



**THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT**

Reportable

Case no: 169/2020

In the matter between:

**THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS
DISTRICT MANAGER OF OPERATIONS,
JOHANNESBURG REGIONAL OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS
OFFICE MANAGER,
JOHANNESBURG REGIONAL OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS**

FIRST APPELLANT

SECOND APPELLANT

THIRD APPELLANT

FOURTH APPELLANT

And

**JOSEPH EMMANUEL JOSE
JONATHAN DIABAKA “JUNIOR”**

FIRST RESPONDENT

SECOND RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: *The Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Jose and Another*
(169/2020) [2020] ZASCA 152 (25 November 2020)

Coram: PONNAN, CACHALIA and NICHOLLS JJA and MATOJANE and POYO-DLWATI AJJA

Heard: 11 November 2020

Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties' representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal website and release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10:00 am on 25 November 2020.

Summary: South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 – clear that all four requirements in s 4(3) met – no reason to remit matter to decision-maker.

ORDER

On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (Yacoob J sitting as court of first instance): judgment reported *sub nom Jose and Another v The Minister of Home Affairs and Others* 2019 (4) SA 597 (GP)

The appeal is dismissed with costs, to be paid on the scale as between attorney and client after 2 August 2020, such costs to include those consequent upon the employment of two counsel.

JUDGMENT

Ponnan JA and Matojane AJA (Cachalia and Nicholls JJA and Poyo-Dlwati AJA concurring)

[1] This case is about citizenship. According to political theorist and philosopher, Hannah Arendt: '[c]itizenship is more fundamental than civil rights'.¹ 'For Arendt, the issue was not simply a question of statelessness, but one of common humanity, and the responsibility we have to one another as human beings who share the world in common. As long as we live in a world that is territorially organized into national states, a stateless person "is not simply expelled from one country" they are "expelled from humanity."'"²

[2] The appeal arises from the refusal by the first to fourth appellants,³ collectively referred to as the Department of Home Affairs (the DHA)), to grant the respondents, the Jose brothers, South African citizenship in terms of s 4(3) of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 (the Citizenship Act).

¹ H Arendt *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1978) at 296-7. Hannah Arendt, a German Jew, was stateless for nearly 20 years before receiving citizenship in the United States in 1951.

² Professor S R Hill 'American Citizenship' (4 November 2018) available at: <https://medium.com/quote-of-the-week/arendt-on-citizenship-d9e23beb4aad>.

³ The first appellant is the Minister of Home Affairs, the second appellant is the Director General of the Department of Home Affairs, the third appellant is the District Manager of Operations in the Regional Office of the Department of Home Affairs and the fourth appellant is the Office Manager in the Johannesburg Regional Office of the Department of Home Affairs.

[3] Section 4(3) of the Citizenship Act provides:

‘A child born in the Republic of parents who are not South African citizens or who have not been admitted into the Republic for permanent residence, qualifies to apply for South African citizenship upon becoming a major if –

- (a) he or she has lived in the Republic from the date of his or her birth to the date of becoming a major;
- (b) his or her birth has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1992 (Act No. 51 of 1992).’

[4] The section thus provides for citizenship to be granted to a child who meets four requirements, namely, the child must have:

- (i) been born in South Africa;
- (ii) been born of parents who are not South African citizens and who have not been admitted into the Republic for permanent residence;
- (iii) lived in the Republic from the date of his or her birth to the date of becoming a major; and
- (iv) had his or her birth registered in terms of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992.

[5] Section 1 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act defines ‘registration’ of a birth as ‘registration thereof mentioned in section 5’. Section 5, in turn, provides:

‘Custody of records and registration of births and deaths

- (1) The Director-General shall be the custodian of all –
 - (a) documents relating to births and deaths required to be furnished under this Act or any other law; and
 - (b) records of any births and deaths preserved, prior to the commencement of this Act, in terms of the Acts repealed by this Act.

