caliphate and its emirate system represented a higher state of civilization than anything yet produced in the non-emirate

societies. According to Cpt. Ames:

When this system of administration was organized for the indigenous population, the District Heads were not sufficiently advanced or experienced to cope with the administration of the large number of extraneous towns and villages which had come into being since the British occupation. These were therefore, grouped to form four areas called Hausa Village Areas, because

the word Hausa is a suitable generic term for all who are not indigenous pagans. Each village area is under the control of a Headman appointed by Government and includes a multiple of extraneous villages, the boundaries of each area being coincident with the external boundaries of three or four adjacent Pagan Districts. This facilitates cooperation between the Headman of these Hausa Village Areas and the District Heads and will also enable them to be subdivided without difficulty when the Pagan District Heads are able to take over the administration of everyone and everything in their Districts.¹

This superiority-inferiority syndrome filtered down to the colonial subjects. Hausa language became an official lingua franca of Northern Region taught in schools and, with it, the spread of Hausa culture and Islamic religion.

Nevertheless, with the commencement of nationalist struggles and movements from the 1940s including the subsequent formation of political parties, the Regional Government which eventually led the Northern Region into self-government in 1959 under the Northern Peoples Congress led by Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, was more sympathetic to the yearnings of the indigenes of Jos than the Hausa-Fulani settlers – his kith and kin. This was because the tin mines labourers, petty traders, bicycle renters, truck pushers etc of Jos overwhelmingly belonged to the opposition political party in Northern Nigeria – the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU).¹ Using state apparatus, the late Sardauna wooed the natives to his side against the settlers. It was he who installed the first indigenous Chief of Jos, Mr. Rwang Pam, a Berom in 1947 and reduced the status of the Sarkin Hausawan Jos to that of a **wakilin Hausawa** (representative of the Hausawa) in the Jos Native Authority Council.¹ This was the state of affairs at independence and after – down to the overthrow of the federal and regional governments on January 15, 1966.

It is to be noted further that before and after independence, settler populations from southern parts of Nigeria – Igbos, Yorubas, Binis, Ijaws, Urhobos, Isekiris,

Ibibios, Efiks etc - also flocked into Jos in large numbers as participants in the tin industry and, later, as federal public servants. Like the Hausa-Fulani, they were also a colonial creation. But these southern settler populations felt constrained to make the kinds of claims which their Hausa-Fulani counterparts were making on Jos because, technically, they were not bona-fide citizens of the then Northern Region. They were citizen of either Western or Eastern Regions and later (1965) Mid-West Region. They therefore confined themselves to their private businesses with less of politics, an attitude that has persisted to date despite the fact that their shops and businesses are looted during violent crises. Otherwise, they have every constitutional right which the Hausa-Fulani settlers are making on Jos.

- iv) The first military government, especially with the creation of Benue Plateau State under the late Assistant Police Commissioner, Mr. J. D. Gomwalk, was not very sympathetic to the Hausa-Fulani claims over Jos and they did not like him. But by this time, the city of Jos had phenomenally expanded in all directions. Jos had been a provincial capital city of the defunct Plateau Province and, now, a state capital of the newly created Benue-Plateau State. The indigenes of the new state now, not just the Jos township – but other Plateau and Benue ethnic groups now flocked into the city as civil servants, traders, transporters, hoteliers, contractors, consultants etc. The Hausa-Fulani wards of Bauchi Road, Gangare, Dilimi etc became helmed in and overwhelmed as a minority group. The original nucleus of Jos city began to spread out to incorporate areas that were originally rural villages at the inception of colonial rule. This process is actively in progress today. This is why, rigging apart, the Hausa-Fulani settlers cannot believe they can lose elections in Jos North.

Furthermore, under Benue-Plateau State, the political claims, of the Hausa-Fulani was dwarfed by the existence of the more authentic Moslem Emirate of Kanam, Wase, Lafia, Keffi, Nassarawa etc. The Moslems of these emirates correctly saw themselves as Moslem indigenes of the state vis-à-vis those of Jos. The Benue-Plateau State government also saw them in that light and reflected this in terms of

the allocation of resources and political appointments. But by this time also, the tension between the settlers and indigenes had become palpable.

Evidence that indigene-settler syndrome was becoming a source of concern to post-independence governments of Plateau State is to be seen in the effort of former Military Governor of Plateau State, Group Captain Dan Suleiman and the late Secretary to the State Government, Audu Abubakar, to make all residents who had lived in Plateau State for up to 20 years graduate into indigenes. The plan was vehemently opposed by Plateau indigenous ethnic groups not just Berom, Anaguta and Afizere – as such, the plan was mortally shelved. But this is the first and only attempt, known to this author, of a conscious effort on the part of government (state or Federal) to address the indigene-settler problem in Plateau State.¹ Yet, that proposal might not have sounded as mad as it was perceived if it was to apply throughout the Federation and not localized to a particular state.

When the then Benue-Plateau State was split into two separate states of Benue and Plateau, the political status of the Hausawan Jos did not change because the acknowledged emirates mentioned above remained in the new Plateau State. But by irony of history, a new dichotomy now emerged in terms of Upper Plateau and Lower Plateau and, with it, a local zoning formula in politics by which the elected governor would come from Upper Christian Plateau while the Deputy Governor would be a Moslem from Lower Plateau. The stake of the politics of Hausa-Fulani in Jos was forced to recede to concentrating on Jos Local Government to their displeasure. This was the state of affairs when General Ibrahim B. Babangida mischievously used the occasion of the creation of new states and local government areas to split Jos Local Government Area into three separate LGAs in 1991 – Jos North, Jos South and Jos East.

D. CREATION OF JOS-NORTH LGA: A CATALYST

The creation of Jos North LGA in the way it was done went against the dominant current of opinion on demands for the creation of LGAs in former of Jos LGA. Only the Hausawan Jos requested for it. The creation of Jos East and Jos-South against the will of the people was interpreted by both indigenes and settlers alike as a deliberate removal of Plateau natives (arna) away so as to pave way for the Hausa-Fulani settlers to take absolute control of Jos, the capital city of the State. As expected, the Hausa-Fulani settlers jubilated while the indigenes greeted it

with anger, anguish, protest and petitions.¹ In the Ajibola Panel set up over the 2008 violent crisis, General Babangida admitted, through his lawyers, that the creation of Jos North LGA in the way he did it, along with a few other cases, had genuine problems which he had hoped to revisit but could not do so due to the fact that he had to “step aside” at the time he did.

From all indications, the settler “Hausawa” community in Jos saw and still see the creation of Jos North LGA as a legitimate constitutional gift to them and nobody else except themselves must rule over it. They see this as their last life-line in Jos. And they have the population and “outside” support to back it. Consequently, an election result (2008) which indicated that their chairmanship candidate (ANPP) was defeated must have been rigged – hence the violent attack on Churches to convert their grievances into a religious conflict. Whether they knew it or ignored it, the other inhabitants of Jos North – natives and non-natives from the state and other parts of Nigeria – had ganged up in the PDP to beat their candidate at the polls.

Clearly, therefore, the Hausawa settlers in Jos are desperate. They feel insecure. They fear their future. But this scenario has partly arisen from their refusal to integrate. The Igbo, Yoruba and other settlers do not have this problem. The Hausawa settlers, feeling superior to the indigenes, have preferred to remain a separate and prosperous Moslem enclave within the larger cosmopolitan population of Jos made up of Christians, “animists”, atheists and free-thinkers. In the opinion of this author, the frequent resort to the burning of Churches is aimed at attracting reprisal attacks on Mosques as a means of converting purely political disagreements to religious ones. This has two major effects favourable to them viz:

- i) Earn sympathy and support from persons and groups outside Plateau State particularly from the far Northern States which are predominantly Moslems from where the descendants of the Hausawa settlers had migrated into Jos in the first instance.
- ii) Drag Fulani herdsmen who live in the rural areas along with natives but who are invariably Moslems, into the urban conflict of Jos. It is to be noted that these Fulanis have been living peacefully with their native peasant counterparts in the rural areas all over the Jos Plateau for over a century. In a symbiotic relationship, they constitute an integral part of the economy of the rural economy.

But it is also clear that the present state government under Jonah Jang has not been too keen to open up lines of communications with these Hausawa settlers beyond the official inter-religious fora which meets as frequently as the frequency of the violent crises when, clearly, a lasting solution lies in genuine political dialogue which will guarantee confidence and trust on both sides. Surely, wrongly or rightly, the Hausawa settlers see the Governor as one whose main agenda, amongst others, is to deal with them and put an end to their lingering claims over Jos once and for all.¹ As many observers and commentators have correctly noted, elections are neither organized by nor conducted in Churches or Mosques; nor are the laws and policies of government with which people are dissatisfied or satisfied. So why are Churches and Mosques being used as the vehicles (actually victims) for the expression of dissatisfaction and anger over clearly political issues. Why are local government buildings and properties not destroyed or INEC offices or political party offices?

E. THE WAY FORWARD

- A state of emergency, as being canvassed in certain circles is not a solution – it is never created in good faith (e.g. former Western Region (1965); Plateau and Ekiti States in 2004). At any rate, the experience in Nigeria is that the declaration of state of emergency did not solve the problem where it was done beyond providing a breathing space for those in power to manipulate the issues in their favour and compound the problems further.
- Dismemberment of Plateau State: This is not only a crazy and unpatriotic suggestion but a palpable insult on Plateau people who labored for its creation. Similarly, suggestions for the removal of federal institutions and establishments from Plateau State and relocating them to other states of the federation is simply a declaration of war on Plateau people by the federal government on behalf of the Hausawa settlers of Jos and their supporters.
- Military intervention where and when necessary should be done professionally without bias no matter how subtle.
- Both the State and Federal Governments should as a matter of urgency, implement all the outstanding White Paper Reports of the various Panels of Inquiry. The transfer of culprits apprehended in the scene of crime to Abuja, allegedly for fair trial, only to be

- eventually released is a form of support by relevant government agencies to perpetrators.
- Organizations, individuals and groups should stop financing and arming the Hausawa settlers of Jos. Instead, they should admonish them to learn to live peacefully, pursue their legitimate businesses and cultivate a sense and feeling of belonging regardless of religious differences. Their parents and grandparents did this successfully in spite of the difficulties.
 - Berom native must stop stealing Fulani cattle if the allegations are true. They must be educated to know and accept the fact that the Fulanis and their cattle are legitimate members of their respective communities. This had always been the case for over a century.
 - The state government must reach out to the Hausawa settlers and engage them in genuine dialogue. Their alleged grievances should be analysed one-by-one with them. Those that can be corrected should be done while genuine work on more weighty ones visibly continue. This will elicit confidence and trust on both sides. Political, social land economic policies of state must cater for all Plateau citizens without discrimination. We should know that these so-called settlers are not visitors soon to return to where they came from. They have been here for over 100 years; built estates, engaged in transport business, trade and other businesses successfully and thereby contributing immensely to the economic development of Jos and Plateau in general. They are not about to abandon their hard-earned property and wealth because of artificially created hostile environment. They must be part and parcel of Plateau politics and should be so wooed. Above all, they are Nigerian citizens with all the constitutional rights pertaining to this.
 - The National Assembly must, sooner than later, review the status and definition of indigeneity and citizenship rights which would apply to all the state of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
 - Both the State and Federal Governments should permit, even encourage, the intervention of relevant expert organizations – national and international – who volunteer to professionally examine some of these problems and to advise relevant arms of governments appropriately. This does not in any way subtract from the

sovereignty and integrity of governments but make available to governments some of the best brains and hands on solving some of these problems.

ENDNOTES

1. C. G. Ames (compiled) Gazetteers of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria Volume IV The Highland Chieftaincies (1934) Frank Cass, London, p. 119.
2. PLATEAU STATE OF NIGERIA Government White Paper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Riots of 12th April, 1994 in Jos, Metropolis; September, 2004, Government Printing Press, Jos, pp. 23 – 24. Government White Paper Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances in Jos and its Environs, September, 2001 (2009). Government Printing Press, Jos, pp. 138 – 142 but particularly p. 141 and 142.
3. There are Moslem indigenes in almost every District of Plateau but they are numerically insignificant.
4. C. G. Ames (1934) Gazetteers of Plateau Province, p. 7; Anthony Dung Bingel (1978) "Jos: Origins and Growth of the Town, 1900 – 1972" University of Jos, Geography Dept., Publication No. 1 Nigeria, pp. 1 - 20.

5. PIDAN (2010) The History, Ownership, Establishment of Jos and Misconceptions about the recurrent Jos Conflicts, Dan-sil Press, Jos, p.48.
6. C. G. Ames (1934) Gazetteers of Plateau Province, p. 118.
7. PLATEAU STATE OF NIGERIA: Government White Paper on the report of the Commission of Inquiry ... 1994, p. 23.
8. PLATEAU STATE OF NIGERIA: Government White Paper Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances in Jos and its Environs, September, 2001; Government Printing Press, Jos, p. 51.
9. Plateau Peace Conference (2004) Plateau Resolves: Report of the Plateau Peace Conference 2004; Plateau State of Nigeria Gazette, vol. 9, No. 2, 11th November, 2004.
10. C. G. Ames Gazetteers ... p. 118 For a more vivid description of disintegration of Berom, Anaguta, Rukuba and Afizere traditional economy and land confiscation and degradation see; B. Freund (1981) Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines. Longman, London, pp. 29 – 72; 110 – 135 and 156 – 173.
11. C. G. Ames Gazetteers ... p. 119.
12. B. J. Dudley (1968) Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., London, p. 94, 95 – 96; 236 – 241 also; Richard L. Sklar (1963) Nigerian Political Parties, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p. 346 fn 38; p. 347. Also see Monday Yakiban Mangwat “Oral Sources and the Reconstruction of Party Politics on the Jos Plateau, 1950 – 1966” in Yusufu Bala Usman and George Amale Kwanashie (eds) (1995) Inside Nigerian History, 1950 – 1970: events, issues and sources. Presidential Panel on

Nigeria since Independence History Project, University of Ibadan, Nigeria; Printed by Ahmadu Bello University Press, Zaria, pp. 293 – 308.

13. Dudley (1968) Parties and Politics ... pp. 236 – 241.

14. A purported draft proposal in respect of this was viciously circulated in drinking joints at that time to mobilize the native populations of Plateau State against the proposal. Because, Abdu Abubakar, the then Secretary to the State Government, was a Moslem from Keffi, it was assumed that he initiated the proposal and got an innocent Military Governor to back it. As already pointed out in the text, the proposal caused palpable outrage and hostility and was dropped. To the best of my knowledge, the idea has never been revisited. Yet, it might be a way out of resolving the indigene-settler problem so long as it is made to apply throughout the Federation.

15. PLATEAU STATE OF NIGERIA: Government White Paper ... on 1994 riots p. 5. For a recent narratives of the same thing see; Ogoh Alubo (2008) Ethnic Conflicts and Citizenship Crises in Central Nigeria, P.E.F.S, University of Ibadan, p. 70; pp. 67 – 94; and Philip Ostein (2009) “Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Nigeria in Muslim-Christian Relations in Africa. www-sharia-in-Africa.net/pages/publications.php. August 2009. Pp. 1- 42 but specifically p.9 on the creation of Jos North Local Government Area.

16. Philip Ostein (2009) “Jonah Jang and Jasawa:...” p.17 also pp. 7 – 26.

Chapter Nine

THE EXCLUSION OF MINORITY GROUPS IN THE PLATEAU: UPROOTING CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

AUDU, N. GAMBO, PhD

Introduction

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious competitive developing federation richly blessed with good climatic condition, vast and fertile arable land for a thriving agricultural sector, splendid vegetation scenery, robust and thriving tourism sites, virile, enterprising and dynamic citizens, diverse human and material resources, etc. Indeed Nigeria is so immensely endowed with both human and material resources that if the country had cultivated a patriotic, disciplined, responsible and visionary leadership at independence, it would have long cast off its unenviable third world identity and joined the elite club of developed countries. Regrettably, the leadership question remains at the core of Nigeria's persistent underdevelopment with wide ramifications of

negative consequences. Lack of equitable development is posing a grave threat to the weak foundation of national unity and integration. The adoption of a federal model for managing the complex diversity (Tyoden, nd: 184) which characterizes Nigeria has not significantly fostered national cohesion. This poor performance of the federalist ideology in the critical enterprise of building a socially cohesive, politically stable and economically prosperous Nigeria is fundamentally attributed to weak commitment to the cultivation of 'federal spirit.' In a more explicit sense, successive governments in Nigeria since independence have miserably failed to cultivate in sufficient quantity, integrative principles and strict adherence to them in the enterprise of governance. This critical expectation was made the more difficult by the protracted authoritarian military rule and the arbitrariness that characterized military style of governance. In a sense, Nigeria is a plural and deeply divided society trapped in the throes of nation building (Osaghae, 2005; Tyoden, 2006; Egwu, 2003; Bach, 1989; Lijphart, 1977). As with every plural and divided society, Nigeria is buffeted by some set of oppositions such as North-South, Islam-Christianity, indigenes-Settlers and a host of other fissiparous tendencies. All of these have conspired to generate groundswell opposition to the country's effort at building a legitimate, stable, cohesive and developmental state.