(2) Particulars obtained from the documents referred to in subsection (1)(a) shall be included in the population register and such inclusion is the registration of the births and deaths concerned.

(3) In the case of a non-South African citizen who sojourns temporarily in the Republic, particulars obtained from documents mentioned in subsection (1)(a) shall not be included in the population register and the issuing of a certificate in respect of such particulars is the registration thereof.’

[6] The parents of the respondents are Angolan citizens, who fled that country in 1995 and sought asylum in South Africa. The first respondent, Joseph Emmanuel Jose (Joseph), was born on 12 February 1996 and the second respondent, Jonathan Diabaka “Junior” (Junior), was born on 28 August 1997. Both, who were born in Coronation Hospital (now the Rahima Moosa Mother and Child Hospital), have lived in South Africa their entire lives.

[7] They, together with their parents, were granted refugee status in 1997 under the Refugees Act 130 of 1998. That endured until January 2014, when they were informed by the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs that pursuant to a repatriation process initiated by the South African government their refugee status had been withdrawn. Joseph was then 17 years old and Junior 16. Both were learners at Barnato Park High School. In August 2013, they were informed by the DHA that their refugee permits would not be renewed and that they should call on the Angolan Embassy for further information. At the Angolan Embassy, they were told that in order for them to remain lawfully in South Africa, they had to apply for Angolan passports, failing which they faced ‘repatriation’.

[8] As Joseph, who deposed to the founding affidavit, put it: ‘[a]fter obtaining this information, it was clear that the option presented to my family was a stark one, for me and my brothers in particular’. Both accordingly felt compelled to apply for Angolan passports via the Angolan Embassy in South Africa. They did so because, as they explained, it was the only option available to them to lawfully remain in South Africa, the place that they regarded as their home. At the time they were in high school and needed to regularise their stay in South Africa in order to continue with their schooling. Junior’s passport was issued on 28 December 2013. Joseph’s two days later.

[9] Joseph states: ‘[b]eing “repatriated” to Angola would be no “return” to a country of origin for either me or my brothers. It would be a forced removal from our country of birth and home country to a foreign land’. The respondents have never been to Angola. They have no family there and know little about Angola or the way of life in that country. Neither speaks any Portuguese. Each speaks only a little Lingala.

[10] When the respondents thereafter experienced difficulty in obtaining identity documents from the DHA, they approached Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) for assistance. LHR advised them that they were eligible to apply for citizenship in terms of s 4(3) of the Citizenship Act. However, by August 2017, all efforts to obtain citizenship had come to nought. The respondents accordingly applied to the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria for an order in the following terms:

- ‘1. The First Respondent (alternatively the First to Fourth Respondents) are ordered within 10 (ten) days of the granting of this order to grant each of the Applicants South African Citizenship in terms of section 4(3) of the South African Citizenship Act No 88 of 1995;

2. Only to the extent necessary:
 - 2.1 The failure of the First Respondent (alternatively the First to Fourth Respondents) to make a decision in respect of the Applicants' applications for citizenship in terms of section 4(3) of the South African Citizenship Act No 88 of 1995 (made by way of affidavit and sent to the Respondents by email on 25 August 2016 and 24 October 2016 respectively) [is] reviewed and set aside; and/or
 - 2.2 Any decision made by any of the Respondents to refuse either of the Applicants' above mentioned applications for citizenship is reviewed and set aside.'

[11] The application succeeded with costs. On 15 March 2019 Yacoob J ordered the first appellant, the Minister of Home Affairs (the Minister) 'to grant the applications of each of the applicants for South African citizenship in terms of section 4(3) of the Citizenship Act, 88 of 1995, within 10 days of this order'.

[12] On 23 August 2019, the learned judge granted leave to the DHA to appeal to this Court 'only on the question whether it was competent in the particular circumstances of this case to order the Minister to grant (as opposed to consider) the applicants' applications for citizenship.'

[13] It is so that courts would almost always refer matters back to enable the decision-maker to make a fresh decision. Occasionally, however, a court makes the decision itself.⁴ This is such a case.