Many scholars (Osaghae, 2005; Ojo, 2005; Olufemi, 2005; Amuwo, 1998; Egwu, 2003) have attributed the persistence and growing potency of these fissiparous tendencies to the failure of the federal framework to manage and accommodate these contradictions that have remained the enduring attributes of the Nigerian society. The conscious adoption of some federal instrumentalities such as federal character, quota system, unity schools, National Youth Service Scheme and others have not significantly succeeded in resolving some of these contradictions in the polity. In fact as the country grows older new forms of contradictions such as citizenship-indigeneship controversy, shariah-non shariah states, etc. are emerging on the political scene and with older ones acquiring greater potency and resilience. The citizenship versus indigeneship conundrum which has come to occupy the centre stage of national political discourse is not only sensitive but also intensely emotive. Violent conflicts (Alubo, 2006) have erupted in virtually every part of Nigeria which significantly derived their source from the citizenship-indigeneship dichotomy. At the core of this serious national problem which is threatening to roll back the frontiers of the thin national unity and integration so far attained is the issue of "inequitable access to power and resources accentuated by the perceptions of relative deprivation, exclusion,

marginalization, and domination” (Osaghae,2005:v). The point must be underscored that protracted authoritarian military rule has not only deepened some of these contradictions that characterize the Nigerian federalism today but also in a more fundamental sense, heightened their potency as consequence of catastrophic governance.

It is against the background of the preceding that the paper takes a critical look at the ugly and lamentable development in Plateau State and how the exclusion of minorities has inevitably uprooted the fundamental rights of citizens in the state. Plateau state is a critical component of the national framework in the sense that it is home to Nigerians of diverse socio-cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. Non-Nigerians have also found Plateau state, especially Jos, the state capital irresistibly attractive because of the semi-temperate climate that characterizes the cosmopolitan city. The state is a microcosm of the Nigerian society in terms of its complex social diversity. Preceding the eruption of violent conflict on 7th September 2001, the state was widely acclaimed as Home of “Peace and Tourism” because of the uncommon peace and tranquility that had been unique feature of the state. However, with the outbreak of violence in 2001 and the consequent fracturing of peace, Plateau has since become a hotbed of intense and violent conflict expressed along primordial faultlines. This development has deconstructed the state into two opposing camps and redefined the geography of the city. One part of Jos is predominantly peopled by the Hausa/Fulani who are mainly Muslims and another part is occupied mainly by Christians. The boundary between these two settlements are so rigidly defined that there is hardly any interaction between them. This is the context within which we can appreciate the emergence of minorities who feel, and are indeed, actually excluded from the mainstream socio-economic and political processes in Plateau state. This exclusion has in a sense, eroded the citizenship rights of the affected persons and made them second class citizens in a political community where all inhabitants exist under a common sovereign. Discriminatory practices of this nature are pretty repugnant to one’s moral sensibility and threaten social harmony in a very fundamental sense.

The paper contends that the exclusion of minorities on the Plateau and the consequent erosion of citizenship rights is a fundamental expression of the lacuna that exists in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as articulated and foisted on Nigerians by the military. The Constitution has failed to adequately capture the expectations, aspirations and preferences of

Nigerians and worst of all, its inability to provide for the fair resolution of the citizenship controversy. It is lamentable that after eleven years of Nigeria's experiment with grossly imperfect democratic system, not a fair attention has been accorded to the citizenship question which has continued to pose grave threat to national unity and stability. This is a clear manifestation of the persistent scarcity of political will to tackle the hydra-headed citizenship question in a country that is characterized by pronounced segmental cleavages. The citizenship controversy is further fueled by acute poverty of good governance which has cultivated in most Nigerians deep seated sense of primordial attachment. In a sense, the persistence and growing resilience of the citizenship-indigeneship conundrum can best be comprehended in the context of the national question which has notoriously refused to yield itself to a mutually agreeable resolution. Let us now examine the notions of citizenship and indigeneship.

On Citizenship and Indigeneship

The notion of citizenship defines the mutual relationship of give and take between the state and an individual. It connotes "relationship of reciprocal rights, duties and obligations between the state and the citizen" (Fred, 2007: 48). The Open Society Institute (2009: ix) defines citizenship as "the legal relationship between an individual and a state in which the state recognizes and guarantees the individual rights." Both the state and citizen owe mutual obligations and duties to each other. For instance, the primary obligation of the Nigerian state to its citizens as prescribed in Chapter Two of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic is to "promote the security and welfare of the people and their participation in government" (FRN, 1999 Constitution: 10). The duty of the citizens is to provide both tangible and intangible support towards the upkeep of the state. The state needs the support of the citizens in order to be able to meet up its obligations to the citizens which include the protection of the rights of citizens and non-citizens alike. The common rights of citizens are the right to permanent residence within the political community, the right to freedom of movement within the state, the right to vote and be voted for or appointed to public office, the right of access to public services, the right to diplomatic protection when outside the country and other rights that are guaranteed to noncitizens as well as citizens. The Open Society Institute (2009) avers that neither citizenship nor nationality is used to indicate the ethnic origin of the individual concerned. The two terms refer only to the legal bond between a person and a state.

It is worth stressing the point that citizens do not have any legitimate basis to withhold support to the state if the state has demonstrated consistent faith in meeting its obligations to them. This reciprocal relationship between the state and citizens is what is referred to as social contract or charter. Ideally what one requires to enjoy the rights of a citizen is membership of a national political community and sworn loyalty and allegiance to the community. However, the mode of acquiring citizenship rights differs from country to country. The ability of a state to capture and retain the affective attachment of its citizens depends to a large extent on how fair and equitable it distributes public goods especially in a society characterized by pronounced segmental cleavages like Nigeria. Lack of equity and fairness in the distribution or allocation of values can easily deconstruct such a plural community into competing primordial identities like ethno-regional platforms (Ohaneze Ndigbo, Afenifere, Arewa Consultative Forum, Ijaw National Congress, Middle Belt Congress, etc.) religious platforms (Christian Association of Nigeria, Jamatul Nasril Islam, Pentecostal Movement of Nigeria, etc.) all competing for space and resources in the polity (Osaghae, 2003). All these pan regional associations and religious bodies have assumed greater importance in the articulation of responses to national issues than the state within which they are located. They have therefore, wittingly or unwittingly, acquired the status of federating units. They have also as Osaghae (2003: vii) has noted, "Provided ample space (legitimacy) and weapons for discriminatory claims and practices, contested citizenship conflicts along the divides of indigene-non-indigene/migrant/settler, religion and ethnicity."

Indigeneship on the other hand refers to primordial claims of people who see themselves exclusively as owners of a given space by virtue of their being there earlier than other groups that have joined them later. It is the claim that this place belongs to us and therefore all the rights associated with such claims are exclusively for the indigenes or natives. Indigeneship is a social construction which seeks to exclude other people from enjoying certain rights and privileges within the community. For instance, in 1996, the Hausa-Fulani in Wase Local Government Area sought to exclude the Tarok community from participating in a nationwide Local Government election on non-party basis. The slogan of exclusion was "*Wase banda Yergam*" (meaning: Wase without Yergam, a pejorative term deliberately used to provoke the collective political sensibility of the Tarok in Wase). The implication of this ideology of exclusion is that the Tarok people do not share in the ownership of Wase Local Government Area and are therefore, not stakeholders in the Wase project. Indigeneship is constructed on a primordial platform which is utterly devoid

of civic orientation. Indigeneship and citizenship dichotomy is akin to modernism versus traditionalism. While the domain of citizenship is an all inclusive one characterized by the dominance of civic orientation, the domain of indigeneship is not only exclusive but also dominated by primordial orientation and attachment. Nigerian citizenship has been discounted for primordial considerations of who first settled or inhabited a particular location and how the period of arrival entitles and denies people rights and opportunities (Alubo, 2008). As reprehensible as this practice is, the Nigerian state has not been able to articulate any effective response to it.

Background to the Citizenship-Indigeneship Controversy in Nigeria

The controversy around the citizenship-indigeneship dichotomy as it is expressed in Nigeria today is not a recent phenomenon. If anything, it has only acquired greater potency with the steady diminution of Nigeria's socio-economic fortune since the 1980s. As socio-economic opportunities were fast diminishing, contestations over scarce but allocatable resources got heightened among competing groups engaging each other on conflicting identity platforms. Conflict in Contemporary Nigeria expresses itself along ethnic, religious and regional identities. Each group feels it has not been fairly and equitably treated and the tendency is to attribute this unfair treatment to the rising influence of some groups. The adoption and implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme to fast track economic recovery has ironically brought about a swift decline in the ability of the Nigerian state to provide for the basic socio-economic needs of the people (Jega, 2003; Alubo, 2008). This massive loss of capacity to engage in basic social provisioning by the state has actually fueled the resurgence of identity based contestations over scarce resources. Politics of exclusion became widespread in the critical sense that only the constituencies and clients of those who control the state continue to maintain access to state resources through patronage. Thus under this condition generated by the structural adjustment programme, identity-based groups emerged within the political space to either protest exclusion and oppression or to make demand for fundamental rights and socio-economic provisioning.

There is therefore, a sense in which one can contend with considerable vehemence that the emergence of identity-based groupings as platforms for contest over scarce socio-economic opportunities was spawned by severe hardship inflicted on Nigerians by the economic recovery programme foisted on the people by an unresponsive and insensitive authoritarian military

government in the 1980s. The failure of the state to come to the aid of distressed citizens in a traumatized economic environment has led to the development and deepening of primordial consciousness at the expense of civic consciousness. This has created legitimacy problem for the Nigerian state and has according to Jega (2003: 34) “forced citizens to increasingly retreat from their Nigerian identity which the post colonial state had sought to promote, into communal, ethnic, religious and all forms of identities thereby making it unrealizable the goal of constructing a citizen with solid Nigerian identity, a detribalized, secular, and patriotic identity.” This is pretty much in agreement with Ake (1994: 7) who argues that the “state in Africa has not become a reassuring presence but remains a formidable threat to everybody except the few who control it.” The consequence of this negative perception of the state is that most have turned away from it to seek fulfillment in their community, ethnic group or nation. The demands which they make on these social formations have turned them into informal polities in active competition with the state. This competition is particularly more acute at the level of citizens’ affection, attachment and loyalty.

Competition over loyalty and attachment of citizens becomes more critical when the state fails to effectively discharge its constitutionally prescribed obligations to the citizens. The sense of emotional attachment to the state is easily lost to a primordial group that is exclusively and purposefully constructed to fill in the lacuna erected by the consistent failure or inability of the state to meet the legitimate needs of citizens. Primordial groups are able to tap a sense of common purpose and a common destiny and a considerable degree of public spiritedness (Ake, 1994) in the sense that they are more caring and protective than a failed state. The failure of the state to minister to the basic socio-economic needs of the people could engender a wide and deep gulf between the two with grave implications for the integrity of the state. On the whole, it can be asserted that a combination of the policy of structural adjustment programme and an authoritarian military rule facilitated the deconstruction of civic citizenship into primordial based citizenship identities. The consciousness generated by these two factors brought about the construction of primordial citizenship in keen contest with civic citizenship. This bifurcation of citizenship fits into Mamdani’s (2003) construct of colonially determined dual citizenship structure in Africa. These are the civic and ethnic. While the civic identity is the identity of a citizen, ethnic identity is the identity of an indigene that is culturally constructed. Here lies the

context of the citizenship and indigeneship conundrum in Nigeria in general and Plateau state in particular.

Constitutional Conundrum around Citizenship and Indigeneship Dichotomy

Much of the controversy around citizenship and indigeneship dichotomy could be attributed to the imperfections of the subsisting 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, especially as it relates to the provisions on the determinants of citizenship. In chapter three of the 1999 Constitution, three modes of citizenship acquisition are prescribed. These are citizenship by birth, registration, and naturalization. The provisions relating to citizenship by birth is particularly of concern to us because there lies the conundrum over this sensitive and emotive issue. Section 25 deals with citizenship by birth and provides as follows:

- i. Every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence, either of whose parents or any of whose parents belongs or belonged to community indigenous to Nigeria;
- ii. Provided that a person shall not become a citizen of Nigeria by virtue of this section if neither of his parents nor any of his grandparents was born in Nigeria; and
- iii. Every person born in Nigeria after the date of independence either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents is a citizen of Nigeria.

These are the qualifications for citizenship by birth as prescribed by the subsisting Constitution. The first qualification is quite explicit about who a citizen of Nigeria is. It makes reference to "community indigenous to Nigeria." The implication of this is that citizenship is derived from indigeneity and unless you belong to a community indigenous to Nigeria, you have not met the constitutional requirement to be a citizen of Nigeria. The Constitution fails to explicitly indicate the supremacy of national citizenship over indigeneity. The United States of America's experience is worth capturing here to show the extent of insensitivity of our Constitution to the critical issue of citizenship in Nigeria. Under article four of the Constitution of the United States of America, it is plainly provided that a "citizen of any state must receive, in all the other states, all the privileges and immunities that he has as a United States citizen" (The Constitution of the

United States, 1999: 54). Clearly, the American experience shows that citizenship is not closely tied to indigeneity as it is the case in Nigeria but rather it is determined by residency factor.

The practice of citizenship on the basis of indigeneship is injurious to the interest of Nigerians who migrate to different parts of the country for different motives and considerations. Generally speaking, citizenship is a carefully articulated principle of equality applied to all members of a political community, but in Nigeria, citizens are not treated equally throughout the country (Fred, 2005). People migrating from one part of the country to another are treated as settlers with consequent exclusion from rights, privileges and opportunities as enjoyed by others. The principle of residency as a determinant of one's citizenship status is discounted in favour of indigeneship This Constitutional lacuna is at the core of the current agitations over who is counted as a citizen and who is labeled as an indigene. Dual citizenship structure within the same country does not help in cultivating civic citizens with strong affective attachment to the federal framework. It also negates efforts at building national unity and integration.

Exclusion of Minorities in Plateau State: Some Salient issues

The citizenship-indigeneship form of identity contestation is not an independent or discrete variable but rather a function of confluence of some salient factors. In other words, the heightened primordial consciousness of Nigerians in contemporary times derives from some critical issues which we will explore and analyze in this section. In doing this, one is conscious of the fact that Plateau state is a critical component of the national framework and is indeed, a miniature Nigeria. The exclusion of minorities and the consequent uprooting of citizenship rights in Plateau state is a function of a multitude of factors that have conspired to generate this ugly situation. First and foremost is the issue of governance which is at the core of Nigeria's problem of nation building project. Since independence on October 1, 1960, successive governments have dismally failed to cultivate and promote the culture and practice of good governance to make Nigerians radiate with happiness and contentment. The management of the public space has not been reassuring. Political power has not been prudently utilized to meet the legitimate socio-economic needs of the people especially the vulnerable and marginalized groups such as women, children, and the hard- to-reach in the society. Regrettably, even as the most deprived, marginalized and neglected, they are more often than not, the worst victims of identity-based

violent conflicts. The situation in Plateau state where identity-based conflict has erupted since 2001 and has remained unresolved has exerted untold hardship on women and children who are the most vulnerable groups.

The critical problem of development in Nigeria today is the exclusive process of public policy making. Public input to policy process with a view to correcting mistakes in policy design and implementation is hardly encouraged in Nigeria. The argument puts forward by Diamond (2004: 223) that Institutionalized participation “provides channels for settling or at least narrowing the conflicts over interests and values and making broadly legitimate policy choices,” is potent and pungent one. Policies are likely to remain stable and enduring when they enjoy broad public support and understanding at the levels of articulation and implementation. This requires some means for distinct organized interests, and historically marginalized groups, such as women and minorities, to make input into governmental decisions and some means of protesting policies and actions that are obviously injurious to their interests.

Good governance is critical to the resolution of the citizenship-indigeneship crisis as it promotes inclusion and not exclusion, transparency and accountability which promote openness of government conduct to the scrutiny of other actors. Public officials are likely to be more responsible and responsive in their conduct if they are conscious of the prying eyes of the public into governmental affairs. The principles of rule of law, constitutionalism, effectiveness and efficiency, consultation and broad participation are fundamental building blocks of good governance. Good governance is likely to be fostered through democratic governance because of their compatibility in terms of principles and mode of operations. Diverse interests of diverse groups are better met in an environment of democratic governance which is pretty receptive to the operational principles of good governance than in an authoritarian environment..

Another salient issue in the citizenship-indigeneship controversy is the vanishing domain of the civic culture. This is evident by the contestation over citizenship even within communities that are arguably homogeneous. For instance, somebody in Langtang North cannot seek to occupy either elective or appointive political office in Langtang South in spite of the fact that they claim common ancestral descent and they share common socio-cultural characteristics. In a sense, they are one people but split into two local government areas for administrative convenience. This is an expression of primordial sense of attachment at a micro-level. If this is the common

experience of people sharing the same socio-cultural and ethnic attributes, it is easy to comprehend why contestation over citizenship-indigeneship is frequently expressed violently. The Ife-Modakeke violent conflict fits into this construct. This is often caused by the growing scarcity of socio-economic and political opportunities and the diminishing capacity of the state to respond appropriately to the legitimate demands of citizens. Ake's (1994) contention that when the state cannot adequately respond to the demands of the citizens, the tendency is for them to withdraw from the public or civic space into their ethnic or primordial enclaves where they seek fulfillment and safety. The citizenship- indigeneship controversy will continue to characterize the collective existence of Nigerians as long as the state is unable to reconstruct its responsive and distributive capacities and to make strenuous effort to address structural violence in all ramifications.

At the moment, Nigerians are left to provide for their security, potable water, power or energy, and a host of other social welfare services which the state has withdrawn from making them affordable to Nigerians. Effective resolution of this issue will require the state to resume social provisioning in order to reclaim its legitimacy and respectability from the competing primordial polities. As Egwu (2003: 51) has averred, "there is need to build a society based on social justice, equity, mutual trust and tolerance for one another. Such a society must take as its basic goal, the promotion of genuine development and the attenuation of grinding poverty which most Nigerians have found themselves." This is a vision of a society where conflict between civic and primordial orientations is eliminated as the benefits of national development liberally permeate all strata of the society and eliminating the fear of want which has been identified as catalyst in the generation of violent conflicts.

The existing 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is not protective enough of Nigerians with considerable entrepreneurial spirit. The provisions relating to citizenship are not explicit enough in terms of which one is superior to the other. Is it national citizenship or indigeneship derived citizenship? The Constitution is conspiratorially silent on this very weighty issue that has inflicted untold hardship on some Nigerians who are driven by passion to walk the tight rope by exiting from their ethnic enclaves to explore opportunities that are copiously available in other places. The Constitution should make a definite statement concerning hierarchy of citizenship in the country. In the United States of America for instance, national

citizenship is superior to any state citizenship which protects American citizens from all forms of discriminatory and exclusionary practices. Nigeria's Constitution relating to citizenship should be carefully reviewed to give protection to all Nigerians and to encourage free movement as a deliberate strategy of promoting national unity and integration. The section should declare in explicit terms the supremacy of national citizenship over any primordially derived citizenship. Citizenship should be predicated on residency to foster strong sense of belonging and inclusion among citizens.

It is observed that all ethnic groups that cohabit Nigeria's territorial space do not have comparable numerical strength. The frontline majority hegemonic ethnic groups are generally feared by the minority non-hegemonic ethnic groups widely scattered in the country. The basis of the fear is that as majority groups, they are so populous as to overflow their states and penetrate the minority enclaves but the minority groups lack comparable numerical strength to counter penetrate the enclaves of the majority ethnic groups. This fear, even though different from the one being articulated here, was vividly expressed by the late Premier of Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Sardauna of Sokoto through the Northernization policy at the twilight of colonial rule. The Northernization policy was targeted at fencing out the educationally advanced Southern elements from dominating political appointments in post independent Nigeria. Similar fear is being expressed by minority groups, especially those located in the northern part of the country. The concerns of some minority groups are the preservation of their peculiar socio-cultural values and the desire to find space at the national level to accommodate their developmental aspirations. Their resistance to the influx of people from other places is driven by the sense of fear of being swarmed or overwhelmed by the intruding groups. All these fears are needless because of the benefits the so called natives stand to enjoy. The presence of other groups in the midst of the natives could challenge the dormant sense of entrepreneurship as they face stiff economic competition.

Corruption is another critical issue in the citizenship-indigeneship controversy in Nigeria. What actually fuels and feeds the controversy are the widespread corrupt practices perpetrated by public officials with impunity. The belief is that when you have your own appointed into high profile political office, such appointment brings with it robust prosperity for immediate relations and cronies of the appointee. This provides the motivation to seek to exclude other Nigerians

labeled as settlers from such appointments so that local champions are considered and favoured. The elite in Nigeria have not cultivated in sufficient quantity, a good sense of civic orientation. They easily play the ethnic card to create access to the national coffers so as to liberate themselves from the pangs of poverty and other disabilities associated with exclusion from the corridors of power (Abah, 2008). Their sense of probity and accountability is weak and makes them more often than not, prone to corrupt behaviour while in public office. As long as corruption continues to thrive luxuriantly like colony of trees along river bank, the tendency of the primordially constructed elite to inflame passion against other Nigerians wrongly regarded as settlers cannot be discouraged. There must be a strong and credible resolve to combat corruption in our public life affairs to make public offices less attractive with consequent reduction in competition over same.

From the foregoing analysis, there is enough evidence to suggest that the Nigerian federal system is critically sick and is urgently in need of diagnostic attention to determine the exact nature of the ailment for precise curative measures to be taken to redeem it from demise. Inter-group relations have been characterized by pronounced animosity such that regional and ethno-religious violence have become so common and frequent. This is a potent threat to peace and stability of the country. The notion of civic citizenship must be promoted to help narrow the range of fissiparous tendencies with their destabilizing effect. It is only this notion of civic citizenship that fuel national consciousness and patriotism. Once citizens are sufficiently imbued with these national ethics, they can live in harmony with one another and this helps in achieving the national ideals as articulated in the Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974. These national ideals relate to the building of “a united, strong and self-reliant nation; a great and dynamic economy; a just and egalitarian society; a land of high and full opportunities for all citizens; and a free and democratic society” (FRN, 1971: 141). The inability of successive governments in Nigeria to translate all these well articulated national objectives into concrete deliverables is accounted for by the persistence of the national question. The citizenship-indigeneship controversy which is violently expressed in some parts of the country is indeed, symptomatic of the absence of values of social justice, equity and fairness in the enterprise of governance. This condition breeds structural violence which we are witnessing in Nigeria today.

Concluding Remarks

The citizenship-indigeneship dichotomy has generated intense controversy in Nigeria. The controversy is more often than not, expressed violently as some Nigerians living in communities other than their birth places struggle against exclusionary treatment meted out to them. In a sense, their citizenship rights are being uprooted and are ascribed the identity of settlers in places where the controversy has snowballed into violent conflicts. The contest is essentially over who is included and who is excluded for purposes of distributing socio-economic and political opportunities. The deprivation of citizenship rights is materially induced against the backdrop of poor social provisioning by the state with very weak extractive, responsive and distributive capacities in the 21st Century. The emergence and persistence of this knotty and weighty issue is attributed to a confluence of some factors such as bad governance, weak constitutional provisions relating to citizenship and indigeneship, crippling and degrading poverty making the mass of the Nigerians vulnerable to the manipulation of some elite with sinister agenda, lack of equitable development which makes some groups to blame their backwardness on those that are believed to have enjoyed disproportionate fortunes from the country's ruling elite and a host of others.

The paper contended that the present citizenship and indigeneity conundrum can be effectively tackled through careful and painstaking constitutional review to make explicit statement about who is a citizen and who is an indigene and which of these two is superior to the other, cultivating the culture of good governance within the current democratic environment which holds considerable promise of bringing equitable development in the country thereby narrowing the range of fissiparous tendencies associated with uneven development, promotion of civic education by civil society organizations to undermine the potency of primordially constructed identities which fuel the controversy around citizenship-indigeneship dichotomy and the imperative of making public offices less attractive than they are now as a means of curbing the monstrous social problem of corruption in both public and private lives. Above all, residency and not indigeneity should serve as a basis of citizenship. This is a common practice in most countries of the world and Nigeria cannot be an exception to this. Nigerians should be painstakingly mobilized to accept the principle of residency as a basis of citizenship because it benefits everybody and not some few.

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Chapter Ten

The Exclusion of the Minority Groups in the Plateau:

A Hausa/Fulani Perspective

Baba Bala Muhammad

The Hausa/Fulani people on the Jos-Plateau are presently among the most excluded, most unjustly maligned, and most marginalized in Nigeria. In a sense, their plight is a microcosm of that of minority groups in Nigeria as a whole.

Public discussions of the plight of the Hausa/Fulani people in Jos tend to conflate two related but different issues, namely: 1) the historical origins of their residency in the area, and 2) the constitutional and democratic bases of their participation (or the lack of it) in the management of public affairs that affect them directly.

The discussions about the historical origins are usually couched in terms of indigeneship and communal ownership of Jos. It is often claimed that the Hausa/Fulani should not be considered

as indigenes of the area because they are allegedly recent arrivals in the area. But the historical presence of the so-called indigenes is presumed but never demonstrated to predate that of the Hausa/Fulani. The point that cannot be disputed is that the right of citizenship in the modern nation-state of Nigeria does not arise from nor does rest on the historical origins of when different groups of people came to inhabit a particular area. Rather the citizenship rights of every Nigerian are enshrined, guaranteed, and protected constitutionally, and further fortified by the internationally accepted conventions of citizenship rights in a modern nation-state.

Thus it is absurd to claim that a certain group of people cannot enjoy the rights of citizenship on the dubious claims of historical origins that have not even been factually proven. As our very well revered Gbong Gwom Jos Elder Jacob Gyang Buba, has rightly stated on many occasions: there should be no problem for any citizen to vote and be voted into the highest elective office in Plateau State. His only problem as a traditional ruler is with people who have not respect for Berom cultural identity and traditional chieftaincy. The pertinent point to emphasize here is that respect should be mutually earned by different communities who live together. While highly desirable, respect or lack of it cannot jeopardize the constitutionally protected rights of citizenship.

Now let us explore in more detail the two related but different issues of historical origins of Jos and the constitutional and democratic bases of citizenship rights.

As noted earlier, much of the so-called historical discussion is lacking in empirical facts. To begin with, who are the Hausa/Fulani on the Jos Plateau? The assumption is that a Hausa/Fulani is any person who is a Muslim, irrespective of his place of origin or the length of his residency in the area. It is not often realized that the term Hausa/Fulani includes also many other ethnic groups such as Kanuri, Nupe, Terra, Gobirawa, or even Muslims from other areas in Plateau State who otherwise fall into the category of indigenes of the state. The realities of cultural and linguistic differences among the groups collapsed into the Hausa/Fulani are not appreciated; and similarly their peaceful co-existence and mutual respect in spite of their difference is equally ignored. While these ethnic groups may belong to the majority in other parts of Nigeria including Plateau at some point, they are now in the minority in Plateau State. As such they are all in the same predicament of being unjustly excluded; hence they all have the same stake in the struggle against their exclusion. They are predominant in the key settlement of Jos, but are also found in

large numbers in Bukuru, Anglo Jos, Tudun Wada Jos, Barikin Ladi, Jos East and Riyom Local Government Areas. Failure to appreciate this heterogeneity is due in part to the fact that Hausa/Fulani is an indirect code word for any Muslim of whatever background rather than a term that accurately describes the ethnic composition of the heterogeneous population in the Jos Plateau. This is the first but not the only problem in the discussions of the historical origins of Jos.

More seriously, there is widely held assumption but not supported by any indisputable historical evidence that the Berom were the first to inhabit the areas of the present day Jos and Bukuru. This assumption ignores the presence not only of the Hausa/Fulani but also other ethnic groups such as Afizere, Berom, Miango, Ateng, Anaguta etc.

Historically Jos grew around the tin mining activity started by the Europeans in the early twentieth century. The Hausa/Fulani people were the first to occupy the present Jos during the mining activity. They also led the economic growth of Jos by expanding into other trading activities that made Jos metropolis the hub of flourishing commercial activities. The growth, dominance and influence of the Hausa/Fulani led to the emergence of a chain of Hausa/Fulani traditional rulers, thirteen in all, holding sway over Jos. British colonial rule did not change the dominance of the Hausa/Fulani. The social and economic activities of the Hausa/Fulani in and around Jos made them the dominant group and also helped in making Jos the most developed of the towns in Plateau State, hence it (Jos) became the state capital. Indeed it is easy to credit the location of Jos as the capital of Plateau Province during the colonial era, and later as a state capital, to the flourishing social and economic activities led by the Hausa/Fulani.

Yet despite their tremendous contribution to the area, the Hausa Fulani have seen the steady increase in their exclusion and marginalization over the years. After thirteen Hausa/Fulani rulers exercised full dominion over the land called Jos between 1903 and 1952, Mallam Rwang Pam, a school teacher, was appointed as the first **Chief of Berom**. His authority was limited to settling disputes amongst the Beroms only. The dubious metamorphosis of the title to a Gbong Gwom Jos was achieved through manipulation of records by emergent elite in the aftermath of the creation of states, particularly under Mr. Joseph Gomwalk as governor of then Benue Plateau state. It is noteworthy that the Beroms in their crusade to overrun the Hausa/Fulani also crushed the Afizere and Anaguta who have suddenly woken up to the reality that their (Afizere &

Anaguta) loss of any claims to the Jos. Furthermore, to show that the Beroms only stumbled on the rulerhip of Jos without clear historical or traditional affinity to the throne, there is no clear definition of ruling houses marked for succession, but the dubious eligibility rule of male Berom from any of the districts in Berom land.

Similarly, Bukuru Town which is presently the seat of Jos South Local Government headquarters was established in 1899, and Alhaji Muhammad became the Chief of Bukuru in 1909. Ahaji Muhammad exhibited exemplary leadership qualities in the discharge of his responsibilities, earning him a merit award by Her Majesty, the Queen of England, in 1942, and the long service medal for 33 years of meritorious and selfless service. By 1960 as a result of old age and having served selflessly for 51 years Alhaji Muhammadu resigned, paving the way for the appointment of his son Alhaji Sulaiman Muhammad as the second chief of Bukuru. Alhaji Sulaiman Muhammad ruled from 1960 to 2001, and also exhibited very rare qualities of leadership and a very high level of tolerance in the discharge of his duties. He was a member of Jos Traditional Council all through these years until his demise in 2001. The people of Bukuru (Hausas, Igbos, Yorubas and Beroms etc) have been coexisting peacefully under the leadership of Alhaji Sulaiman Muhammad irrespective of religion or tribe inclination. Since the demise of Alhaji Sulaiman the Plateau State Government through the Bureau for Local Government and Chieftaincy Administration has remained silent over the issue of succession despite several requests by the people of the town—another clear example of the practice of exclusion.

As part of the exclusion strategy of the Plateau State Government, each time there is a crisis especially in Jos South Local Government area, the Beroms usually hired mercenaries from other local Government areas and neighboring states to collaborate in sacking villages of the Hausa/Fulani Moslems. Examples include the incidences that took place in villages of Kuru Karama, Tim Tim, Gero, Sabon Gidan Kanar and others. In all of these villages the manner of operation is similar as men, women, children and even babies were killed in cold blood and their bodies dumped in their own wells and sewages with only a few of them escaping to tell the horrible account of what had happened. As always nothing happens because hardly is anyone arrested in connection with these dastardly acts. When however Dogo Na Hauwa village was attacked, Plateau State Government made so much noise to the extent of calling on the International Community to intervene against the alleged persecution of the Christians by the

Hausa Fulani Moslems. But Governor Jang and the Gbong Gwom never visited the Muslim-majority villages mentioned above, nor did they invite the international community to see the destruction there, even as international media was already showing the remnants of the destroyed villages to the whole world. While the aforementioned villages of the Hausa/Fulani Moslems are still deserted with little hope of the Government allowing anyone to rebuild their destroyed houses and farms, Dogo Na Hauwa has been rebuilt by the State Government and donor agencies that usually come through it to provide succor only for the Berom victims of the crises.

Clearly the exclusion of the Hausa/Fulani can only be situated in the context of the political expediency of a neo-political elite on the Plateau determined to foster its interest through promotion of a false sense of domination and internal colonialism by the Hausa/Fulani over the so-called indigenes. In particular, the creation of states in Nigeria has had the effect of drastically transforming the fortunes of the Hausa/Fulani in Jos. Beginning from 1967 to 1996 when states were created, there has been a gradual and continuous accentuation of polarization along religious and ethnic lines which further exacerbated the indigene-settler divide. In the old Plateau State before Nasarawa State was excised out of it, there was more religious balance in the population of the state, reflected in the appointment of a Muslim as deputy governor, as well as the appointment of Muslims to several other governmental positions. But the so-called indigenous elites have now chosen to regard the new Plateau State as an enclave that belongs exclusively to Christians only, and in which the Hausa/Fulani do not belong. This is the culmination of a long and conscious exclusion of the group that began under the first military governor of then Benue-Plateau State, Commissioner of Police Joseph Gomwalk in the early 70s, and then continued under Governors Solomon Lar and Navy Capt S. B. Atukum in the 80s, and Joshua Dariye and Jonah Jang since the return of democracy in 1999. All the administrations under these Governors pursued deliberate policies of ensuring that Hausa/Fulani Muslims are excluded from participation in the management of public affairs in Plateau State and ensuring that they do not enjoy any government patronage.