[14] It has not been considered necessary to do more than provide a terse summary of the respondents' case. On those allegations, the first three requirements of s 4(3) of the Citizenship Act were plainly met. Insofar as the

⁴ *Gauteng Gambling Board v Silverstar Development Ltd and Others* [2005] ZASCA 19 para 1.

fourth requirement is concerned, s 4(3) applies to a child whose birth has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Births and Deaths Registration Act. The registration of a birth can occur both in respect of a child born to South African citizens as well as non-South African citizens. Where the parents are South African citizens, the particulars are included in the population register in terms of s 5(2) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act. Where they are not, according to s 5(3), ‘the issuing of a certificate in respect of such particulars is the registration thereof’.

[15] Certificates of birth were issued by the DHA for the respondents. The birth certificate for Joseph was issued on 6 October 1997 and for Junior on 17 June 1999. As s 5(3) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act makes clear, the issuing of these certificates ‘is the registration’ of their births. In the circumstances, both also satisfied the fourth requirement of s 4(3) of the Citizenship Act.

[16] That notwithstanding, the DHA argues that this Court should uphold the appeal and remit the matter to the Minister ‘for consideration of the Respondents’ applications for citizenship, *de novo*’. But, what precisely needs to be considered *de novo* is not made clear.

[17] The DHA seeks to suggest that the respondents never in fact applied for citizenship because they ‘failed to make use of the proper application forms’. This contention is obviously cynical and self-serving. The Minister has failed to prescribe any application forms for s 4(3) applications. In *Minister of Home Affairs*

v Ali and Others, this Court directed the Minister to do so.⁵ That has still not been done.⁶ Given the absence then (and even now) of any proper application form, both respondents applied for citizenship on affidavit. The further contention of the DHA is that it ‘has no records of these two applications’. However, that is plainly disingenuous. On 15 November 2016 the DHA wrote to Joseph’s attorney requesting certain information ‘with reference to your client’s application for citizenship’. In response to Junior’s application, the DHA expressed the view that certain (undisclosed) procedures were not followed when his birth was registered.

[18] The DHA has however had every opportunity in this application to fully investigate and respond to the allegations raised by the respondents. The response in the answering affidavit was: ‘the allegations herein contained are, for purposes of this application, admitted’. It was sought to be suggested that this constitutes a conditional admission. The argument, so it seems, is that the allegations were admitted solely for the purposes of this application. That is plainly untenable. The response was to factual allegations that had been made under oath. Those allegations are either true or they are not. They could thus hardly have been admitted only for the purposes of this application.

[19] The DHA had at its disposal the full machinery of the State, if those allegations could have been disputed, one imagines they would have been. Certainly, the response is not such as to raise a real, genuine or *bona fide* dispute of fact.⁷ A real, genuine and *bona fide* dispute of fact can only be said to arise where

⁵ *Minister of Home Affairs v Ali and Others* [2018] ZASCA 169; 2019 (2) SA 396 (SCA).

⁶ A draft set of regulations was published for comment on 24 July 2020 in GN R 815, GG 43551.

⁷ *Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd* [1984] 2 All SA 366 (A); 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E-635C.

the party who purports to raise the dispute has seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact said to be disputed. As it was put in *Wightman t/a J W Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another*:

‘When the facts averred are such that the disputing party must necessarily possess knowledge of them and be able to provide an answer (or countervailing evidence) if they be not true or accurate but, instead of doing so, rests his case on a bare or ambiguous denial the court will generally have difficulty in finding that the test is satisfied.’⁸

[20] The test alluded to in *Wightman* is to the effect that an applicant who seeks final relief on motion must in the event of conflict, accept the version set up by his opponent unless the latter’s allegations are, in the opinion of the court, not such as to raise a real, genuine or *bona fide* dispute of fact or are so far-fetched or clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers.⁹ It follows that the allegations raised by the respondents have not on genuine and *bona fide* grounds been disputed and must thus carry the day.