Constitutional Aspects of Exclusion of the Hausa/Fulani

The basic strategy of the exclusion of the Hausa/Fulani in Plateau is the ascription of settler-ship to their status. The ascription differentiates them from a class called indigenes. It is also the very basis for the exclusion of the Hausa/Fulani from the political, social and economic benefits

enjoyed by the so-called indigenes. The exclusion has expanded over time to become presently more noticeable in the attempts by Governor Jang to limit or eliminate altogether the access of the Hausa/Fulani not only to political participation but also to economic and educational opportunities.

While the exclusion of the Hausa/Fulani has all along been based on the murky claims of historical origins of Jos, it is imperative to recognize that the Hausa/Fulani residents in the Jos Plateau are first and foremost bona fide citizens of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. As such, they are fully entitled to live in peace in the area, and to participate in the exercise of their citizenship rights, including the right to vote and be voted into any office. As already noted, these rights are not dependent on the historical origins of Jos, but are securely and firmly established by the constitution of Nigeria; hence they cannot be denied on the basis of the disputed history of who was first to inhabit the areas of the present day Jos. Furthermore, since the constitution does not recognize the so-called settler-indigene divide, it is illegal and unconstitutional to exclude the Hausa/Fulani from enjoying all the benefits and rights of citizenship allegedly because of their settler status.

The Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) does not provide any clear definition of the two words; there is also no any other subsidiary law that can help in this direction. The most bandied definition particularly by the so-called indigenes is the one articulated in the controversial report of the Justice Feberesima Commission of Inquiry that was set up in the aftermath of the riots of 12th April 1994. Its terms of reference were clearly given in line with Commission of Inquiry Act, Cap 25 of 1940. The commission went outside the confines of the law and offered a definition which was not supported by law or the evidence before it. On page 25, item 3.1.4 it said “*an indigene of Jos is whose ancestors were natives of Jos beyond memory...*” Apart from lacking any legal authority, this definition is so ambiguous to the extent of becoming meaningless, for each of the words in the definition needs to be further defined, particularly the last two words “beyond memory.” Whose memory? Who decides the length of stay that will count as being “beyond memory”? Additionally, the commission failed to define settlers, and the basis that justifies their exclusion. In the final analysis, the Feberesima Commission was left with no option but to concede that the Hausa/Fulani do in fact qualified as **citizens**. Similarly, the Justice Niki Tobi and Ajibola commissions have also adopted the definition articulated by the

Feberesima Commission (See memo no. 69 and 91 to Ajibola by the Beroms). Therefore, even if Hausa/Fulani are settlers, their citizenship rights must be and have been duly acknowledged.

The creation of Jos North Local Government by the Babangida administration has also been exploited to vilify the Hausa/Fulani and thus justify their exclusion. General Babangida clearly told the Ajibola Commission of Inquiry on the 2008 crisis that the creation of Jos North Local Government was not done in isolation, nor was it designed to confer any special advantage to the Hausa/Fulani in Jos. The former President tendered documents to show that the then Armed Forces Ruling Council decided that any Federal Constituency of certain size will be further divided along the lines of historical affinity and geographical contiguity to create additional local government areas. This according to the documents is to ease government activity and bring the government closer to the people. The overwhelming evidence from election record shows that from 1959-2011 the Hausa/Fulani are numerically the dominant group in the areas that make up Jos North Local Government that has consistently won Local, Regional, State and Federal elections. Therefore, it is absurd to claim that they have no citizenship rights in the area after the creation of Jos North Local Government.

The elites who claim to be the indigenes of the Jos Plateau do not acknowledge these facts. They often make the unwarranted claims that the settler "Hausawa" community in Jos saw and still see the creation of Jos North LGA as a legitimate constitutional gift to them and nobody else except themselves must rule over it. They also claim that the Hausawa settlers, feeling superior to the indigenes, have preferred to remain a separate and prosperous Moslem enclave within the larger cosmopolitan population of Jos made up of Christians, animists, atheist and free-thinkers. This remark ignores the fact that the pattern of settlement in Jos has areas dominated by certain ethnic groups, and the Hausa/Fulani are not exception. Similarly, former Governor Joshua Dariye was also quoted saying that the Hausa/Fulani are tenants on the Plateau and anytime their landlords can decide to eject them. But even a tenant does have legal rights that cannot be trampled on by a capricious landlord. The remarkable thing about this statement by Dariye is that in the run up to the 2011 election, Dariye recapitulated and instead accused present Governor Jang of politics of exclusion with specific reference to the Hausa/Fulani. The obvious reason for this is the political difference of the two of them.

When asked by a journalist what was his reactions to the fleeing of people out Jos in the heat of the recent crisis, Governor Jang responded by saying that he was not the one who brought them to Jos on the first instance. This unfortunate remark indicates an abysmal dereliction of his duty as the first security officer of the state. Similarly, Governor Jang cast aspersions on the integrity of the Special Military Taskforce (STF) when he remarked in the "Next" published on March 10, 2010 that: "I expect that the Army should live up to expectation and stop the carnage in Plateau, If they cannot, then they should as well get out of the place." In response, the Nigerian Army issued a stern rebuke to Governor Jang by highlighting the fact the Nigerian Army (to which Governor Jang belongs) is above board, has earned commendation in its peace-keeping operations in other parts of the county, and will not be blackmailed by Governor Jang's baseless accusations. The relevant point to note here is that the main objective of the political elites of the indigenes is clearly to justify the exclusion of the Hausa/Fulani from participation in the management of public affairs in Plateau State, justifying their agenda not on the solid basis of constitutional rights of citizenship but on largely inaccurate assumptions about historical origins of Jos.

Furthermore, for the indigenous political elites, the contest for the Chair of Jos North is always a fight to finish, pursued by as all means, fair and foul, and deployed to defeat the enemy i.e. Hausa/Fulani. It is also from this perspective that we can understand the real reason for the 2008 crisis in the aftermath of the Local government election. The Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission (PLASIEC) decided at the last minute to relocate the collation centre for the election from the Jos North Local Government Secretariat to an obscured place called Kabong. The most intriguing thing about this decision is that it was taken after more than half of the votes have been counted and it was clear that the preferred candidate, who not incidentally is a Berom, was about to lose the election.

The Hausa/Fulani still believing that their votes will be allowed to count followed to the designated new collation centre. Of course what followed was the crisis in which they dearly paid with their lives for their audacity of believing that their votes should count. Clearly, the indigene/settler divide is the strategy for exclusion of the Hausa/Fulani in order to serve the political interests of the so-called indigenes.

EFFECT OF EXCLUSION:

There is little doubt that the recurrent ethno-religious crises in Jos are the direct consequence of the exclusion of the Hausa/Fulani from the mainstream of public affairs in Plateau State, and also the deliberate and concerted efforts to use state machinery of coercion to cripple their economic, political and social existence in Jos. Glaring examples of these are many, including the arson that destroyed the Jos main market which held Hausa/Fulani investment worth billions of naira. The present Plateau State Government has made clear its intention to destroy prominent business locations belonging to the Hausa/Fulani, such as the main market in Bukuru, the headquarters of the Jos South Local Government, where the Hausa/Fulani own the majority the flourishing businesses. This is not what the government of the day wants to hear. Motor parks and other transport businesses carried out by the Hausa/Fulani are also targeted for destruction. The failed attempt to ban the okada business, also dominated by the Hausa/Fulani, is clearly informed by the same objective of economically crippling the Hausa/Fulani. A very disturbing phenomenon arising from the exclusion and the attendant crises is the proliferation of arms, the emergence of militant gangs of youths, heightened sense of insecurity, and rising crime levels.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE:

The unfortunate descent of Jos into ethno-religious crises may have been foretold, given the avowed pursuit of an agenda of liberation from the imaginary dominating power of the Hausa/Fulani. This agenda is conceived, carefully planned, and skillfully executed through various channels and institutions, including churches and civic organizations. The unfortunate outcome is that the ordinary peaceful Plateau person is sold a dummy that the Hausa/Fulani is on a conquest to Islamize him and thereby grab the rulership of Jos. This has destroyed mutual trust and confidence that for generations have been the foundation of peaceful coexistence in a thriving environment welcoming of all without discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or place of parental origins. Friendships and good neighborliness built over the years have been undermined or totally jettisoned. Jos people have become virtually prisoners in ethnic enclaves—not to mention the terrible loss of lives and property.

Let us begin to think of the way out of the present predicament by openly accepting the inevitable principle that while mutual respect is highly desirable and should be mutually earned

and granted, the fundamental rights of citizenship should never be denied. The Hausa/Fulani in Jos have consistently pursued their one goal of economic activity on the Plateau. Their participation in democratic politics by contesting for political offices is in the accordance with the constitutionally guaranteed opportunities, and their past success in elections have all been based on numerical strength. Since they have the numbers and they are not encumbered by any law, it is preposterous to demand that they should abandon such a legitimate pursuit. As duly acknowledged by the numerous commissions of inquiry and also by the current Gbong Gwom Jos, participation in public affairs by citizens has to be accepted as the starting point of reconciliation among the diverse inhabitants of the Jos Plateau. Furthermore, I would like to suggest the following:

1. Dialogue is necessary for understanding and respecting each other, for without dialog misperceptions cannot be corrected.
2. The Hausa/Fulani must be allowed to live and pursue their legitimate affairs in Jos and Plateau in general.
3. Government of Plateau State must restrain itself from pursuing vendetta and policies that are capable of breaching the peace.
4. There must be a level playing ground for all political contests to allow for legitimate exercise of constitutional rights and democratic freedom.
5. The Government of Plateau State Government should discard all forms of discriminatory policies against the Hausa /Fulani Moslems in the areas of employment, education, poverty alleviation and other social and economic spheres.

Chapter Eleven

REFLECTIONS ON CITIZENSHIP-RELATED CRISES IN JOS: FINDING THE ROAD-MAP FOR PEACE

Joseph H. P. Golwa

Introduction:

The concept of citizenship has become central to the modern state system because of its inclusion as one of, if not the major indices that define the nation-state. Important as this category is in mapping out a state, it, according to Ben Nwosu, “Poses a worrisome conundrum especially in the states of the global capitalist periphery³. As a typical member of such state system of the international community, Nigeria’s multi-ethnic and multi-cultural background

³ Ben U. Nwosu: The Political Economy of Citizenship – Indigenship Controversy, in Joseph H. P. Golwa & Ochinya O. Ojiji (eds) Dialogue on Citizenship in Nigeria, Isu Media, Abuja, 2008, P. 79.
2. See Ibid, P. 81.

present practices that have tended to devalue citizenship of the nation state. Thus, beyond the constitutionally set criteria of citizenship, relational dynamics lead to construction of lower levels of community membership that sometimes stand in contradiction to that set by the state.²

The contestation of citizenship rights particularly over issues related to indigene and settler status of the people resident in particular areas of the country at a point in time is no doubt one of the major constraining factors to national unity. These contestations have manifested in form of violent conflicts. The frequency and recurrence of these conflicts across different States and Local Government areas has become worrisome and a subject of major concern for scholars, policy makers and majority of the people directly affected by the conflicts. Recently, Jos, capital city of Plateau State, North Central Nigeria popularly known as “Home of Peace and Tourism” became the melting point of citizenship-related crises in the country.

The multi-cultural setting of Plateau State has earned it the name of a “miniature Nigeria” where in addition to its over 30 different ethnic groups, there reside at least a representation of each Nigerian ethnic group. This development makes the State particularly the Capital Jos very vulnerable to these contestations.

While States bordering Plateau like Kaduna, Bauchi, Taraba and Nasarawa were embroiled in violent conflicts in the time past, Plateau was thought to be an Island of peace in the ocean of conflicts. Nobody or institutions, neither state or non-state actors ever believed in the early warning signs that Plateau State would degenerate into the violence hitherto experienced by its neighbours. It was only a matter of time that in 2000/2001, Southern part of Plateau State bordering Nasarawa State witnessed spill-over effects of violence from the latter states. The conflicts in the Plateau South took a notorious turn for the worse as previous citizenship contestation over who is an indigene or a settler added another identity variant, this time religion to the entire conflict vortex. Plateau State was never to know the peace it had enjoyed for long. However, the tragedy had had to do with the inability of actors to learn from past experiences, and put in place the right peacebuilding mechanism in the State to avert future occurrence of violent conflicts. Since the spill over conflicts from Southern Plateau further complicated the already tensed situation of the contentious issue of the ownership of Jos, in 2001/2002, the

conflagration, that engulfed the state never abated easily. Once in its latent form, Jos remained seated on a gunpowder keg: It only required a girl walking to her house through a Muslim prayer area to be the trigger that set the stage for the manifest carnage in the entire Jos North, part of Jos East and Jos South³ From here, the crises again eventually shifted from the urban centres to rural areas of the State.

³ The same thing was reported to have happened at the University of Ibadan in a most daring and provocative form when a supposedly female Christian fanatic sneaked into a Mosque and in the moment of prayers was shouting for Muslim faithful to repent and embrace her own faith. The irony is that, in Ibadan it was quickly managed and contained from escalation but it was never so in Jos case. which escalated to major crises. The citizenship-indegenship misunderstanding is not so much mixed with religion in Ibadan area as perhaps in Jos, hence it was easily managed and contained.

Several scholars (Okwudiba) Nnoli, 2001; Eghosa Osaghe, 2002; Alubo, 2006; Rotimi suberu, 1996; Sam Egwu, 2003; inter alia) have discussed the vexed issues of citizenship-related crises particularly in Nigeria and the challenges it has posed to national cohesion, peace and development. A major work of the Institute in 2008 titled Dialogue on Citizenship in Nigeria also discussed these issues in detail and proffered solutions.⁴

This paper does not intend to reinvent the discourse as it has been on the front burner of academic, activists and policy agenda. The tragedy has remained the inability of major actors and influential persons within our polity to creatively and proactively find actionable ways out of the conflict quagmire.

Therefore, the paper attempts to majorly reflect on the citizenship-related crises in the specific area of Jos as a mirror-image of similar crises in other to parts of the country and to find the road-map which hopefully will promote peace in the troubled city and environments.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE FOUNDATION FOR CONFLICT IN JOS

The history of Jos like other cities in Nigeria and the rest of Africa has its periodize phases in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. The convolution of these histories has no doubt laid the foundation for today's conflict and the partisan disposition of historians from affected sides has not in any way helped matters. Also, the nature and character of the post-colonial state to manage these differences has rather complicated the problem thereby providing the platform for communal, ethnic and religious acrimony and violence in the society.

4. See Joseph H. P. Golwa & Ochinaya O. Ojiji (eds) – op. cit.

Depending on the side of the divide, some historians have attempted to write, re-write or distort the history of Jos. However, it is clear that pre-historic Jos identity (i.e. indigenous ethnic identities) is rooted in Nok culture from whence ancestral linkages are drawn to the present day. There is a common consensus among historians as to the autochthonous groups of Jos. Debunking the absence of autochthonous groups in the Jos Plateau, Sa'ad Abubakar said:

Undoubtedly some of the ethnic groups on the Benue basin and the Bauchi Plateau migrated from the North. However, this does not mean that there had been no autochthons but only empty lands into which the various immigrants moved... Thus, it can be said that in most areas the autochthons that had existed were probably eventually overwhelmed by alien immigrants except possibly on the Jos Plateau⁵

Corroborating the above, another historian Monday Mangwat outlined immigration pattern into Jos Plateau thus:

The people and the formation of groups on the Jos Plateau areas can be traced to several phases. The first phase, Circa. 200BC to 1000AD was the pre-historic period. The second C. 1100 to C. 1700 AD was occasioned most largely by developments in the Kanem-Bornu region particularly following the establishments of the second Kanuri Empire which occasioned the emigration of groups of people who refused to be incorporated into the new Kanem polity to the

5 Saad Abubakar (1980) "People of the Upper Benue Basin and the Bauchi Plateau before 1800" cited in the History, Ownership, Establishment of Jos and Misconception About the Recurrent conflict, Jos: Dan-Sil Press, 2010, P.2.

Jos Plateau. The third, C. 1600 to C. 1800 AD was associated with the Jukun Kwararafa activities. The fourth phase, C. 1800 to 1907 AD was related to the Fulani herders and Hausa traders which culminated in the Sokoto Jihad⁶

Jos pre-historic and pre-colonial histories shows a mix of existing autochthonous groups (Afizere, Anaguta and Berom) and other groups migrating into the area to form what is Jos Plateau. The people had mutually coexisted without any form of dominance by any group over another.

The colonial history of Jos shows that by design, it was meant to be transformed into a colonial city centre. The city was therefore a deliberate creation of the colonialist to serve as a centre for people from all over the country migrating there to find their means of livelihood. Thus, the construction of railway tracks from Port Harcourt, Lagos, Kano and Maiduguri linking up with Jos as another major terminus was to re-enforce the importance of the city making it a nerve centre in the area in line with the pre-colonial migratory pattern into the area. The population increased with accompanying demographic changes. Jos was no doubt a haven for colonialists and intense Christian missionary activities which gained a stronghold on the natives and other immigrants' altogether. Islamic activities were equally being practiced in the area. It is for these complexities of migrations and settlements that Jos in particular and Plateau State in general has often been referred to as miniature Nigeria on a melting pot of Nigeria's ethnic groups. The Climate condition itself is

6. Monday Mangwat (1984), A History of class Formation in the Plateau Province 1902 -1960: Genesis of a ruling Class, extracted from Ibid. P.3.

clement and attractive. Yet, the same reasons and complexity of ethnic background and population mix amidst scarce resources have constantly been manipulated to become a veritable platform for future conflicts in the city.

The post-colonial state in Nigeria only took on the colonial form without a major creative administrative policy to effectively integrate the people as one nation with a uniquely conscious identity. In other words, immediately after independence in 1960, there were no conscious efforts by regional governments in the South, North and East to deliberately integrate the different ethnic minority groups in their respective regions. Added to this was the fact that post colonial Nigeria became heavily disposed to the two main religious groups namely, Christianity and Islam. There were no effective mechanisms on ground either to encourage genuine integration of the indigenous people and the migrant population, nor encouraging these immigrant populations to integrate among themselves on the other hand. Whatever mutual trust that existed, possibly was an unconscious one which did not have deep roots. This, itself was a potential ground for conflict.

POLITICS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE JOS CRISES AS A CASE STUDY OF THE NATIONAL PROBLEM OF CITIZENSHIP-INDEGENESHIP CRISES

Politics and constitutional developments in the country have failed to address issues of citizenship rights in Nigeria generally. The activities of conflict entrepreneurs who derive pleasure in manipulating these emotive sentiments/issues have further compounded the crises. They do this most often to dominate and or influence other persons of different ethnic or religious inclination for the purpose of achieving their selfish political interests. According to Ibeanu and Onu, “identity entrepreneurs act as self-appointed boundary keepers and make capital out of deep emotions of ordinary people”⁷. Other scholars on identity issues such as Nnoli (1978), Egwu (2006), Adetula (2006) among others agree that the space of political power particularly is a veritable arena of dichotomies connected with identity.

As Nwosu vividly observes, even though it clearly contradicts the principle of rational choice, identity entrepreneurs will go the extra mile of ensuring that a non-indigene of an area would not be allowed to seek votes for political representation of the area – that such person seeking to represent the place was born there, grew up there and pursues his or her livelihood in the same place is immaterial.⁸ The truth as Nwosu says, is that in our modern experience, politics has come to be at the centre of citizenship-related crises in Jos and other parts of the country. This view with regards to Jos is confirmed by the eruption of violence following the tussle over the Chairmanship of Jos North Local Government between a Hausa man and an Afizere candidate. This led to the communal violence of April 12, 1994. Also in 2001, the ethno-religious violence that took place in Jos was as a result of resistance by indigenous ethnic groups to the appointment of a Hausa man as the State Coordinator of the Federal Government initiated Poverty Alleviation Programme in Plateau State. (NAPEP)⁹. Also, using the same constitutional provisions of appointment of Ministers from a State to which they are indigenous, the appointment for Dasuki Nakande as Minister

7. Ibeanu, O. and Onu, G. (2001) *Ethnic Groups and Conflicts in Nigeria*, Vol. 2, Ibadan: Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies, University of Ibadan, P. 8

8. Nwosu Ben (2008) "The Political Economic of Citizenship-Indegenship Controversy" in Golwa, J. and Ojiji, O. (eds) *Dialogue on Citizenship in Nigeria*, Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, PP. 79 – 98.

9. Egwu, S. G. (2005) "Beyond 'Native' and 'Settler' Identities: Globalization and the Challenge of Multicultural Citizenship in Nigeria", *The Nigeria Social forum 2004* in www.nigeriasocilaforum.org/Download/nsf.pdf.

in the Federal Republic was vehemently condemned and opposed to by the Senator representing Plateau North Senatorial district, Dr. Gyang Dantong during his confirmation at floor of the Senate Chambers. The Senator's argument is premised on his belief, that "the Hausa man is not indigenous to Jos" but which Nakande claims to

be. These conceptions and misconceptions are very unfortunate and must be addresses in a wider context for the purpose of building peace and stability.

THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN JOS

Citizenship related conflicts easily have untoward consequences. For instance, that the violent conflict in Jos has continued unabated means several things in conflict analysis of the area:

i).

That the root causes of the crises have yet to be fully addresses to enable the citizens have confidence in government's ability and capacity in conflict management. Since issues of citizenship-indigeneship contestations are emotive issues, addressing them would require constitutional action from which they ought to derive their source. In other words, handling citizenship-indigeneship related conflicts, no matter how deep they serve as the source of conflict in Jos, must go beyond Plateau State. Indeed, they require wider application at national level because the issues are not peculiar to Jos alone.

That the consequences of these challenges by themselves define the character of the cycle of violence in Jos. The shape of this character include:

ii).

- a. the ready availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the hands of many criminals and non-state actors;
- b. the tendency to easily seek vengeance by the different groups who feel cheated;
- c. the deep seated hatred and animosity among the groups in Jos; leading to the emerging of settlement patterns in some parts of the city on religious basis. These communities exist as arch enemies to each other to the extent that people from either side can easily disappear if they happen to find themselves in each others community. Infact some of these communities bear

- unofficial names such as 'Afghanistan' and 'New Jerusalem, for Muslims and Christians respectively;
- d. the ease with which the conflict takes on religious coloration which in view of its simple appeal to emotions and sentiments gets to widen the scope of the crises faster;
 - e. the ease with which different groups mobilize counter attacks and the consequent massive loss of lives and property in the Jos cycle of violent conflict.
 - f. the seeming prevailing spirit and atmosphere of fear that gripped the residents. This is much so that mere movement of swarm of bees would cause such a heavy stampede in Jos with people running in the belief that there was another outbreak of violence.
 - g. the prevalence of rumour milling in Jos with a negative role in complicating the conflict situation.
 - h. The presence and involvement of foreigners in the crises.
 - i. Very clear absence of a strong elders forum that could call the rampaging youth or even state government to order.
- iii). The cycle of violence in Jos also tells of absolute failure or absence of early warning and early response system in Plateau State that would have helped to prevent repeated occurrences of violence. The truth is that none of the stages of the conflict in Jos ever came without its early warning indicators. The problem has been either failure of the authorities to understand these or lack of adequate responses. This failure to be proactive in using an effective early warning system has been responsible for the situation where government continuously finds itself managing conflict at hand, instead of preventing same which would have been cheaper.
- iv). That even if the initial causes of the crises was citizenship-indigeneship related, the nature of the violent conflict currently has gone far beyond borders and beyond those original reasons, to now

become a national and international question. The solution must therefore be found in local, national and international level.

- v). That the crises have led to the emergence of many conflict entrepreneurs who have found it profitable to sustain the crises for personal gains.

The rather unclear provision of the constitution on citizenship-indigeneship issues has not helped to clarify the confusion. 1999 Constitution seemingly provides the legal framework for discrimination over who is a settler or non-indigene as the State(s) tend to support this divide along primordial lines. Section 147(3) of the 1999 constitution for instance makes specific provision requiring appointment of Ministers from States of the Federation to be based on indigeneship. Kazah-Toure has vehemently argued that citizenship in Nigeria constitution is fundamentally defined in most primordial terms of consanguinity. He observes further that millions of citizens are denied of some rights where they reside on the basis of their being non-indigenes.¹⁰ yet they are Nigerian citizens.

The cycle of violence in Jos which has gone beyond indigeneship-citizenship contestation also require the political will of governments (State and Federal) to handle. This will be by way of creating a strong mechanism that will harmonize all the past reports and implement their recommendations.

Citizenship-related conflict especially as experienced in Jos has assumed very complex character. This explains why it is difficult to identify and name any one particularly cause of the Cycle of Violence in Jos at any given point in time. Thus, the crises have often been associated with some common features or issues such as **land tenure** or **ownership of Jos, insecurity, politics, difficulty in reconciling the diverse interests, religious/ethnic sentiments, governance challenges, Local Government/Ward creation and failure of Conflict Early Warning System**. This complex character is reflected in the recommendations of various Panels/Committees/Commissions of Inquiry

into the citizenship-Indigenship related crises of Jos Plateau between 1994 – 2010, as in the table below:

Issues	The Justice J. A. Fibresima Commission 1994/Recommendations	The Niki Tobi Commission 2002/Recommendations	The Plateau Peace Conference 2004/Recommendations	The Justice Ajibola Commission 2008/Recommendations
Land Ownership	<p>4.0.2</p> <p>Evidence showed that there are conflicts of thought in the minds of the Berom, Anaguta, Afizere and Hausa-Fulani communities in Jos. These conflicts seem to originate from values placed on tradition, heritage, ancestry, pedigree, territorial claims, control over</p>	<p>Government should provide grazing area and permanent routes for Fulanis to feed their cattle. Hausa-Fulani community should be encouraged to dialogue with other communities and accept ownership of Jos by the Afizeres, Anagutas and Beroms.</p>	<p>(7.5.13)-(ii)</p> <p>Government should enforce Town-planning laws.</p> <p>(7.1.1.) – Claim of ownership of Jos.</p> <p>Delegates made reference to many documents at their disposal to confirm the fact that the pre-colonial history of Jos is synonymous with only three indigenous ethnic</p>	<p>Government should address illegal acquisition mapping of slums.</p>

	<p>environment and the inhabitants therein, representation in state or local government, and the like.</p> <p>In all these matters, it appeared to us that courts of law or tribunals do not always provide adequate solution. We therefore feel that in local matters, particularly where the grassroots may be affected or involved, consultation will be a rewarding exercise.</p>	<p>Anything short of this will not make for peace.</p>	<p>groups which share boundaries with each others, namely, Afizere, Anaguta and Berom. It was confirmed that these ethnic groups like all other indigenous ones have lived in peace with other people that had settled among them.</p>	
<p>Security Challenges and Illegal Aliens in</p>	<p>(4.0.5c) The State's Police Command</p>	<p>Laws should be respected and enforced.</p>	<p>(7.7.13) Delegates commended the</p>	<p>There should be security and it should be recognized</p>

<p>Jos.</p>	<p>should be adequately equipped with materials and manpower to enable it perform its statutory duties effectively. The welfare of the policemen such as accommodation, transportation, and commensurate and timely payment of their salaries and allowances should be seriously looked into by Government with a view to</p>	<p>Government should do every thing in its power to see that the security agents i.e. the police and the military are always at alert and are able to respond promptly to distress calls by individuals. In this way, crisis situations can be effectively controlled before they get out of hand.</p> <p>Urgent steps to be taken to fish out illegal aliens who are said to be in large numbers in the state.</p>	<p>efforts of security agents in apprehending suspects of the various crises, but frown at the inability of Government to prosecute them.</p> <p>The police should also be properly trained to handle crisis situations.</p> <p>Federal and State governments to take security matters seriously, and increase the level of active coordination and sharing of intelligence among the Police, Customs,</p>	<p>points.</p> <p>There should be provision for improved security at Bauchi Motor Park.</p> <p>Provision for emergency response and enforcement of regulations.</p> <p>Investigate allegations against the forces for excessive use of deadly extra-judicial killings and dereliction of duty.</p> <p>Check immigration</p>
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	<p>ameliorating their poor conditions of service.</p> <p>(4.0.5a)</p> <p>We recommend to government to spread its intelligence-gathering network far and wide to cover all individuals And organisations such as religious, cultural and social organisations that could be potentially dangerous to peace and order.</p> <p>(4.0.5b)</p> <p>We recommend to government to</p>	<p>Religious fanatics should not be posted to head police commands.</p> <p>Government and the security agents should put in place measures that will check the illegal possession of firearms in the state. There was evidence before the commission that arms were illegally stock-piled in the state and these were freely used during the crises. They should not be allowed to happen again.</p> <p>(16)</p> <p>Government</p>	<p>Immigration and State Security Services to enhance their capacity in the State.</p> <p>Proliferation of small arms and light weapons.</p> <p>i. Traditional Rulers should be empowered to enable them check the proliferation of arms within their domains.</p> <p>ii. People who give useful information in the whereabouts of illegal arms should be</p>	<p>aliens mercenaries.</p> <p>That the Fe Government needs to immediate attention to training equipment of its se agencies and apparatus, particularly i area of ope and lo supports. Th State and Fe Government security seriously should inc the level of a coordination sharing</p>
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	<p>omit no detail when considering advice and information from the Police, the State Security Service etc, and individuals such as traditional rulers, community elders, Youths organisations and women leaders. In the same vein, we advise the security agencies not to discountenance security information and intelligence reports from other sources as</p>	<p>should do everything in its power to see that the security agents i.e. The Police and The Military are always at alert and are able to respond promptly to distress calls by individuals. In this way, crises situations can be effectively controlled before they get out of hand.</p>	<p>protected.</p> <p>iii. There should be continuous inter local government mop up of arms by security agents.</p> <p>iv. Government should establish border posts to check the proliferation of arms.</p> <p>v. There should be inter-state co-operation on mop up of arms.</p> <p>vi. Seeming insecurity and slow response of government to security issues</p>	<p>intelligence amongst Police, Cu Service, Immigration Service, Security Se within PI State to en their capacity</p>
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	<p>rumours because of professional rivalry or personal pettiness.</p> <p>4.0.7c</p> <p>Fire fighting equipment and measures must be properly maintained at all times.</p>		<p>results in colossal loss of lives and property.</p> <p>vii. Government should provide Security Agents with arms – detecting gadgets to assist them in the fight against arms proliferation.</p> <p>Plateau State Government should appeal to neighbouring States to cooperate in checking the movement of peoples to Plateau State during</p>	
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			elections.	
Politics/Reconciliation and Governance.	(4.0.3) We recommend to government that in making appointments, awards, and promotion, especially in sensitive government positions such as Commissioners, Directors-General, Chairmen of Boards and Parastatal, Chairmen of Local Governments, etc. It should be guided by justice,	(13) Government appointments should be made only after wide consultations with stakeholder as failure to do this has often led to misapprehension and disaffection among the people. The Commission firmly believes that non-implementation by government of the reports of previous Commissions of Inquiry, and in particular the Report of the	(7.41) The use of derogatory terms and name calling e.g. 'Kafiri', 'Arna' etc, should be discouraged. All communities should respect one another's custom, tradition and religion. (7.4.4) Communities should exploit any available opportunities to integrate with one another. Elders should be willing to inculcate good	State government should set reconciliation commission allow advertisement meet and resolve their differences. Those embrace reconciliation may be granted amnesty criminal prosecution. There should be publication of previous reports of commission of government papers on reports as well

	<p>fair play, objectivity and equity. Government should try to consult relevant concerns, so that no rights are seen to be threatened with usurpation.</p>	<p>Commission of Inquiry into the riots of 12th April 1994 in Jos Metropolis (The main features of which are very similar to the September, 2001 Civil disturbances), is a sure recipe for a repeat performance of such disturbances. The Commission therefore recommends that Government should take seriously and implement diligently the recommendations of this Commission</p>	<p>values in the youths.</p> <p>Segregative pattern of settlement e.g. Angwan Rogo for Muslims and Jenta Adamu for Christians etc, must be discouraged.</p> <p>Negative attitudes of unforgiveness, hatred, revenge, anger, unremorsefulness and easy resort to violence must be discouraged.</p> <p>Ethnic groups should freely participate in one another's cultural activities so as to</p>	<p>gazetting of s Putting motion implementati committee will look means implementin previous current repor</p> <p>Government should rel slum ma such as Ka Kasuwan to safer loca which shoul be delin along the apparently belonging to given e grouping.</p>
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		<p>of Inquiry. Non-implementation will embolden the perpetrators of the crises and their sponsors to tread on the same path again and again.</p>	<p>enhance social interaction. The following reports which were not released should be released, gazetted and implemented. The Justice J. A. Feberesima of 12th April, 1994. Hon. Justice Felicia K. Dusu (September 7, 2001) among others. All other reports (not mentioned) at the Local Government levels should also be released, gazette and</p>	<p>Market allocation should reflect religious ethnic spread should not predominate any part group ... this a whole market will not be targets because is seen to be to a part ethnic group.</p>
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			<p>implemented.</p> <p>Conference particularly recommends that the resolution of the Peace Conference 2004 should be implemented without delay.</p> <p>A publication of previous reports of Commission of Inquiry, the issuance of Government White Papers based on the gazetting of the same – should be done.</p>	
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<p>Religious Issues</p>		<p>(4) Use of loudspeakers on external walls of churches and mosques should be made illegal by the Plateau State House of Assembly.</p> <p>(5) Indiscriminate construction of places of worship in residential areas of Jos and other towns to be outlawed by the state government. The mosque at Congo-Russia, Jos, where the crisis started should not be rebuilt.</p> <p>Government</p>	<p>There should be no blockage of any Public Roads by any religious body during worship.</p> <p>The Government should implement the law on blockage of Public Roads during worship.</p> <p>Communities should be encouraged to live according to their religious values and principles.</p>	<p>Outlaw social religious acts of loudspeakers on road block and indiscriminate development of churches and mosques within residential areas.</p> <p>Ban blocking streets during religious worships and enforce this.</p>

		should monitor the establishment of private schools and their syllabi to detect and eliminate religious fundamentalism.		
Issues of Creation of Jos Local Government and delineation of Wards.		Restructure electoral wards in Jos North local government to correct imbalance.	The creation of Local Government Areas should be base on the historical facts of the people and their sustainability.	State government should p redelineation electoral according guiding cr and based population fi within the ar Evidence b the commi leads to inevitable conclusion the delineation w Jos North

				<p>government allowed registered Hausa/Fulan voters to more wards the numer superior n voters. Present Jos local govern should redelineated about sustainable governments equal representativ number of within each government.</p>
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Source: Called from Right to Know (R2K) Nigeria, 2010, PP. 5 – 10 and TELL March 21, 2011, Page 53.