[21] In interpreting s 4(3) of the Citizenship Act, this Court held in *Ali* that the section applied even to those persons – like the respondents – who were born prior to the section coming into operation on 1 January 2013.¹⁰ The judgment records:

‘Before us, counsel for the Minister conceded that the respondents complied with all the jurisdictional requirements in s 4(3) of the Act and qualify to be granted citizenship by naturalisation in terms of the Act. Counsel further conceded that s 4(3) of the Act is a self-standing section and need not be read or interpreted in conjunction with s 5 of the Act. I consider

⁸ *Wightman t/a J W Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another* [2008] ZASCA 6; [2008] 2 All SA 512 (SCA); 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) para 13.

⁹ *Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd* [1984] ZASCA 51; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E-635C.

¹⁰ *Minister of Home Affairs v Ali* para 21.

these concessions to have been properly made. In addition he conceded that the argument based on retrospectivity was unsound.’¹¹

[22] Recently, the Constitutional Court had occasion in *Chisuse and Others v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs and Another*,¹² to consider the constitutionality of ss 2(1)(a) and (b) of the Citizenship Act. The Court recognised that whilst the doctrine of the separation of powers must be considered, that does not mean that there may not be cases in which a court may need to give directions to the Executive. After referring to *Mohamed*,¹³ *Fose*¹⁴ and *Mwelase*,¹⁵ the Court stated (at para 88):

‘These authorities must also find application in determining the appropriate relief in a case dealing with citizenship. The reason for this is that citizenship does not depend on a discretionary decision; rather, it constitutes a question of law. The amended Citizenship Act does not require the Department of Home Affairs to consider any public interest when deciding whether or not to recognise a person’s citizenship. Instead, if the requisite conditions to acquire citizenship are satisfied, the Department of Home Affairs is required to recognise this citizenship and proceed with the concomitant administrative procedures, without any further consideration.’

[23] In that matter the Constitutional Court also held (at paras 84 and 90):

‘It bears repeating that the Department of Home Affairs has consistently failed to recognise the applicants’ citizenship and give effect to the rights emanating from it, without providing adequate reasons for this denial in a manner consistent with the High Court’s and this Court’s orders and procedural requirements. Furthermore, at the hearing, the respondents conceded to an interpretation of the amended Citizenship Act that would recognise the applicants as citizens, but

¹¹ *Minister of Home Affairs v Ali* para 18.

¹² *Chisuse and Others v Director-General, Department of Home Affairs and Another* [2020] ZACC 20; 2020 (10) BCLR 1173 (CC); 2020 (6) SA 14 (CC).

¹³ *Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa (Society for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in South Africa intervening)* 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC); 2001 (7) BCLR 685 (CC) para 71.

¹⁴ *Fose v Minister of Safety and Security* 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC); 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) para 19.

¹⁵ *Mwelase v Director-General, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform* [2019] ZACC 30; 2019 (6) SA 597 (CC); 2019 (11) BCLR 1358 (CC) para 49.

continued to oppose the applicants' submissions on the basis of factual evidence which is inadmissible before this Court. In view of these considerations, it is evident that there is a reasonable apprehension that the respondents may continue to hinder the applicants' quest for citizenship. It is, therefore, in the interest of justice that the applicants should not be further impeded in the enjoyment of their rights by the respondents' conduct.

...

In the circumstances, I believe there are sufficient grounds to confirm the High Court's order, which directs the Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs to issue the necessary documents recognising the first and the third to fifth applicants' citizenship as soon as possible. The applicants have already suffered greatly by the dilatory conduct of the respondents and there is no reason why they should continue to be at their mercy.'

[24] Accordingly, the suggestion that the matter has to be remitted to the Minister is purposeless, given that it is already absolutely clear that the respondents meet all four requirements contained in s 4(3) of the Citizenship Act. In truth, it is inappropriate for the DHA to persist in it. At the level of fact, the appeal is therefore contrived and serves no useful purpose.