Recommendations contained in the Table are the selected few issues with relevance to citizenship-indegenship r

That the five (5) major Panels/Commission of Inquiry on the Jos cycle of crises spanning a period of 16 years found it at each point in time to make recommendations on same issues means that the roots causes of the conflict have yet to be addressed. Also, for the fact those same issues are linked to the indigene-citizenship contestations means that this peculiar issue or crisis has a national application therefore requiring national approach for solution.

FINDING THE ROAD-MAP FOR PEACE IN JOS

The Jos citizenship related crises presents an opportunity for peacebuilding in the Plateau and especially other neighbouring States in Nigeria given the notoriety it has gained from violent conflicts. Like I suggested in an earlier work: “Looking into the Crystal Ball: Lessons Learnt and Way Forward into Citizenship Crisis in Nigeria”⁴ finding a road-map to peace is embedded in two broad approaches, namely:

Constitutional/ Legal and Political

Constitutional/Legal Approach – For the reason that there exist in the 1999 Constitution some aspects whose interpretations are prone to manipulation and abuse, there is ground for it to always be misunderstood. There is therefore the need, for instance, for more emphasis to be placed on citizenship and residency rights rather than one’s place of origin or indigenship. By way of suggestion or expectation any future constitutional amendments should explicitly capture the following concerns:

- i. That any Nigerian born in any state of the federation and stays continuously in that state should have full residency rights (as constitutionally spelt out) like any other indigene, irrespective of the place of origin of parents except on matters relating to tradition and culture of the so called indigenes.

11. See Golwa, J. and Ojiji O. eds (2008) Dialogue on Citizenship in Nigeria, Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, PP. 132-157.

- ii. That any Nigerian who stays and works as well as performs his civic duties in any state of the federation continuously for a specified period which should not be more than ten years, should automatically enjoy full residency rights like any other bonafide indigene of that state.⁵ Their residency rights should be made justifiable at all the three tiers of government. These must be preceded by sensitization and advocacy programmes needed in appreciating the value of mutual respect for traditions/cultures, religious beliefs and peaceful coexistence. This is necessary because the section 147 (2) (3) of the 1999 Constitution and amended, is not clear and definite in the definition and explanation of indigenship as distinct from citizenship which in the Nigerian context are used as the confusedly used as same.

Political Solution:

i). Advocacy Programmes. In addition to sustaining and strengthening programmes like the NYSC Scheme and the unity school programme, there is need for the following steps and programmes to be undertaken: civic education on patriotism; citizenship education on nationalism; political/public education on rights and obligations of citizens; mass/peace education on citizenship and residency rights; and, continuous research and advocacy into citizenship and indigeneship issues for deeper understanding of the citizenship challenges. These are functions of funding which must be accorded the relevant research and related agencies.

ii. Punishing Impunity

The constant reference being made on same issues and similarity of recommendations on those issues by the above five Commissions/Panels/Peace Conference over a period of 16 years (1994 – 2010) shows the nagging presence of the same problems over and over. The problems have remained unsolved because of inability of governments to implement those recommendations and punish impunity. And where impunity is not punished there is absence of deterrence. Hence there exists an environment of lawlessness as people will develop a penchant for taking the law into their hands to

12. Imobighe, T. (1987), "Problem of National Integration: the Issues of Nigeria Citizenship and State Indigenes". Nigeria Journal of Policy and Strategy, Vol. 2. (1), June, PP. 1 – 11.

defend themselves. They do that easily in the belief that governments have unjustly failed to protect them. Thus, governments (both federal and state) should have the will to implement those recommendations and punish impunity as a strategic way of ending the citizenship-related cycle of violent conflict in Jos.

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Chapter Twelve

IDENTITY CONFLICT AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN JOS

JOSEPH PETER OCHOGWU

GERALDINE YOP-KIM

BACKGROUND:

Jos the Capital of Plateau State in the North Central zone of Nigeria hitherto the “Home of Peace and Tourism” has for some time now been witnessing frequent and incessant violent conflict which has had tremendous humanitarian implication as well as threatened the sanctity of the State and people. Central in these conflicts are identity based issues which find their bearing in various forms ranging from ethnic, religious political, social and so on. The conflicts in Jos always expand from the immediate trigger (e.g. political), to involve a wider range of issues usually ethnic and religion. This has made it hard to really define the conflicts in the first instance and even more difficult to manage. Jos, Plateau State has progressively climbed the nation’s ladder of violent conflict next only to the entire Niger Delta region.

A quick scan of the history of conflicts that occur in Africa shows the existence of identity based issues in them. The identity element such as tribalism, ethnicity, religion etc in these conflict is usually as a result of the multi ethnic and religious nature of most African States especially Nigeria with its diverse ethnic heritage. Even though mono ethnic and cultural societies might not be left behind in having their own identity issues the intensity in places with ethnic and cultural diversities tends to be higher. In Nigeria, the most commonly expressed identity is in form of ethnicity and religion. This primordial values which also include culture and tradition are so entrenched in the average Nigerian that they not only bear names to reflect their ethnic

origin and religious background but they also shaped and mold the nature and extent of social, economic and political relationships and interactions (Alubo, 2009; Turaki, 2011). Therefore it is of no surprise that when conflicts erupt they most often and easily take on ethnic and religious coloration. Conflicts that are identity related also tend to occur more in the North-central or Middle belt part of the country where there exist the most clusters of smaller ethnic groups each comprising of a good mix of the two dominant religions (Islam and Christianity) as well as traditional religion in the country (NOA, 2002).

Belonging to an ethnic or religious group or any other form of association in itself is not wrong or a problem, but it is the complexities that arise when these different forms of identities are applied wrongly in relating with other individuals or members of other groups that most at time lead to conflicts that is to say that if identity based issues are not handled properly they also lead to conflicts or crisis usually of violent propensity. The issues of identity have so dug into Nigerians that at all levels and spheres the different forms of identity are applied as the basis for reception, accommodation and relationship building. Although Nigerians strives to operate modern democracy, it appears they cannot do away with identity based politics thus leading to all manner of criteria like a person's "state of origin", "tribe", language", "religion" "local government", "zoning", "federal character", "catchment area" etc as the basis for employment, education, political appointment interalia in the country. Though these identity-based criteria in the public space of Nigeria might have been useful at the rudimentary stage of balancing national development in the country, its contemporary relevance in both national, state and local public spaces has only further worsen the crisis related to these issues of identity and brought to fore the limited capacity of the Nigerian state to manage the violent manifestations of the crises. Interestingly, the management of identity crisis along state conventional strategies when they escalate has further deepened whatever the triggering factors were.

The conflicts which have claimed numerous lives and property have exposed how very limited the capacity of the State government is to effectively handle or manage the conflict. Subsequently, the more recent conflicts especially from November 2008 till dated have exposed not just the State government's inefficiency but also that of the Federal Government to play their primary role of conflict management. It has also brought out the intricacies and politics involved in managing conflicts of this sensitive nature by and between both state and non state actors. The

various attempts to manage the crisis often led to rift or clash of interest as a result of actors' biases or prejudices or perceived ones. The role of the state particularly the Federal Government on one hand and the State Government on the other hand has brought to fore the seeming incapacity of these key conflict management stakeholders to manage the Jos conflict therefore reinforcing politics across the identity-divide.

The conventional approach to managing identity conflicts in the country has always been military-security followed by legal-judicial without any strong attempt at evolving a holistic community peacebuilding approach that will heal wounds, reconcile groups, rebuild the city, disarm armed groups and persons, reintegrate displaced persons, etc. The increasing conflict of interest and preference over which conflict management institutions either the military or the police is to keep the peace in Plateau, the controversies over the operation of the Special Task Force (STF) and the creation of "Operation Rainbow", the one-sided rehabilitation of displaced persons of particular identity, the tensed positions of ethnic and religious persons and groups in the Plateau have all successfully made the conflict intractable.

This paper is an attempt to examine identity-based conflicts in Jos, Plateau State north-central Nigeria and how the politics involved in the management of the conflict has only further exacerbated the conflict. Rather than conflict management institutions both military-security, legal-judicial, and other peace intervention agencies to build confidence across identity-divide and promote meaningful and effective ways of conflict resolution in Jos, their covert and overt actions and inactions has only continued to ensure mutual distrust and lack of confidence amongst the people and across the divide. The main objective of the paper is to identify challenges of politics in conflict management particularly Jos, and find ways through which genuine process of conflict management will be evolved to provide a veritable platform for the resolution of the conflict in Jos.

IDENTITY CONFLICT IN JOS

From the preceding section, we have seen that the situation in Jos is basically identity based as it involves not only issues of ethnicity, religion, and politics on one hand but also of "mismanagement" of the conflicts by both the Federal and State government on the other. The

section has provided an insight as to how politics played by those who are supposed to be key actors in managing conflict are negatively affecting the process, thus prolonging the conflict itself.

In discussing the identity conflict in Jos, the dominant feature is its expression and manifestation in terms of ethnicity and religion, even though these forms do not usually play out on their own but in relation to other forms like political and socio-economic. On a wider scope, identity deals with the sense of belonging or characteristics one feels or is believed to have as an individual or as a member of a group. It has been defined as “a combination of socio cultural characteristics which individuals share, or are presumed to share with others on the basis of which one group may be distinguished from others” (Alubo, O. 2009). Ogo Alubo observes that identity has a combination of layers of ethnic, religious, gender, class and other layers all of which refers to the same person either in self definition or as defined by others. Going by this definition, one then gets the understanding as to how people propagate various affiliations at different degrees just to have a sense of belonging and recognition. Identity also provides an avenue in which people can express or access their rights and opportunities within a given society.

As for the case of Nigeria the dominant form of identity which people prefer to subscribe to is first and foremost ethnicity, closely followed by religious and these forms usually supersede political, economic, gender, demographic and others. The hierarchy in terms of identity values of ethnic or religious differs depending on the region. In the far North, religious identity comes first, in the South ethnicity is most likely to come first before religion (see Lewis and Michael, 2001; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). The reason for this could be explained by the historic experience of Nigeria which saw different ethnic communities with their cultural and traditional peculiarities being brought together to form a nation by colonial policies. These policies were put in place mainly to foster the administration and exploitation of African states without consideration for the existing traditional political structures or survival of the various native communities. Hence, the policies which mostly were aimed at divide and rule tended to deepen ethnic prejudice as they encouraged tribal representation to the detriment of trade unions (Nnoli, 2008). Another resultant factor from the colonial policies which also entrenched ethnicity was the necessity to eliminate the deep inferiority complex engendered by racial white superiority complex required an aggressive assertion of the African’s own past, language, myth and culture.

This meant focusing attention on communal histories and revival of communal pride (Nnoli, 2008).

As Fearon and Laitin (2003) observed, that a greater degree of ethnic or religious identity does not by itself constitute a major or direct cause of violent conflict. Rather, violent conflict is associated with conditions that favour insurgency such as poverty that characterizes weak states. However, Most of the time people subscribe to these various identities with the hope of gaining some sort of “upper hand” which they fear they might not get when they stand on their own. This brings up the important issues of access to opportunity and resources and the fear of being overshadowed by others perceived to be greater, or more influential. Identity therefore becomes a means of bargaining either coercively or subtly at both individual and collective levels to achieve goals that the use of more objective criteria is unlikely to deliver. The role of the state in ensuring balancing and access to resources among the various groups becomes critical in a diverse, plural and multi-ethnic entity like Nigeria and Jos city in particular.

The Jos conflict appears to be something of an enigma, owing to its complex nature and manifestation. There is so much confusion that it is being called names such as mayhem, crisis, riot, ethno – religious, political, communal, inter communal conflict and so on. From the period 2001 to present, the manifestations of the conflicts that occur in Jos have always tended to expand from the immediate causal issues to include a wide variety of issues, the most common of which are ethnic and religious. Elaigwu (2010) noted that while the manifestation of these various conflicts which occurred over time usually have ethnic and religious characteristics because of the people involved, history have shown that the causes are mostly political or economic.

At the fore of the Jos conflict is the competition for the political control of Jos especially Jos North Local Government Area (LGA) Council, as it not only serves as the capital of the state but also the hub of most economic activities in the state. This spring's up the indigeneship –settler dimension which then degenerates into identity crisis of ethnic and religious colouration (Egwu, 2004; Best 2007). This is the case because in the struggle to access whatever is at stake be it political or economic, the parties usually align themselves along a certain identity in order to justify their rights. By aligning themselves, they believe it will provide them the needed advantage of either number, recognition or what so ever they perceive is the advantage. As in the

instance of the Jos warring groups the “indigenes” are of Berom, Anarguta and Afizere ethnic groups predominantly Christians and the “settlers” are the Hausas and Fulanis who are mostly Moslems. Clearly if it is not their ethnic group that separates them it is religion. This distinguishing factor also manifest in the nature of attacks and clashes as churches and mosques are the constantly featured targets. It is instructive to mention that there are several other groups of many different ethnic affinities like the Idomas, Igalas, Ibos, Urhobos, Ijaws, Bachamas, Ijaws, Kanuris, etc, who have settled in Jos over the years, the difference is that, these groups have not laid claim to been an indigene or ownership of Jos unlike their Hausa and Fulani counterparts (see Egwu, 2004; Justice Fiberesima Report, 1994).

PAST ATTEMPTS AT MANAGING IDENTITY CRISES IN JOS

From a general perspective, history has shown that the life span of most violent conflicts or the prospect of their re-occurrence depend on certain key factors such as the actors involved, what is at stake (interest), availability of resources to undertake them, the underlying issues (i.e. triggers or causes of the conflict) and most fundamentally how the conflict is managed. The termination of any violent conflict is as a result of commitment and proactive measures of peace building consciously put in place to mitigate conflicts like in Kaduna State, North Western Nigeria.

Managing conflict is not just curbing violence when it erupts or settling matters after they occur but also involves preventive measures that see to it that disagreements, dissatisfactions and agitations do not escalate to violence. Conflict management as ‘the process of reducing the negative and destructive capacity of conflict through a number of measures and by working with and through the parties involved in the conflict...’ (Best, 2005:95). Conflict management especially identity related conflict is not solely a law enforcement measure calling for the application of force, but entails comprehensive peacebuilding measures aimed at building confidence amongst and between the different groups. Conflict management here entails both hard and soft. Hard is the use of superior force to overwhelm violence arising from warring parties for the purpose of deterrence and law and order; soft is the actual communication, healing, reconciliation and recovery back to pre-conflict stage to enable other peacebuilding measures to take place.

In the case of the Jos conflict not much has been done on the preventive phase as there is no well organized conflict early warning mechanism put in place to monitor conflict trends by state or federal government and even where there seem to be some signals (such as rumours, threats of violence etc) little or no attention tends to be given to them. As observed in Best (2007), most residents of Jos and beyond were aware that the area was threatened with violence weeks ahead of the outburst of September 2001. Both warring parties had circulated subversive materials threatening violence well in advance of the conflict but there were no clear conflict preventive measures in place by the Government when violence broke out. A common feature in Nigeria shows that it is only when conflicts reaches violent stage that policemen are first deployed and most of the time not properly kitted to handle the situation, then it will require the involvement of military and the enforcement of a curfew to contain the violence (Akinteye A., Wuye J.M. and Ashafa M.N. 2001; Toure, 2003). These measures which are temporary, only serve as buffer between the conflicting parties and help to restore relative peace but they do not address the underlying causes that led to the conflicts. Aside, military-security presence, not much is been done on the soft-side of conflict management which is the component that can bring about conflict resolution in the city.

Though Best (2007) observed that attempts were made towards addressing the issues and finding peaceful end to conflicts by state and non- state actors. Part of the attempts and measures put in by the government were the setting up of: judicial panels or commissions of inquiries, joint security force (comprised of the military, police and state security service), peace and reconciliation committee, information and community relations committee, community relation agency, commission on security. There were also interactive forums with the governor and president, peace summits, retreats, advocacy visit by the president, top government officials and by influential Nigerians and peace initiatives by some Local Government councils and traditional rulers in the state. These measures were taken during and in the immediate aftermath of the declaration of state of emergency in Plateau State during the President Olusegun Obasanjo and Governor Chibi Dariye era. Of note, was the Plateau Peace Conference 2004 organised by the Administrator of the State, Major – General M.C. Alli with consent of the Presidency (Plateau State Government, 2004).

Non state actors' attempts involved interventions and initiatives by both national and international nongovernmental organizations as well as community and religious based organizations notable among them were; Centre for Peace Initiative and Development (CEPID), which worked in conjunction with USAID and OTI, Inter- Faith Mediation Centre, Civil Liberties Organisation, Community Action for Popular Participation, Human Rights Watch, Christian Foundation for Justice (Best, 2007). The Institute for Governance and Social Research (IGSR) and other non-state actors have been undertaking some peace intervention works in Jos since the violent outbreaks in 2010 and 2011. Regrettably, most of the efforts put in place by both state and non-state actors to building peace in Jos were all sacrificed on the altar of politics as the political will to channel these efforts were lacking. Thus, when the conflict erupted, stakeholders that ordinarily would have helped the process of management were either caught up in the conflict or became literally docile. Whether their actions is deliberate or perhaps the conflict overwhelmed the conflict managers is difficult to hazard a guess at this point.

THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN JOS

Identity related conflicts as earlier noted is a major recurring feature of Nigeria's socio-political and economic landscape as a result of which its management has become complex with far-reaching implications particularly on both state and non-state conflict management institutions and groups. The fluidity of identity-based conflicts easily permeates conflict management institutions and affects the abilities of these institutions or their representatives (i.e. personnel) to effectively manage conflicts particularly in weak states like Nigeria. The traditional or primary responsibility of the state includes the maintenance of law and order, promoting mutual coexistence amongst its citizen and ensuring peace and development of the nation. Though, this still remains the role of the state in Nigeria, the historical and political context within which the state in Nigeria was formed, nurtured and is operating has increasingly brought the question of its capacity to effectively administer this role to the fore.

While there remain a heavy presence of the police and military in Jos and its environs, the situation has largely remained tense with recurrent clashes and attacks, secret killings and other negative outcomes that characterize an unresolved conflict-embroiled society. A major

contributing factor to this situation as observed in this paper is as a result of the politicization of the interventions and entire conflict management process by the government (state and federal), security agents and non-state actors who are involved there. The hitherto conventional approach (i.e. deployment and use of force by military-security forces) to managing conflict seem to have failed owing to modernization, enlightenment, arms buildup, gross social inequality, abject poverty, mass unemployment, religious piety, resource squeeze and the crass inability of the Nigerian state to respond to increasing societal conflict dynamics and meet up with the contemporary conflict security challenges confronting it.

Conflict management (both hard and soft) of the Jos crisis took its worst manifestation with the outbreak of violence in November, 2009 which led to mass killing of some persons of Muslim religious identity and mainly of Hausa/Fulani ethnic identity at Kuru Karama as well as the reprisal attacks and gruesome murders of persons at Dogon-Nahauwa and three other villages of Berom ethnic/Christian identity in March, 2010. The role of the State (both state and federal) particularly those of the military-security forces responsible for managing the conflict fell short of basic standard in the protection of life and properties especially of non-combatant civilians in conflict areas. Politics and subtle manipulation of conflict management institutions by persons in authority over-shadowed whatever attempts that are in place to curtail the violence. The politics at the top hierarchy of government and society amongst and between the various identities in conflict both at the state and national levels further fueled the conflict as those at the bottom had their covert supports coming from different quarters thereby making the conflict intractable.

The manifestation of the politics in conflict management in the Jos crisis became prominent with the rift between the Federal Government under late President Umaru Yar'Adua versus the State Government under Governor Jonah Jang. The inability of the Federal Government and Plateau State Government to manage their inter-governmental relationship degenerated to the filing of a suit against the former by the latter contesting the setting up of a Panel of Inquiry. It first started with reports that the President refused to grant the Governor audience when he came to brief Mr. President on the development in the wake of the crisis (Ohuegbe, 2009). The alleged snubbing of the Governor by the President must have not gone down well with the Governor as his reaction to the setting up of the Major General Emmanuel Abisoye (rtd.) headed Administrative Panel of Inquiry by President Yar'Adua to look into the November 28, 2008 crisis in Jos was strongly

opposed. The Governor (Plateau State Government) filed a suit in the Supreme Court to seek its determination on the legal and constitutional powers of the President to set up the panel as well as to restrain him from such. The Governor also went ahead to set up a Six-Man Committee headed by a one-time Attorney General of the Federation, Prince Bola Ajibola (SAN). The result of this President Yar'Adua versus Governor Jang feud had been that it distracted them from concentrating on the main task at hand which was really looking into the crisis and finding best ways and individuals suited to manage the conflict and it further brought about more divisive identity-related sentiments as the general public observed and the media always reported it with their own interpretations and analysis.

Another direct manifestation of this feud was observed in a statement, press release and an interview by executive of some Christian Forum that all federal government officials of Muslim inclination including the First lady and wife of the President, Hajiya Turai Yar'Adua, the Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Danbazzau and members of the Committee set up by the House of Representative were accused of taking sides in the conflict. These people were accused of visiting Plateau State after the crisis and instead of paying a courtesy visit to the Governor and the Gbong Gwom Jos as is the normal protocol with high profile visits; they only paid the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 3rd Armoured Division in Jos, Major-General Saleh Maina. They were also accused of visiting and taking relief materials to the camp for the Muslim internally displaced persons and avoided that of the Christians (Onuorah & Akhaine, 2009; Ambe-Uva, 2010; Sahara Reporters, 2010). Thus, rather than people with good offices using such in dousing the tension, their actions and inactions further created distrust and stoked the conflict.

The January 17th, 2010 outbreak of violence in Jos and the Dogon-Nahauwa killings also sparked off another major face off surrounding the management of the conflict in Jos. This 'face-off' which was between the Governor Jang and the GOC 3rd Armoured Division of the army, Major-General Saleh Maina, triggered a series of accusation and counter accusations between the State Government and the security agents with manifestations that included having varying reports on events and conflicting figure of casualties etc. The resultant distrust between these two parties to manage the conflict on the ground also spilled over to the people in Jos and its environ as subsequently the security agents especially the army were always alleged to be part of the attacks

that were to follow. Some people particularly those of Berom ethnic group and other Christian groups believe that the GOC is on the side of the Muslims as he is a Muslim by religious practice and identity. Also, Berom/Christian group alleged that the composition of the military task force (Special Task Force) sent to keep peace in the State was partial in favour of the Hausa-Fulani/Muslim group. This resulted to persistent calls for the removal of the GOC by the indigenous Berom people/elders and some Christian groups in the state (Agekameh, 2011). It is worth mentioning that though Major General Saleh Maina has been redeployed from Jos to another military posting, the people (i.e. Berom) are calling for the outright withdrawal of the military with replacement from the Nigeria Police Force. Whatever this portends, remain a subject of conjecture and further interrogation.

The religious leaders and groups are not left out of the politicization of the conflict management process. Probably, as part of their efforts to condole, appease or show support or dismay to their followers, some religious leaders and groups on both the Muslim and Christian sides have been making statements especially to media that are detrimental to peacebuilding. In the event of such, when they are telling their own version of the story, they sometimes get carried away that some of their statements at time not deliberate, further fuels the conflict. Examples of such publications are as seen in the address of Rev. Dr. Soja Bewarang (Leadership Newspaper, 18/2/2010); a open letter of special appeal to the President by Hon. Ahmad Muhammad (DailyTrust Newspaper, 11/1/2011), and a press release by Dr. Khalid Aliyu Abubakar (DailyTrust Newspaper, 17/1/2011).

The politicization does not exist only between or within government and religious leaders but can also be trace to the media where reports are biased, or one party is given more reportage and the other party under-reported. The media as a critical instrument for peace promotion and conflict management has been culpable in the Jos crisis. At the heat of the Dogon Nahauwa massacre, a Journalist who was mistaken for an Aljazeera Correspondent was almost lynched by mobs of Berom descent (Personal Interview, 27/11/2010). The supposedly partisan nature of the media has led to the inability of reporters from certain media houses not been allowed to cover certain part of the city particularly those that are of different identity be it ethnic or religious. Also, where a practicing Journalist is of the same ethnic or religious identity but works for media house that has reportorial sympathy to the other party, such Journalist is also refused access to

information and coverage. Not less than 4 Journalists have lost their lives with several others injured and some are likely to be attacked because of their media work in Jos (Focus Group Discussion with Media Practitioners in Jos, 27/11/2010).

Another major development in the Plateau that impede any conflict management efforts in the Jos conflict is the frequent positioning of local politicians of both identity groups who always make political capital of the crisis. Most politicians in the state do claim to have the “magic wand” that will resolve the conflict in Jos. In their attempts to score cheap popularity and political relevance, the tendency is for them to personalize the conflict management of the crisis by solely blaming the State Governor for the entire crisis and his incompetence to manage the crisis. This bad politics has played itself out severally in the Plateau as witnessed during the Dariye era and the present Jang administration. Both Governors have consistently maintained that, though they are the Chief Security Officers of the State, none of the military, security or police Chiefs in the State is answerable to them. Specifically, Governor Jang has been shouting over this issue of lack of authority over the police, army and other security personnel deployed or serving in the state. The chain of command and authority is controlled by the Federal Government and has remained the same as rigidly provided in the constitution even when a state is faced with emergency arising from identity-based conflicts, authorization for deployment and the rules of engagement is ordered and directed by the Federal Government. Local politicians even with their knowledge of the constitutional provision in respect of hard conflict management in times of deep crisis have continued to play to the gallery and making the crisis more complex with their unguarded statements.

As identity permeates conflict management institutions and individuals with supposedly good offices, any attempts at managing the conflict suffer peace deficits as those at the bottom take advantage to engage in arbitrary acts that further compound the conflict and security situation in Jos. Several other government agencies like the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), etc and non-government organisations that would have brought in place confidence building measures to complement the military-security component in seeking peace in Jos have not made meaningful impact to transform or resolve the conflict. While the conflict still lingers,

there are existing clash of interest between some government agencies like the Police and NEMA (see Odey, 2010).

CHALLENGES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN JOS

The escalatory nature of the Jos crisis and seeming inability of both state and non-state conflict management institutions to effectively manage the crisis has to do with its politicization as well as several challenges that have made the conflict complex. Some of the challenges are as follows:

- i. **Ineffective Internal Security Operations:** the Nigerian military has found itself operating under very tight and hazy political environment where its personnel are caught up in the dangerous high-wire identity politics in the nation. In addition is the lack of logistics such as vehicles, communication equipments and tracking devices, among others that according to the Chief of Training and Operations (CTOP), Army Headquarters, Major General Lawrence Ngubane, has made it difficult for the troops to effectively carry out its operations Daily Sun Newspaper, 31/1/2011.
- ii. **Difficult Terrain:** as the conflict revolves within the city and guerrilla-like attacks on rural communities scattered across the Plateau, it is very difficult for the Special Task Force to cope due to the difficult terrain as they can hardly provide security coverage for the entire rural communities. The natures of the attacks on rural communities by mercenaries who are led by guides familiar with the Plateau rural terrain are carried out in the wee hours of the night. The military-security personnel hardly have local knowledge of the terrain which poses severe constraints on their internal security operations.
- iii. **Mutual Distrust and Lack of Confidence:** there is a general lack of confidence between the indigeneous ethnic groups and the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups, so also there is distrust between people of the two main religions in the Plateau. The atmosphere of distrust and lack of confidence is so much that even the military and other conflict management institutions are distrusted by different groups in the conflict with preferences for either the police by one group against the military or vice versa.

- iv. **Arrogance of Power and know it All Mentality:** power hardly listens. Those at the helm of affairs who dispose of prebends to their people do not consider it necessary to listen to the other sides. Both at the state and federal level, politicians in public political offices assumes a mentality of having known all about the conflict, and thereby parade their own supposed solution to the conflict on the people. This arrogance of power has made it difficult for the political leadership especially at the State level to effectively reach-out to parties in the conflict particularly the Hausa and Fulani Muslim groups in the state. There is hardly consultation of the different parties by the government, and the hard stance of the state government only worsened the process of conflict management in the state, as groups particularly the Muslim Hausa and Fulani groups see the Governor and his administration as party in the conflict. This gross loss of confidence on the state government by a critical party to the conflict is further eroding the prospects of conflict resolution in Jos.
- v. **Mutual Fear, Anxiety and Apprehension:** what has given rise to the distrust and lack of confidence in the Plateau is the fear, anxiety and apprehension from both parties in the conflict either from the ethnic or religious sides. While the Hausa/Fulani Muslim groups fear marginalization, emasculation and possible encirclement in Jos, the Berom, Anarguta and Afizere as well as other Christian groups fear possible domination and imposition of Islam on them in the city.
- vi. **Commercialization of the Conflict:** the Jos crisis has become the wealth generation source for some elements and parties in the conflict. Parties from both sides are able to easily mobilize funds from their groups for mobilization and conflict. The military and police personnel are also benefiting from the conflict as extra allowances are been paid and some rogue elements amongst them also engage in illicit activities ranging from gun-running, illegal security cover for some parties, etc. Non-governmental organizations, academics and religious leaders are equally benefiting from the conflict in terms of relevance and profit.
- vii. **Externalization of the Conflict:** the identities in conflict especially the religious ones are part of global religious citizenship – Christianity and Islam. The both religions have their roots outside of Nigeria with the major players in these religions non-Nigerians. As

the Jos conflict assumes a more complex and horrific nature, the tendencies is for these external actors to dominate the conflict. Once it gets to this level, local state and non-state actors are likely to play secondary roles in the conflict as the conflict would be given new definition and direction from outside the shores of Nigeria. External conflict actors would find Jos as the fertile ground to increase global anarchy on the existing world order.

- viii. **Preference for Hard Conflict Management:** the Nigerian state in its traditional form is given to the use of force as its main strategy for conflict abatement or regulation. In this form, the soft or non-forcible conflict management is excluded or neglected. It is clear that this approach can hardly resolve the conflict in Jos. The Federal Government has planned to replace the existing Special Task Force composing of the tri-service (army, navy and air force) personnel with Operation Rainbow to be made of both the military and other security services who are to train local youths for community security and hand over to them to keep the peace in their respective communities. This is already generating controversy as the Muslim Hausa and Fulani groups are not in support of the likely security changes in operation. How this plays out is still unfolding.
- ix. **Conspiracy of the National Political Elites:** the Nigerian political elites are the major beneficiaries of the crisis of identity and the politics of identity bedeviling the nation. While there are frequent and recurrent identity-related conflicts in the country particularly in Jos, the political class prefers the use of such identities to build their local political empires or constituencies at the Wards, Local Governments or State levels. Each politician tries to protect his/her turf of influence either by propagating ethnic or religious identity to mobilize support, or does so to consolidate his/her stronghold over the people and his immediate constituency. The inclusion and non-amendment of the indigeneity clause in the Federal Constitution are ways of legitimately consolidating identity politics in the political system by the political elites in Nigeria as identity is a major mobilization variable to gain votes in elections.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

With the plethora of Government's Panels, Commissions, Peace Conferences, etc on the Jos crisis after many years of conflict experience, one has expected a reduction in the level of violent

conflicts in the State. However, the conflict is taking a worst form in terms of weapon-dynamics, tactical operations by actors, criminal mix and above all the politicization of conflict management. It is the politics of conflict management that has increasingly made the conflict intractable and complex with potentials for more carnage.