[25] The appeal is also unsustainable as a matter of law. Although the Constitutional Court in *Chisuse* was dealing with a different section of the Citizenship Act, the principle that it firmly established is that 'citizenship does not depend on a discretionary decision; rather, it constitutes a question of law'. It proceeded in that matter to declare four persons to be South African citizens and directed the Director-General to attend to the necessary formalities.

[26] The conduct of the DHA consigns the respondents to remain as non-citizens in the only country they have ever known from birth:

‘Citizenship is not just a legal status. It goes to the core of a person’s identity, their sense of belonging in a community and, where xenophobia is a lived reality, to their security of person. Deprivation of, or interference with, a person’s citizenship status affects their private and family life, their choices as to where they can call home, start jobs, enrol in schools and form part of a community, as well as their ability to fully participate in the political sphere and exercise freedom of movement.’¹⁶

This is, accordingly, not the kind of matter for technical point-taking; particularly technical points without legal merit.

[27] It follows that the appeal must fail. Costs, including those of two counsel, must follow the result. The remaining question is the scale of the costs.

[28] In heads of argument filed on behalf of the respondents it was stated:

‘The *Chisuse* judgment makes utterly clear that whatever merit the Department might have thought its appeal held, it is now unsustainable. We therefore invite the Department to, within two weeks, withdraw its appeal and tender the costs on a party and party scale, including the costs of two counsel.

In the event that the Department does not do so, we ask this Court:

- (i) To direct that costs be paid on an attorney-client scale, including the costs of two counsel; and
- (ii) To consider directing that the officials who are responsible for directing that this appeal be persisted with following receipt of these heads of argument show cause why they should not personally have to pay the costs concerned.’ (Emphasis supplied.)

[29] The DHA argues that inasmuch as: (i) the appeal is before us with the leave of the high court; (ii) the high court formed the view that there are reasonable prospects of success in the appeal and that the appeal is deserving of the attention

¹⁶ *Chisuse v Minister of Home Affairs* para 28.

of this Court; and (iii) there is no conduct on their part, which is deserving of censure, a punitive costs order is unwarranted. What prompted Yacoob J to grant leave is the following:

‘However, it is clear that, since the Supreme Court of Appeal was not called upon to deal with the issue of the relief granted in the *Ali* case, and whether it may also have been appropriate to order the Minister to simply grant the applications for citizenship, there are conflicting High Court judgments on exactly the same issue, that is, whether a decision on an application in terms of section 4(3) of the Citizenship Act, where all the relevant facts have been established, requires the exercise of judicial deference. It is not clear whether the requirements had been clearly established in the *Ali* matter but I accept that there is a difference in approach between the two Courts and that it is in the public interest and the interests of justice for the Supreme Court of Appeal to determine that difference.’

[30] In *Ali*, the high court (per Wille AJ) took the view that:

‘The court must not be seen to usurp and undermine the function of the respondents. The applicants contend for an order that they be granted citizenship by the respondents in terms of s 4(3) of the Act. . . In my view, for this court to direct the respondents to grant to the applicant’s citizenship in terms of s 4(3) of the Act, would amount to stepping into the “arena” of the respondents and would amount to judicial overreach.’¹⁷

The high court in *Ali* was thus of the view that an order of the kind that issued by Yacoob J amounted to judicial overreach. *Chisuse* has since put the issue to rest. In *Chisuse*, the Constitutional Court confirmed the high court’s order, which had directed the DHA to issue the necessary documents recognising the applicants’ citizenship.

[31] The judgment of the Constitutional Court was delivered on 22 July 2020. By that stage the appellants had already filed heads of argument. Understandably, they

¹⁷ *Ali and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Another* [2017] ZAWCHC 94; 2018 (1) SA 633 (WCC) para 13.

then persisted with the point. But that ought to have changed with the delivery of the Constitutional Court's judgment. Even, assuming that they were not immediately aware of the judgment, from the time that the respondents filed their heads of argument on 3 August 2020 they were on notice. The DHA, however, continued as if nothing had changed and took no steps to limit the incurring of further costs. Plainly, it was obliged to have reconsidered its position, which it failed to do. To borrow from *Madibeng Local Municipality v Public Investment Corporation Ltd*,¹⁸ the conduct of the DHA was 'beyond the pale'. Plasket AJA added:

'As an organ of state, it is required to act ethically, and has failed dismally to do so in this matter. Litigation, said Harms DP in *Cadac (Pty) Ltd v Weber-Stephen Products Co & others*, "is not a game"; organs of state should act as role models of propriety; and they may not behave in an unconscionable manner.'

In that, the DHA failed.

[32] As it was put by the Constitutional Court in *Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank*:

'... The punitive costs mechanism exists to counteract reprehensible behaviour on the part of a litigant. As explained by this Court in *Eskom*, the usual costs order on a scale as between party and party is theoretically meant to ensure that the successful party is not left "out of pocket" in respect of expenses incurred by them in the litigation. Almost invariably, however, a costs order on a party and party scale will be insufficient to cover all the expenses incurred by the successful party in the litigation. An award of punitive costs on an attorney and client scale may be warranted in circumstances where it would be unfair to expect a party to bear any of the costs occasioned by litigation.

¹⁸ *Madibeng Local Municipality v Public Investment Corporation Ltd* [2018] ZASCA 93; 2018 (6) SA 55 (SCA) para 30.

The question whether a party should bear the full brunt of a costs order on an attorney and own client scale must be answered with reference to what would be just and equitable in the circumstances of a particular case. A court is bound to secure a just and fair outcome.

More than 100 years ago, Innes CJ stated the principle that costs on an attorney and client scale are awarded when a court wishes to mark its disapproval of the conduct of a litigant. Since then this principle has been endorsed and applied in a long line of cases and remains applicable. Over the years, courts have awarded costs on an attorney and client scale to mark their disapproval of fraudulent, dishonest or *mala fides* (bad faith) conduct; vexatious conduct; and conduct that amounts to an abuse of the process of court.¹⁹

[33] Here, it would be unfair to expect the respondents to bear any of the costs occasioned by the appeal after 3 August 2020. An award of costs on an attorney and client scale from that date onwards is warranted. There is a further consideration: courts of appeal often have to deal with congested court rolls. Their time and resources should be spent on the determination of real disputes. By persisting in an obviously unmeritorious appeal, the DHA has denied litigants who are truly deserving of the attention of this Court from having their matters heard.

[34] The Constitutional Court has affirmed the principle that a public official who acts in a representative capacity may be ordered to pay costs out of their own pockets in certain circumstances.²⁰ The source of a court's power to impose personal costs orders against public officials is the Constitution, which requires public officials to be accountable and observe appropriate standards in litigation. In *South African Social Security Agency and Another v Minister of Social Development and Others*, the Constitutional Court held:

¹⁹ *Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank* [2019] ZACC 29; 2019 (9) BCLR 1113 (CC); 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) paras 221-223.


²⁰ *Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank* para 153.

‘It is now settled that public officials who are acting in a representative capacity may be ordered to pay costs out of their own pockets, under specified circumstances. Personal liability for costs would, for example, arise where a public official is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in conducting litigation.’²¹

We are by no means satisfied that those requirements are met in this case.

[35] In the result, the following order is made:

The appeal is dismissed with costs, to be paid on the scale as between attorney and client after 2 August 2020, such costs to include those consequent upon the employment of two counsel.



V M PONNAN
JUDGE OF APPEAL



K MATOJANE
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL

²¹ *South African Social Security Agency and Another v Minister of Social Development and Others* [2018] ZACC 26; 2018 (10) BCLR 1291 (CC) para 37.

Appearances

For appellants: G Bofilatos SC (with him M Moropa)

Instructed by: The State Attorneys, Pretoria
The State Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For respondents: S Budlender SC (with him T Mosikili)

Instructed by: Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Incorporated,
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