Addressing the Jos conflict will require a genuine commitment of the political actors at the State and Federal levels to deal with the specific fears, anxieties and apprehensions of the parties in the conflict. It is clear that playing politics with the conflict and using force in its management has been futile and would remain so. The crisis however provides the best opportunity for the Federal Government to be creative and proactive in its approach to managing modern day Nigerian conflicts that have their roots in ancestral or colonial origins. The state in Nigeria must modernize itself to cope with modern challenges as it is obviously difficult to manage modern Nigerian society using colonial or post-colonial strategies.

A major way to modernize is to assume a character of a state with a cosmopolitan attributes whose primary concern is development, revenue generation and good governance for all irrespective of status: citizen, immigrant, religious or ethnic. It is the cosmopolitan character of a new Nigeria state that will have the capacity to remove federal character clauses in its employment, admission and appointments. This character will trickle-down to the state and local governments who will copy-cat the national government thereby reducing the spate of identity-based conflicts and the crass underdevelopment which the society currently suffers.

In the immediate, the Federal Government needs to re-strategize its engagement in managing the Jos conflict. The government needs to use a holistic peacebuilding strategy wherein it brings both its forcible and non-forcible conflict management capacities to manage the crisis in Jos. Doing that will entail allowing the military to provide only the necessary hard security cover for other agencies of government with confidence building capacities and mandate to begin to operate in the Plateau. To de-escalate the conflict, there is need to bring in credible personalities like Dr. Yakubu Gowon, Abdulsalami Abubakar and Chief Olusegun Obasanjo all three past Heads of State to engage the conflicting parties in a series of dialogue. This quick high level intervention will provide the necessary buffer for the parties to commence confidence building amongst themselves that will help in healing, reconciliation and recovery.

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Report of the Workshop

The Centre for Democracy and Development, CDD in collaboration with the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, IPCR and the Open Society Initiative in West Africa, OSIWA has

convened a 2-day '**National Workshop on Citizenship and Indigeneity Conflicts in Nigeria**' on the 8th and 9th February 2011 at the Denis Hotel, in Abuja, FCT. The workshop brought together over 50 human rights activists and experts drawn from the fields of history, sociology, anthropological, political sciences, community members from communities that have experienced indigeneity based conflicts in Nigeria.

While welcoming participants to the workshop, the Country Director of the Open Society Initiative in West Africa, Mr. Dayo Olaide noted that the Workshop was long in coming. He explained that the workshop is convened with the hope of putting an end to the bloodbath in Jos. He recalled how various civil society organizations had held discussions within themselves and with the former National Security Adviser on the vexing issue of the Jos conflict.

Olaide told the participants that although a CIA prediction that Nigeria would disintegrate was roundly rejected by Nigerians; the same report had indicated that the factors likely to pose grave challenges to Nigeria and other developing countries were likely to be a mix of local factors such as corruption, tribalism and ethnic conflicts as now being manifested in Nigeria. Looking at the caliber of participants at the workshop, Mr. Olaide expressed optimism that the recommendations arising from the workshop would be far reaching and would provide a roadmap for the resolution of Citizenship and Indigeneity Conflicts in Nigeria.

On his part, Dr. Joseph Golwa, the Director General of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution noted that the opening of the workshop marked a milestone in the collaboration between the Institute, CDD and OSIWA as well as with other stakeholders on the issues of citizenship, indigeneity and settlership in Nigeria. He argued that the issue is of concern to all Nigerians not only because of the protracted nature of conflict in Jos; but also due to the proliferation of other identity based conflicts such as the *Boko Haram* conflict. He welcomed all participants and looked forward to an interactive workshop that would provide lessons for other Nigerians to learn.

Dr Jibrin Ibrahim the Director of the Centre for Democracy and Development while making his opening remarks noted that the workshop is an important opportunity to promote the partnership in trying to confront the debate over citizenship and indigeneity. He recalled that the Rotimi Constitution Drafting Committee in 1976 reflected on the dominance of the 3 ethnic groups in

Nigeria's political system and sought for a provision that would allow for a more inclusive system hence the introduction of the indigeneity clause in the 1979 Constitution. Not long afterwards, the same clause became a tool to exclude Nigerians from the political space on grounds of indigeneity. He concluded that every state of the federation and every Local Government is affected as we all benefit/suffer from patterns of indigeneship and exclusion. He called for reflection on who is a Nigerian and what such a provision would entail – these are some of the recommendations he hoped would be put forward at the end of the meeting.

The Commandant of the National Defense College who was represented by Mr. Danjuma Aku noted that the College was indeed pleased to participate in such a workshop. He reiterated that resolving the intricate issues surrounding citizenship in Nigeria ought to be the priority of all Nigerian. He therefore commended the organizers of the workshop and wished all participants fruitful deliberations and assured them of the best wishes of the National Defense College.

Professor Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Professor of African Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill while presenting the keynote address titled '*Citizenship and Exclusion in Africa: Indigeneity in Question*' thanked the organizers for convening such a timely workshop. He noted that the ongoing turmoil in Côte d'Ivoire, the Great Lakes Region, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere on this continent can be traced to the question of citizenship and exclusion, as segments of the national population feel excluded from the enjoyment of their full citizenship rights. Since these rights include access to power and those resources needed to ensure decent livelihood and a better future for the youth, the question of citizenship is central to the crisis of the state in postcolonial Africa.

Other papers presented and discussed at the meeting included '*Indigeneity and Belonging in Nigeria from the Pre-Colonial times to 1960*' by Professor Armstrong Adejo; '*Citizenship and Indigeneity in Nigeria – A Constitutional Matter*' by Clement Nwankwo; '*Historical Insights on Plateau Indigenes and the Struggle for Emancipation*' by Professor Monday Mangwat; and '*The Exclusion of minority groups in the Plateau: Uprooting Citizenship Rights*' by Dr. Audu Gambo. '*Reflections on Citizenship -Related Crises in Jos: Finding the Road-Map for Peace*' by Dr. Joseph Golwa, DG Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution; '*Indigeneity and the Bifurcation of Citizenship Rights in Nigeria: The Search for a Political Solution*' by Jibrin

Ibrahim, Ph.D. Director Centre for Democracy and Development, CDD; *'Identity Crisis and the Politics of Conflict Management in Jos, Nigeria'* by Joseph Ochogwu and Geraldine Yop-Kim of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution. The workshop would also feature discussions of case studies from other theatres of citizenship and indigeneity conflicts such as Zangon Kataf by Dr. Toure Kazah-Toure; Aguleri/Umuleri by Professor Okey Ibeanu and Peter Mbah as well as Kano by Ibrahim Muazzam.

The meeting featured high level discussion on the theme, frank and honest discourse as well as recommendations towards the resolution of the crises of citizenship in Nigeria. Participants were drawn from the academia, government agencies, and members of communities affected by such conflicts, especially from Jos as well as the organizers. A communiqué outlining the conclusions and the recommendations of the workshop was drafted, debated, approved and then signed and dispatched to the media and other stakeholders at the end of the meeting.

The next phase of the project involves the following:

1. Following up with paper presenters to revise their presentations and submit.
2. Editing the revised papers
3. Publication of a book of proceedings
4. Engaging stakeholders on issues of citizenship and indigeneity in Nigeria.

Note: the Communique (called Abuja Declaration) and a summary of papers presented are attached.

Workshop Rapportuers:

Idayat Hassan

Nengak Daniel

National Workshop on Citizenship and Indigeneity Conflicts in Nigeria

Date: 8th & 9th February 2011, Denis Hotel, Wuse II Abuja

The Abuja Declaration on Citizenship and Indigeneity Conflicts in Nigeria

Background:

At the base of citizenship and indigeneity conflicts in Nigeria is the question: 'who is a Nigerian with full rights'? The Constitutions conflicting provisions on citizenship and indigeneship has exacerbated this conflict. There are therefore no clear cut guidelines to the states; this is why there are various Local Governments issuing out 'Indigeneship Certificates' to those they consider 'indigenes'; these certificates have often opened doors of opportunity to those who hold them while at the same time excluding 'non-indigenes' from a large chunk of the rights the Constitution grants citizens. Therefore 150 million Nigerians are endowed with citizenship rights, but many of them who are classified as 'non-indigenes' by the state have been left without a base in the State to enjoy these rights

On the part of the civil society and other public institutions/organisations, there have been a number of strategic interventions, as a way of addressing the challenges posed by citizenship and indigeneity: the African Centre for Democratic Governance (AFRIGOV), the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), the Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies, and OSIWA have undertaken projects targeted at addressing the question of citizenship in Nigeria.

It is against this background that the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), with support 2 from the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) convened a „**National Workshop on Citizenship and Indigeneity Conflicts in Nigeria**’ in Abuja, Nigeria from February 8th -9th 2011. The national workshop brought together over 60 human rights activists and experts drawn from the fields of history, sociology, law, anthropology, political science and community leaders from communities that have experienced indigeneity based tension and conflicts. The workshop also benefited from renowned experts like Prof. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja who presented the lead paper by sharing insights and comparative lessons. The national workshop was convened to address the following objectives:

(i) to examine the history, nature, and scope of citizenship and indigeneity conflicts in Nigeria;

(ii) to examine the history, nature, and scope of citizenship and indigeneity conflicts in Plateau State;

(iii) to examine the risks of breakdown of inter-governmental relations in resolving conflict as evident in the Federal/State impasse over Plateau State;

(iv) to develop proactive strategies and action to help resolve conflicts over citizenship and indigeneity in Nigeria.

Observations:

The participants observed as follows:

1. **Weak/Bad Leadership and Governance:** All over the country and across all tiers of government, the resources of the country and taxpayers money are being squandered and misused, without any tangible thing to show for them. Failed promises of politicians, in the face of competition for political spoils, unemployment and all manners of social and economic exclusion have resulted in anxiety, animosity and anger amongst groups and communities.

2. **Constitutional Lacuna:** The gaps in the constitution as they relate to the meaning and rights that are tied to indigeneship and citizenship have become major drivers of conflicts in Nigeria. These gaps weaken the ability of citizens to embark on litigation, and create room for some to undermine the rights of other citizens. While the Constitution as reflected in Chapter III defines a citizen and how to acquire citizenship, it does not make same provision for indigeneity. This has provided a basis for administrative practices by governments at all levels, which undermine inter-ethnic relations.

3. **Harsh Economic Realities:** The steady decline in the economy in the early 1980s and the impact of structural adjustment reforms, and the fierce competition for resources has made politics to become warfare among the political elite. These elite often use clauses of indigeneity and exclusion to further their political goals.

4. **Weak political leadership:** The lack of able and capable leadership to manage diversity and conflict has become a key driver of conflict, which in turn has led to the politicization of conflict management processes. The fraudulent nature of the electoral process that allows for the

emergence of leaders against the will of the people accounts for the slide to both weak and bad governance that the country currently confronts.

5. Military rule and militarism: Prolonged military rule and the culture of militarization have led to an entrenched culture of hate and violence. One of the irony of military rule was that it led to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This has become a language that conflicting parties appropriate in expressing their grievances within the context of citizenship and indigeneity.

6. Small Arms and Light Weapons: The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has become a major threat to national security in Nigeria. Some of the causal factors include the desperate move by politicians to seek power by all means, the vulnerability of the youths due to unemployment and poverty, which has made them to be used as vehicle for perpetrating violence in the country

7. Use of traditional, cultural, religious and public institutions and groups: Traditional institutions, cultural associations and local associational groups, including youths and vigilantes are being used in the perpetration of violent conflicts. Many of these institutions or groups have been mobilized in the name of struggle for justice, freedom, self-determination, religion and ethnic empowerment etc. However the instrumentalisation of these category of people in the fight for justice, spells doom for the country as far as the search for durable peace, security and stability is concerned.

8. Security and Law Enforcement Agencies: As a fall out of the conflicts, the ability of law enforcement agencies to play the role of neutral arbiters is compromised by increasing signs of partisanship in the crisis have encouraged the culture of impunity.

9. Compensation for Victims of Conflicts: The aftermath of conflicts are characterized by lack of compensation for victims and care for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

10. Lack of Political Will: The lack of political will to identify and prosecute culprits/perpetrators has flared tempers and aggravated the conflicts. Religious and ethnic

jingoists who make inflammatory remarks and wage divisive campaigns have not been prosecuted.

11. Government's Panels and Commissions of Inquiry: In many cases, the integrity of government appointed panels and commissions of inquiry to address the crises have been called to question. Hence, many victims of conflicts have lost confidence in the ability of government to resolve the conflicts.

12. The Media: The role of the media as it relates to conflict reportage has fallen short of the expected standards of objectivity, balance and neutrality.

13. Use of Religion and Ethnicity: Conflicts in Nigeria are often manipulated and instrumentalised as a vehicle for mobilization using religion and ethnicity. Increasingly, these conflicts have gathered a life of their own, to the extent that voices from below have now become the drivers of conflicts, thereby displacing the political elites. The scale and intensity of these conflicts are being driven by communities and groups, which constitutes a threat to the stability of the nation

Resolutions:

The key issues for the way forward have to do with (a) confidence-building, (b) inclusive political processes, (c) belonging, (d) integration and (e) intensive campaign for peace through dialogue and mutual appreciation and respect amongst communities (f) accountability and justice with respect to past conflicts. In light of the foregoing the workshop resolved as follows:

To the Federal and State Governments:

(i) Provide a constitutional definition for indigeneity and residency. In addition to these definitions, the framework for acquiring both as well as the rights and responsibilities accruable to both.

(ii) Governments at all levels should create an enabling environment that will promote economic advancement that will attract investment so as to address the challenges of poverty, unemployment, under-employment and youth restiveness or criminality in the country.

(iii) Governments at all levels should ensure the enforcement of the relevant policies and laws on the control of small arms and light weapons to reduce the potency of conflict, which serves as escalating factors for destruction and violence.

(iv) The culture of transparency and accountability as building blocks for good governance should be imbibed by the political class, so as to guarantee the emergence of visionary and capable leadership for the management of diversity.

(v) Security agencies that are charged with the responsibility of protecting the lives and property of citizens should imbibe the spirit of inter-agency cooperation and civil-military relations so as to ensure timely, effective and unbiased response to security threats; they should also be reoriented on how to handle community conflicts.

(vi) School curricula should be redesigned to encourage the teaching of history and civic education with emphasis on what unites Nigerians rather than what divides them.

(vii) Neutral, impartial and objective panels should be set up in all cases where conflicts persist, and reports of such panels and commissions should be carefully considered and implemented with emphasis on investigating and bringing perpetrators of conflicts to book, as a way of checkmating the culture of impunity, within the principle of due process and accountability.

(viii) A multi-media approach should be used in promoting the spirit of "One Nigeria" as it relates to equality in diversity. All state and federal information agencies and departments should buy into the project. Drama, concerts and so on, in local languages should be used to promote this. State and Local Governments summits on the spirit of "One Nigeria" should be promoted.

(ix) Governments at all levels should promote peace building activities in their domain by involving all stakeholders in the process.

Religious Leaders and Institutions:

(i) Should identify instruments and mechanisms within their religions, so as to promote the culture of tolerance and peaceful co-existence in a multi-religious and multi-cultural society.

(ii) Should produce preachers' guide as it relates to ethics that discourages incitement preaching.

(iii) Should guide against the politicization of religion and theologizing of political issues, as well as remain neutral umpires.

Traditional Leaders and Institutions:

(i) Should look into their cultural heritage and produce instruments that enhance peaceful co-existence and the spirit of inclusiveness.

(ii) Should organize exchange visits on mutual cooperation across their neighbours and who chooses to stay in their domain.

(iii) Should remain custodians of their people cultural heritage and shun partisanship in political process.

To Communities and Groups:

(i) Communities and groups should be activists in the promotion of advocacy on peace education.

(ii) Community skills and capacity to dialogue and address conflicts should be built through multi-stakeholder dialogues in the communities.

(iii) Spirit of tolerance and integration should be preached at community levels. Deeper cultural and religious interactions, exchanges; and mutual respect should be encouraged in this light.

To Civil Society and other non-state Actors:

(x) In collaboration with other stakeholders, they should play active roles in fostering and facilitating dialogue among conflicting parties on issues emanating from the problem of citizenship and indigeneity in their various forms and manifestations.

(xi) They should play watch-dog role in mobilizing the citizens to demand transparency and accountability as the pre-condition for good governance, so as to guarantee the emergence of visionary and capable leadership for the management of diversity.

(xii) They should work with communities to develop mechanisms for detecting early warning signs to conflict, and report same to the appropriate or relevant agencies for prompt action.

(xiii) Provide platforms for interaction and advocacy on issues related to residency rights, so as to build inter-communal harmony from the local to the national levels.

(XIV) The media should uphold the principle of objective and balance of reportage of conflict arising from citizenship and indigeneity related issues, and make conscious efforts in their reportage.



